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ABSTRACT 
 
The provocation for this dissertation is a brief contention: aging is not synonymous with 
disease.  This contention is a corrective reaction to the pervasive sensibility that aging is 
a disease, and which therefore casts the character of time’s passing as a process of 
destruction.  The upshot of this corrosive sensibility is that we are not aging well.  
Guided both by the belief that we can reconstruct the meaning of time’s passing and an 
ameliorative sensibility to heal human suffering, the dissertation offers an alternative, 
more fruitful understanding of aging in which the character of time changes from a 
process of destruction into one of creative individual genesis.  This is how we should 
experience time as time passes.  Living in this way is an achievement:  It is the activity 
of ferreting out the best possible ways in which to live so that life is deep and robust 
with concatenated meaning.  
This philosophical diagnosis of aging is situated within two philosophical 
traditions—first, existentialism and, second and primarily, the pragmatism of classical 
American philosophers.  The deceptively simple insights from existentialism at work in 
the dissertation are this: that we are ontologically free to choose our own persons and 
that our freedom resides in the ever-present possible.  The next philosophical move that 
is made is the pragmatic turn: that, with a sense that there is always something better, we 
attend to how it is that we press into our possibilities by listening to and heeding 
experience so that we adapt and grow as individuals.   
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Stop this day and night with me and you shall possess the origin of all poems 
  You shall possess the good of the earth and sun, (there are millions of suns left,) 
  You shall no longer take things at second or third hand, nor look through the  
eyes of the dead, nor feed on the specters in books, 
  You shall not look through my eyes either, nor take things from me, 
  You shall listen to all sides and filter them from your self. 
Walt Whitman, “Song of Myself” part 2.32-41 
The provocation for this dissertation is a brief contention: aging is not synonymous with 
disease.  This contention is a corrective reaction to the pervasive sensibility that aging is 
a disease, and which therefore casts the character of time’s passing as a process of 
destruction.  The upshot of this corrosive sensibility is that we are not aging well; we 
waste time, we squander time, we lose time decaying and dying when all the while we 
could be living.  This dissertation thus aims to reconstruct the meaning of time so that its 
passing means creative genesis, not destruction.  Its aim is to show how we might use 
the time that we have so that time itself is pedagogical, so that the way in which we age 
speaks and provides nourishment for continuous human growth.   
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HISTORICALLY SITUATING THE WORK:  CLASSICAL AMERICAN THOUGHT 
AND TRYING AS AN ONTOLOGY 
This philosophical diagnosis of aging is situated within two philosophical traditions—
first, existentialism and, second and primarily, the pragmatism of classical American 
philosophers.  The deceptively simple insights from existentialism at work in the 
dissertation are this: that we are ontologically free to choose our own persons and that 
our freedom resides in the ever-present possible.  The next philosophical move that is 
made is the pragmatic turn: that, with a sense that there is always something better, we 
attend to how it is that we press into our possibilities by listening to and heeding 
experience so that we adapt and grow as individuals.   
According to classical American thought, intelligibility comes from inside 
individual experience: it is context that shapes philosophical inquiry.  Novel experiences 
are generated by novel circumstances—by the “push and press of the cosmos,” as 
William James writes (“Present Dilemma” 362).  Classical American philosophy 
emphasizes the need for a continuing dialectic between experience and reflection so that 
the meaning of our experiences is continually transformed.  Thus, classical American 
thought is best understood as a pedagogy of how to take the world into our lives.   
Like classical American philosophy itself, the dissertation takes for its point of 
departure the work of Immanuel Kant.  Kant reframed the epistemological debate 
between the rationalists and the empiricists by asking not, as the proponents of these 
approaches asked, how we can bring ourselves to know the world, but by asking how it 
is that the world comes to be known by us.  Contra Locke, says Kant, we are not passive 
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tabula rasas on which the world writes, and, contra Descartes, we cannot comprehend 
with reason a reality outside of our own experience.  According to Kant, human beings 
interpret the world: we are the arbiters of meaning.  Crucially, then, for this dissertation, 
time depends on the human being: time is a human construct.     
Where both classical American philosophy and the dissertation depart from Kant, 
however, is that, according to Kant, there is only one way in which we interpret the 
world.  In contrast, according to classical American philosophers such as William James 
and John Dewey, experience does not have—and nor does it need—the certainty of a 
universal structure.  Instead, the world is fundamentally uncertain.  There is more than 
one way to conceptualize the world:  We unceasingly interpret superabundant 
phenomena in the context of the practical concreteness of our own experience.  
Crucially—and this is key—our continuous interpretation means that we are bound in an 
ontology of trying, of trying to make things “work,” where “work” means that we live in 
the world in such a way that the flow of time is at its best is a process of adjustment, of 
ontological  amelioration, a process of spiritual growth.  
AGING AND OUR EXPERIENCE OF TIME’S PASSING 
If, following Kant, time is a human construct, then one of the questions at the heart of 
the dissertation is how does time go by for us?  This, indeed, is what aging means.  The 
character of aging is of our own construction.  The work thus explores both how we 
experience time as time passes and how we should experience time as time passes.   
Historical discussions of aging have traditionally centered on two major themes, 
including, first, the increased wisdom of the elderly, and, second, the physical and 
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mental decline of the elderly.  To wit, we are fundamentally ambivalent about time’s 
passing:  It is in time that we learn and grow, but it is also in time that we forget and 
decay.    However, what becomes salient in this project is the idea that aging can cut 
much deeper than the more obvious manifestations of decay:  Aging can be an 
ontological disease that eliminates novelty and possibility—spiritual nutrition—from our 
lives.  Thus, following a review in Chapter II of the two major historical themes of 
aging, aging that brings wisdom and aging that brings decrepitude, in philosophical 
exposition and in other forms of literature, Chapter III articulates the deadly ontological 
implications of aging when it is experienced as a withdrawal from time.   
Guided both by the belief that we can reconstruct the meaning of time’s passing and 
an ameliorative sensibility to heal human suffering, the dissertation offers an alternative, 
more fruitful understanding of aging in which the character of time changes from a 
process of destruction into one of creative individual genesis.  This is how we should 
experience time as time passes.    Living in this way is an achievement:  It is the activity 
of ferreting out the best possible ways in which to live so that life is deep and robust 
with concatenated meaning.  
While ontological inanition may pose a problem for everyone, young and old, there 
is, however, a danger particular to those in advanced age.  As we enter advanced age, 
time becomes obstreperous, and death, aging’s embodied finale, is palpable.  This 
prospect of a soon-approaching death, which culminates in either oblivion or some form 
of immortality, profoundly affects our living, especially in later years.  Chapter IV thus 
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explores in depth the ways in which this prospect of death affects our living; the chapter 
then ventures recommendations for the way it should and should not affect our living.  
The grave, potential pragmatic problem with death’s effect on living is this:  As we 
grow older, many experience their lives as a preparation for death and, in religious 
traditions, rebirth into an eternal afterlife.  However, valuing our experiences only 
insofar as they are part of an end, as part of an eschatology, constitutes a withdrawal 
from experience.  That is, if we experience life as if it consists of bits and pieces of a 
determinate trajectory, the meaning of our experiences is circumscribed.  Death, 
whatever it amounts to, becomes a sterile metaphor of explanation of the events in our 
lives.  Death is not the only event that gives our lives meaning!  This is the optimistic 
message; for, even if death does mean oblivion and the end of embodied experience, 
there is reason enough to nurture a deep and abiding hope that each day of a life in time 
can be part of a textured journey worth having, no matter the final outcome. 
Finally, after examining and reflecting on our experience of aging, Chapter V 
applies that work to policies that concern the aged.  It is argued that the sensibility that 
guides the programs that take care of older adults in the community should be one of 
hospitality.  Hospitality is the core characteristic of the hospice program, meant to 
provide spiritual care for the dying.  It is argued that hospitality in other settings may 
also nourish an aging experienced as growth and thus supplement the kind of care for the 
aged already in place, too narrowly conceived as simply a matter of retarding mental and 
physical degeneration and forestalling death.      
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The work itself fills a tremendous gap in philosophical literature:  Only one work 
explicitly addresses aging within the discipline of philosophy—Simone de Beauvoir's 
The Coming of Age (1970).  Beauvoir maintains that aging is a process of degeneration, 
and her tome is dark and lachrymose.  The attitude of the message here, in great contrast, 
is, in the tradition of classical American philosophy and pragmatism,  melioristic, which, 
in the words of John J. McDermott, “acknowledges both sin and possibility” (Drama 
157); and the message is that, while many aspects of old age may indeed merit 
lamentation, some aspects should merit celebration.  Every moment that time passes, 
even in old age, is an opportunity to live deeply. 
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CHAPTER II 
OLD AGE: PHILOSOPHICAL AND LITERARY  
METAPHORS OF EXPERIENCE 
 
Warnings to avoid generalizing attitudes toward old age are numerous.  Generalizations 
are fraught with caveats, and indeed much historical scholarship suggests that opinions 
about older people throughout history cover a wide range.  However, what is striking 
about the portrayal of aging in philosophical exposition and in other forms of literature 
are the broad continuities.  Cultural and structural forces, including the recent gains in 
life expectancy, have shaped our understandings of senescence, and, to be sure, the 
experience of aging is intensely singular—the experience of my aging is quite poignantly 
like no one else’s.  However, there are common metaphors of the manifestations of 
aging that transcend space and time.  Aging, like birth and death, like illness and disease, 
like beauty and love, like so many perplexing events we struggle throughout our lives to 
understand through study, reflection, and through dialogue with others, participates in 
both the universal and the unique.  The fact is that, from the moment of conception, we 
all age.  There is a feeling of radical singleness in individual experience, but we come 
together when the fringes of our experience overlap, and it is in this overlap that we 
gather the universal.  The universals of shared experience soften the existential shock 
and portentous meaning of singular experience.  Friend, you say, tell me what it is like to 
grow older.  So, too, Socrates asks Cephalus on the banks of the Piraeus, friend, tell me 
what it is like to be older.  Socrates queries,    
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I enjoy talking with the very aged.  For to my thinking we have to learn of them 
as it were from wayfarers who have preceded us on a road which we too, it may 
be, must sometimes fare—what it is like.  Is it rough and hard-going or easy 
and pleasant to travel?  And so now I would fain learn of you what you think of 
this thing, now that your time has come to it, the thing that poets call ‘the 
threshold of old age.’ Is it a hard part of life to bear or what report have you to 
make of it?  (Republic line 328e)   
Cephalus’ response is indeed one of the most studied philosophical descriptions of 
aging of our time.  Moreover, his response is characteristic of one of the two main and 
quite contrary portrayals of the elderly in the Western philosophical tradition, each of 
which has paradoxically existed alongside each other.  Interestingly, the most notable 
proponents of the two portrayals—Plato and Aristotle—are famous arch-rivals.  The 
deep and abiding concern of philosophers is wisdom; it is thus not surprising that Plato 
and Aristotle, along with other philosophers, have traditionally occupied themselves 
with aging’s effects on mental capability, character, and the body insofar as it affects 
mental capability.  Their two portrayals are diametrical: quite simply, Plato asserts that 
age ushers in wisdom, Aristotle, mental and physical decrepitude.  Indeed, Plato’s 
picture of aging is in places so rosy that commentators often cast Plato as the sentimental 
idealist whose utopian vision for the elderly is either, they suspect, a socio-political 
comment on or a retreat from reality. Aristotle’s picture of aging, at the other extreme, is 
so shockingly callous and pessimistic that we all at the very least hope he did not get it 
right either.    
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Perhaps, however, the relevant concern is not who got it right, Plato or Aristotle; the 
relevant concern is rather how these vertebral stands of thought interweave to form the 
cacophonic texture of our experience of what it means to grow older.  Plato and 
Aristotle’s contrasting portrayals of aging, far from being burlesque caricatures, are both 
deeply rooted in the real indeed.  As Ronald Blythe writes in his acclaimed series of 
memoirs recorded in his The View in Winter: Reflections on Old Age,  
It is the nature of old men and women to become their own confessors, poets, 
philosophers, apologists and story-tellers.  My method, if method it can be 
called, in listening to a few of them, some friends, some strangers, was to hear 
what they had to say with an ear which had been mostly informed by what 
someone called the “low-lying literature of old age.”  No single conclusion can 
be deduced for them or it.  Old age is full of death and full of life.  It is a 
tolerable achievement and it is a disaster.  It transcends desire and it taunts it.  It 
is long enough and it is far from being long enough . . . .  (29)   
It is in this spirit of rich contrariety, too, that Ralph Waldo Emerson composed the 
following two diary entries: 
June 1864 
Old age brings along with its uglinesses the comfort that you will soon be 
out of it,—which ought to be a substantial relief to such discontented 
pendulums as we are.  To be out of the war, out of debt, out of the drouth, out 
of the blues, out of the dentist’s hands, out of the second thoughts, 
mortifications, and remorses that inflict such twinges and shooting pains,—out 
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of the next winter, and the high prices, and company below your ambition,—
surely these are soothing hints.  And, harbinger of this, what an alleviator is 
sleep, which muzzles all these dogs for me every day?  (404) 
Alas!  But—in the same month of the same year, he shares the revelation that, 
June 1864 
   Within, I do not find wrinkles and used heart, but unspent youth.  (404) 
Thus, as we grow older from minute to minute, month to month, from decade to decade, 
the sensibility that captures the contours of our experience is deep ambivalence.  Is aging 
the life-affirming process of cultivating wisdom, or is it a death march to “out of it”?   
Emerson and Blythe answer that it is both of these.   
We now briefly trace both of themes of aging—aging as wisdom and aging as 
decrepitude—separately through history, from their beginnings in the prehistoric world, 
as they reach their most explicit thematic philosophical formulations in the canons of 
Plato and Aristotle, and then as these themes are taken up by other philosophical and 
literary figures.  This chapter sides with neither theme and draws no conclusions other 
than, as suggested above, that both themes are based in truth and that aging is both a 
“blessing and a curse,” as the hackneyed phrase goes.  What follows thus is a 
nonpartisan literature review of the two predominant historical attitudes toward the 
elderly: the elderly as sagacious and the elderly as decrepit, senile, and ill-tempered.     
THE ELDERLY SAGE 
Old age teaches all things along with the wearing of time. 
Sophocles, Fragments Fragment 664 
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The theme of the elderly sage came into being very early, in fact, as soon as human 
beings began to reach advanced ages.  In preliterate societies, the elderly tribe members 
filled vital roles: they were the group’s story-tellers, living archives, educators, 
counselors, judges, and often the village chiefs.1
                                                 
1 Leo W. Simmons’ work The Role of the Aged in Primitive Society, cited in the affixed Works Cited, is a 
helpful sociological study of the status and the treatment of the aged within primitive societies.  See, in 
particular, his chapter “The Use of Knowledge, Magic and Religion” for primitive people’s attitudes 
toward the elderly with respect to knowledge, wisdom, and experience.  For a summary of the treatment 
and the role of the elderly in primitive societies, see Simone de Beauvoir’s chapter “The Ethnological 
Data,” as well as Georges Minois’ chapter “The Middle East of Antiquity: The Experience of Old Age 
between Myth and History,” both of which are cited in the affixed Works Cited. 
  The kind of wisdom that these elders 
had was first-hand knowledge—the wisdom of experience.  Knud Rasmussen, explorer 
of North Greenland and Polar Eskimo historian, relates the following remark made by an 
elderly native:  “Our tales are the narratives of human experience  . . . . The word of the 
new-born is not to be trusted, but the experience of the ancients contains truth.”  
Therefore, when we tell our myths we do not speak for ourselves; it is the wisdom of the 
fathers which speaks through us” (27); this echoes an old African proverb that “when an 
old man dies, a library burns down.”  The crucial point here is that, in these very early 
societies, the aged individual was viewed as embodied wisdom.  As noted sociologist 
and author Leo W. Simmons observes, “Few generalizations concerning the aged in 
primitive societies can be made with greater confidence than that they have almost 
universally been regarded as the custodians of knowledge par excellence and the chief 
instructors of the people” (140).  Because of their wisdom wrought by long experience, 
the aged were an important part of the community and, for the most part, were treated 
with deference.  
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It is, however, imperative to note that, despite their importance, it was not 
uncommon to sacrifice the elderly or for them to sacrifice themselves in order to 
conserve the resources necessary for tribal survival.  Primitive societies were made 
vulnerable by decrepitude, and they dealt with the feeble swiftly.  The life of the elderly 
sage, then, was quite precarious and ultimately depended on the community’s ability to 
support those who could not support themselves.  The ambiguity of old age is thus here 
stark, even in prehistoric times: the old possessed life-sustaining knowledge; yet they 
were also ultimately the most expendable when it came to tribe continuity.   
When the elderly and sagacious Homer of classical Greece began to codify tribal 
tales, notably in his great epic poems The Iliad and The Odyssey, he exercised a 
formative force on not only ancient Greek culture but on the entire history of Western 
culture as well.2
                                                 
2 The number of historical surveys of the history of the elderly in Greece and Rome are few in number but 
are excellent.  For example, see Simone de Beauvoir’s chapter “Old Age in Historical Societies” and 
Georges Minois’ chapters “The Greek World: Sad Old Age” and “The Roman World: The Old Man’s 
Grandeur and Decadence” in his History of Old Age, all cited in the affixed Works Cited.  See also Tim G. 
Parkin’s entry in A History of Old Age and his excellent Old Age in the Roman World: A Cultural and 
Social History, both cited in the affixed Works Cited.  See Karen Cokayne’s Experiencing Old Age in 
Ancient Rome, cited in the affixed Works Cited.  Also see Bessie E. Richardson’s Old Age Among the 
Ancient Greeks: The Greek Portrayal of Old Age in Literature, Art, and Inscriptions. New York: 
Greenwood Press, 1933. 
   Greek art of the classical period portrays Homer as the ideal venerable 
figure, dignified and wise, and Homer remains today the archetype of the elderly sage.  
Homer’s character Nestor, who plays an important role in The Iliad, is, like Homer, 
greatly respected for his wisdom, and, although he lacks physical strength, Homer tells 
us that Nestor excels all the Achaians in counsel (XI.592-631).  The importance of the 
aged Nestor derives from his presumed superior judgment cultivated from years of 
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experience.  He is introduced in The Iliad as the “sweet-spoken, the clear-voiced speaker 
of Pylos” from whose “tongue the words flowed sweeter than honey” (I.230-67).  The 
young warrior Agamemnon lauds Nestor: “Once again, old man, you are master of the 
sons of the Achaians in assembly.  Oh father Zeus and Athene and Apollo—if only I had 
ten such advisors among the Achaians!  Then lord Priam’s city would soon topple, 
captured and sacked at our hands” (II.361-401).  Nestor is a model retired warrior and 
orator, and his counsel is noble and valued.   
The wisdom of tribal elders and Homer and Nestor takes on hefty metaphysical 
weight in the work of eminent ancient Greek philosopher Plato.  Plato defended a 
metaphysical, epistemological, and ethical theory that proposes and then locates 
universals in the particulars of our experience in the realm of the Forms.  The 
conversation between Socrates and the aged Cephalus in the opening scene of one of 
Plato’s most influential middle Socratic dialogues, the Republic, constitutes Plato’s 
longest and most direct commentary on the subject of aging.  Cephalus is a retired, 
affluent member of a merchant class who, due to his age, is no longer physically able to 
journey to visit Socrates. The dialogue opens with Cephalus chastising Socrates for not 
visiting him often enough, for, Cephalus states, “as the satisfactions of the body decay, 
in the same measure my desire for the pleasures of good talk and my delight in them 
increase” (line 328d).  This line conveys much, for Plato, the consummate philosophical 
rationalist, believed that the body’s deterioration in senescence helped liberate and 
enhance one’s intellectual capacities.   
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Socrates then asks Cephalus a simple question: what is old age like?  Cephalus has a 
ready answer: despite the burdens of old age, Cephalus has found happiness due to his 
exceptional moral character.  He relates that, although many men “long for the lost joys 
of youth,” Cephalus, on the other hand, has been soothed by tranquility and has found a 
“blessed release” from his passions and desires.  Cephalus avows, “When the fierce 
tensions of the passions and desires relax, then is the word of Sophocles approved, and 
we are rid of many and mad masters” (329c-d).  Importantly, Cephalus assures Socrates 
that those who lament the lost pleasures of youth, such as wine, women, and feasts, 
suffer not from old age but suffer rather from an intemperate character (329d).  
Moreover, for Cephalus, who has lived a life of justice and piety, a “sweet hope” of a 
pleasant afterlife attends his old age, in great contrast to those who have not lived such a 
life of justice and piety (330e-331a).   
Cephalus, unfortunately it turns out, identifies justice in relationship to wealth:  
Cephalus’ wealth, although it is not sufficient for justice, provides him with the means to 
be just—that is, he says, to pay his debts immediately, keep his word, and make 
sacrifices to the demanding gods, which protect him from the fear of divine retribution 
(331b).  Socrates, however, soon summarily rejects Cephalus’ definition of justice, and 
we are left to question Cephalus’ character; we suspect that he may be motivated by the 
simple and base desire to avoid punishment, a desire which Plato later famously 
criticizes in the tale of the Ring of Gyges (359c-360d).  
The question of the true worth of Cephalus’ character notwithstanding, Plato in this 
passage lays the groundwork for his dovetailed ethics and epistemology, and Plato’s 
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attitude toward aging follows quite logically.  Cephalus, unlike many of his elderly 
friends, claims to lead a flourishing or eudaimonistic life because he cultivates virtue or 
arête, not because he is elderly per se.  Crucially, according to Plato, one cannot be 
virtuous without first knowing what virtue is; similarly, once one knows a virtue, one 
will then exhibit that virtue.  Plato thus grounds his ethics in his epistemology:  Virtue 
consists in knowledge.  Moreover—and this is the key—knowledge consists in the 
activity of reason.  Plato, along with others in the rationalist tradition, draws a sharp 
distinction between reason and the senses, and he believes that it is the ascetic 
epistemological journey that reveals universal truths.  Reason is superior to the senses, 
which always deceive us.  For Plato, it is the archetypes of the objects of experience, the 
Forms and ultimately the Form of the Good, discoverable only through reason, that make 
meaningful the events and objects in our lives.3
The idea that aging frees one from corporeal concerns was not a new one in Plato’s 
time, and it was and remains still a very powerful idea indeed.  This idea was given a 
  The aged Cephalus has thus divested 
himself of certain bodily states that hamper his reason and would prevent him from 
cultivating good character.  Although Cephalus is certainly not as laudable as the 
philosopher who steadfastly pursues truth with an intellect unaided by the senses and 
who is hence able grasp the true meaning of justice, Plato nevertheless treats Cephalus 
with respect.  
                                                 
3 The proof for the existence of the Forms, which is embedded in the discussion of the immortality of the 
soul, appears in the Phaedo (lines 74a-75b).   In the Republic, Plato uses three helpful images to explain 
the Forms, including the Analogy of the Divided Line (509d-513e), the Metaphor of the Sun (507b-509c), 
and, perhaps most notably, the Allegory of the Cave (514a-520a).  
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biological basis when the early Greek physician Hippocrates theorized that the cause of 
senescence was a gradual loss of innate heat and moisture.  It is indeed quite remarkable 
that the core of Hippocrates’ theory remains preserved in modern scientific correlations 
between basal metabolic rates and aging (Minois 70-71).  Sexual passions, also, were 
thought to depend on innate heat and moisture.  Therefore, it biologically followed that 
the elderly had diminished sexual desire (Cokayne 115).  Moreover, traditional rational 
philosophical and religious sensibility elevates mind over matter: from monistic and 
dualistic metaphysical doctrines of the supremacy of mind over matter to religious and 
secular normative theories that the passions should diminish with age, the passions have 
had little place in the philosophical and religious canons.  Cato, Marcus Tullius Cicero’s 
mouthpiece in his well-known treatise on aging, De Senectute (On Old Age), remarks, 
“O admirable service of old age, if indeed it takes from us what in youth is more harmful 
than all things else!” (29); for “pleasure thwarts good counsel, is the enemy of reason, 
and, if I so may speak, blindfolds the eyes of the mind, nor has it anything in common 
with virtue” (31).  Both Cicero’s Cato and Plato’s Cephalus observe that old age is not 
entirely without pleasures; however, the pleasures they list are the ones associated with 
intellectual pursuits, such as good conversation, not sensual enjoyments.  Religious 
traditions, too—both Western and Eastern—have seen the degradation of the body in old 
age as a metaphor for worldly transience and have emphasized life as a preparation for 
meeting the challenge of physical death and the liberation of the soul, leaving little place 
for the passions.   
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German philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer’s view on age and diminishing passions 
must be contextualized within his quite famously pessimistic weltanschauung.  In broad 
strokes, we can bear the difficulties and miseries that occur in our frail human lives, 
according to Schopenhauer, if we develop a kind of stoic asceticism.  Aging for 
Schopenhauer is a progression through a series of characteristic stages, in which we 
gradually cultivate and take comfort in a kind of ennui that shields us from the cruelties 
of existence.  Below several portions of Schopenhauer’s essay “The Ages of Life” are 
quoted.  Although lengthy, these quotations taken together depict well Schopenhauer’s 
view of the aging process.  The idea that the aging process consists in a passage through 
an organic series of characteristic stages is, in fact, quite ancient and remains relevant 
today: it occurs time and again in historical texts, it is often implicit in our everyday 
experience, and it is the norm in disciplines such as the social sciences and psychology.  
Here Schopenhauer offers his interpretation of the stages of life.  
In the bright dawn of our youthful days, the poetry of life spreads out a 
gorgeous vision before us, and we torture ourselves by longing to see it 
realized.  We might as well wish to grasp the rainbow!  The youth expects his 
career to be like an interesting romance; and there lies the germ of that 
disappointment which I have been describing.  (99)   
Schopenhauer continues, 
If the chief feature of the earlier half of life is a never-satisfied longing 
after happiness, the later half is characterized by the dread of misfortune.  For, 
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as we advance in years, it becomes in a greater or less degree clear that all 
happiness is chimærical in its nature, and that pain alone is real.  (100)  
Further,  
The consequence of this is that, as compared with the earlier, the later half 
of life, like the second part of a musical period, has less of passionate longing 
and more restfulness about it.  And why is this the case?  Simply because, in 
youth, a man fancies that there is a prodigious amount of happiness and 
pleasure to be had in the world, only that it is difficult to come by it; whereas, 
when he becomes old, he knows that there is nothing of the kind; he makes his 
mind completely at ease on the matter, enjoys the present hour as well as he 
can, and even takes pleasure in its trifles. 
The chief result gained by experience of life is clearness of view.  This is 
what distinguishes the man of mature age, and makes the world wear such a 
different aspect from that which it presented in his youth or boyhood.  It is only 
then that he sees things quite plain, and he takes them for that which they really 
are: while in earlier years he saw a phantom-world, put together out of the 
whims and crotchets of his own mind, inherited prejudice and strange delusion: 
the real world was hidden from him, or the vision of it distorted.  The first thing 
that experience finds to do is to free us from the phantoms of the brain—those 
false notions that have been put into us in youth.  (100-01) 
Despite their radically different versions of reality—at the foundation of Plato’s universe 
is reason and at Schopenhauer’s a non-rational, instinctual urge he calls “Will”—both of 
 19 
 
them hold the Stoic view that the passions of youth occlude reality itself.  As we age, we 
divest ourselves of these passions, and we see the way the world really is.  
However, it is worthwhile to note in passing that the idea that passion, particularly 
sexual passion, ebbs with the passage of time is not uncontested—there is, in fact, strong 
evidence to the contrary.  Literature is replete with examples.  Geoffrey Chaucer is well-
known for his satire of those who fall far short from the particularly religious ideal of 
chasteness in their old age.  The Reeve in Chaucer’s Canterbury Tales sorrowfully 
confesses, 
 Desire sticks in our nature like a nail 
To have, if hoary head, a verdant tail, 
As has the leek; for though our strength be gone, 
Our wish is yet for folly till life’s done. 
For when we may not act, then will we speak; 
Yet in our ashes is there fire to reek. 
  Four embers have we, which I shall confess: 
 Boasting and lying, anger, covetousness; 
 These four remaining sparks belong to eld. 
 Our ancient limbs may well be hard to wield, 
 But lust will never fail us, that is the truth. 
 And even now I have a colt’s tooth . . . .  (lines 24-34) 
The Reeve lacks not physical desire, but only ability.  Indeed, Chaucer’s legendary tales 
are imbued with lecherous desire.  The old individual’s sexuality in this didactic text is 
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the object of ridicule, improper and absurd.  For the nineteenth-century Russian poet 
Fydor Ivanovich Tyutchev, on the other hand, the approaching end of life quickens and 
deepens the eros of his elderly subject, evident as he strikes a more poignantly lovely 
chord in his “Last Love.” 
  How much more superstitiously 
  And fondly we love in declining years. 
  Shine on, shine on, farewell light 
  Of this last love, this light of sunset! 
   
The shadows have spread across the sky 
   
 
And only westward does the radiance wander. 
   
Linger, linger, evening-day, 
   
Lengthen, lengthen, O enchantment. 
 
 
Let blood run thin in veins, our fondness 
   
Does not run thin within our hearts. 
   
O you, O you, O my last love! 
   
You are my bliss and my despair. 
Tyutchev’s passage resonates with passionate longing.  Victims of transience are we, 
and it is the sense of tragic loss that makes love ever the more bitter, and, crucially, ever 
the more sweet.   How different than Schopenhauer’s pronouncement that only pain is 
real!   
Cicero expresses neither Tyutchev’s melancholia nor Chaucer’s salacious impiety in 
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his De Senectute.  Cicero models the first several pages of his optimistic work on 
Socrates and Cephalus’ aforementioned discussion of aging in Plato’s Republic.  These 
first pages are in the form of a dialogue, which is set in the household of Cato the Elder.  
The character Scipio expresses his admiration for Cato for, unlike other old men, Cato 
bears his age well.  Cato then—like Plato’s Cephalus—marks a distinction between 
virtuous and non-virtuous individuals: Cato claims that he bears age well because he is 
virtuous.  He explains, “For those who have in themselves no resources for a good and 
happy life, every period of life is burdensome; but to those who seek all goods from 
within, nothing which comes in the course of nature can seem evil” (4).  Further, Cato 
advises his companions that the “best-fitting defensive armor of old age, Scipio and 
Laelius, consists in the knowledge and practice of the virtues . . .” (7).  Thus, according 
to Cato—like Cephalus—the faults that men attribute to their age are truly faults of 
character and not of old age per se.  Cicero’s passage comes straight out of the Republic, 
and, indeed, the virtues were very important in Roman philosophy.    
Post-Aristotelian Roman moralistic philosophy centered on a character-based ethics 
in which individuals cultivated virtue in order to live a happy or flourishing life, or “the 
good life.”  Roman Stoic philosopher Seneca writes, “Virtue alone affords to joy that’s 
unbroken and tranquil” (“Letter XXVII” 92).  Following Aristotle, virtue is the 
disposition to act in the right manner, at the means of the extremes of excess and 
deficiency, which are vices.  Virtue is practical wisdom: it consists of learning through 
experience the mean path in a variety of circumstances.  Romans believed that virtuous 
behavior could be learned over time and practiced.  Acquiring good judgment required 
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years of training and experience, which Romans strived to implement with rigorous 
pedagogical programs beginning in youth.  Practical wisdom, then, was truly only 
demonstrated by the aged—by those who had time to cultivate a judicious experience 
which could direct proper conduct in certain circumstances.  
In Cicero’s De Senectute, the aged Cato shares his acquired wisdom with his 
interlocutors:  Following the brief dialogue, the remainder of the piece is a monologue, 
in which Cato, in the longstanding philosophical method of rational argumentation, 
loquaciously and often originally refutes four reasons why old age is wretched.  The four 
reasons he refutes are the following: old age prevents one from managing affairs, it 
impairs bodily vigor, it deprives one of sensual gratifications, discussed above, and, 
finally, it is a prelude to death.  Cato’s response to the first reason, that old age prevents 
one from managing affairs, echoes Plato’s position:  Cato argues that the passage of time 
tends to bring wisdom.  He likens the old man to the pilot of a ship, who sits in the stern 
and holds the helm, while the others “go to and fro in the gangways” (14).  As Cato 
proclaims:  “Great things are accomplished, not by strength, or swiftness, or suppleness 
of body, but by counsel, influence, deliberate opinion, of which old age is not wont to be 
bereft, but, on the other hand, to possess them more abundantly” (14).  Cato—the 
Roman Nestor—wields great power in war due to his accomplished and venerated 
counsel.  In Cicero’s words, the “crowning glory of old age is authority” (47), and, of 
course, Cicero himself achieved outstanding political prominence and authority.  Cato 
next dismisses the challenge that old age impairs bodily vigor by responding that those 
who did not take care of themselves in their youth have greater impairments to their 
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bodily strength, and that, moreover, bodily strength is not needed in old age anyway; 
strength of mind more than makes up for the loss (20-25).   
Cato does admit that age may impair memory; but only for those who do not use 
their memories!  “Old men remember everything they care about,” Cato remarks (16).  
Wonderfully tangible here is the upbeat vertebral strand in Cicero’s De Senectute, which 
exudes an expression that resonates today—either “use it or lose it.”  Old age should be 
replete with endeavors and filled with a striving, not a retirement.  Cicero’s words are 
profound:  “Old age, indeed, is worthy of honor only when it defends itself, when it 
asserts its rights, when it comes into bondage to no one, when even to the last breath it 
maintains its sway over those of its own family” (27-28).  Cicero anticipates 
Shakespeare’s utter condemnation of the doomed aged King Lear, who, in Shakespeare’s 
account, transfers the entirety of his authority to his evil daughters, and then suffers 
disastrously cruel consequences.   Shakespeare, along with Cicero, heralds the idea that 
age is “not just a number” but, rather, relates to our capacity for independence.  And, 
above all, Cicero expresses our contemporary faith that aging is ultimately under our 
own control.   
 Opinions have been divided, however, on just how adventurous the elderly should 
be.  As Georges Minois observes in his comprehensive survey of various perceptions of 
old age from antiquity through the sixteenth-century, Seneca believed that the elderly 
should retire from public activity (102); further, Minois records, sixteenth-century 
Michel de Montaigne thought it monstrously imprudent for Cato, the voice in Cicero’s 
treatise on old age, to learn Greek in his old age—death is much too close to begin 
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adventurous projects (265).  “A thing in mine opinion not very honorable in him,” says 
Montaigne about Cato in his Essayes; further, “It is properly that which we cal doting or 
to become a child againe” (2: 428).  Montaigne indeed paints a sober picture of old age: 
“The longest of my desseignes doth not extend to a whole yeare; now I only apply my 
selfe to make an end: I shake off all my new hopes and enterprises: I bid my last farewell 
to all the places I leave, and daily dispossesse my selfe of what I have” (2: 429).  While 
they certainly did not advocate idleness of mind, Seneca and Montaigne believed that 
life in the later years should be a period of retirement, not of public activity.   
Cicero’s Cato rejoins Seneca and Montaigne quite summarily: the young, Cato 
points out, are just as likely to die as the old, and Cato himself suffered the death of his 
son.  Cato’s reply to Seneca and Montaigne is embedded within the discussion of the 
fourth and final vituperatio that old age is a prelude to death.  Cato was partly right: 
scholar Tim Parkin notes that infant mortality rates in ancient Greece and Rome were 
appalling, much like infant mortality rates in most centuries with the exception of our 
own; however, survival to an older age in ancient Greece and Rome, Parkin observes, 
was common if one survived those first dangerous years (“Ancient” 41).  And, in the 
time of the Black Death of the Middle Ages, it was the old who survived the scourge 
while the children and young adults perished.4
Empirical data notwithstanding, however, what we can philosophically glean from 
Cato’s deceptively simple remark that the young are just as likely to die as the old is the 
   
                                                 
4 See Georges Minois’ chapter “The Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries: Old People Assert Themselves” 
in his History of Old Age, cited in the affixed Works Cited.  
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age-old and complex philosophical problem of uncertainty.  The future is by its very 
nature uncertain.  This uncertainty, when brought to the fore of consciousness, makes 
palpable the utter fragility of existence—for both young and old.  Twentieth-century 
American philosopher John Dewey, in arguably his most Existential work, warns “man 
finds himself living in an aleatory world; his existence involves, to put it baldly, a 
gamble.  The world is a scene of risk; it is uncertain, unstable, uncannily unstable.  Its 
dangers are irregular, inconsistent, not to be counted upon as to their times and seasons.  
Although persistent, they are sporadic, episodic” (“Existence” 278).  According to 
Dewey, the universe is, at least for us, ultimately unpredictable, chaotic, and, to many, 
ostensibly morally unjust.  As Gloucester in Shakespeare’s King Lear laments,  
As flies to wanton boys are we to the gods;  
They kill us for their sport.  (IV.i.37-38) 
Inscrutable suffering is pervasive:  Plagues and tsunamis decimate, famines strike, and 
children die much too young.  
Is the world a scene of risk?  Dewey thought so, but Cicero, despite his above 
comment, did not.  Implicit in this monumental metaphysical question is, first, whether 
there is any order in the world, and second, if there is indeed order, whether we can 
understand it.  Importantly, at the core of our heritage from ancient Greek philosophy 
and Judeo-Christian theology is the idea of an intelligible order of nature, of which we 
are a part.  The Greeks called this natural order the cosmos.  Cicero, along with other 
Stoics such as Seneca, believed that a unity—ordered by the logos—underlay the chaotic 
appearance of the world.  The Stoic emphasis in particular was on cultivating a certain 
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kind of practical wisdom—on taming excessive emotion to reach a state of apatheia; it 
was only in this state that the logos which ensured the natural order could be heard.  It is 
evident, then, that the Stoic tradition, as a part of the rationalist tradition, harbored, and 
continues still to harbor, a deep and abiding distrust in the passions.  Further, according 
to the Stoic view, when we discern and accept what the logos tells us, we find inner 
calm; and what the logos tells us is nothing less than our place in the world: according to 
the law of nature, we are each a small part in the considerable and lofty universal order.  
The quintessence of Stoicism, then, is not the singular individual; rather, it is the 
existential submission of the individual to a consummatory explanation of the cosmos.      
Ancient Greek philosophers believed that the logos could be heard, that this 
regulating principle was intelligible to human understanding; many, however, both then 
and today, believe that, although there may be, indeed, an organizing principle, it is 
implacable, beyond human comprehension.  According to this angle of vision, human 
beings are barred from the secrets of the universe; and, crucially, it is not our place to 
know the natural order.  To believe that human beings could penetrate the recondite 
rational underpinnings of the cosmos beyond the bounds of personal experience, in their 
estimation, constitutes radical metaphysical hubris.  In Goethe’s Faust: The Second Part 
of the Tragedy, which Goethe himself completed during the last year of his life, an aging 
Faust expresses a distrust of any sort of metaphysical speculation.  
Through all the world I only raced: 
Whatever I might crave, I laid my hand on, 
What would not do, I would abandon, 
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And what escaped, I would let go. 
I only would desire and attain, 
And wish for more, and thus with might and main 
I stormed through life; first powerful and great, 
But now with calmer wisdom, and sedate. 
The earthly sphere I know sufficiently, 
But into the beyond we cannot see; 
A fool, that squints and tries to pierce those shrouds, 
And would invent his like above the clouds! 
Let him survey this life, be resolute, 
For to the able this world is not mute. 
Why fly into eternities? 
What man perceives, that he can seize.  (lines 11433-47) 
Time has worn away the daring hubris of Faust’s youth and in its place is a peaceful and 
serene wisdom.  Note well!  The wisdom age brings here is not the authoritative, 
sagacious counsel of Homer and Cicero; nor is it Plato’s rationalist vision of the intellect 
unhampered by the senses.  Faust’s wisdom, instead, comes paradoxically from a 
reconciliatory awareness of his own epistemological limitations as an earthborn creature. 
Christian orthodoxy, which Goethe challenges in the passage above, readily 
reinterpreted the Stoic emphasis on the acceptance of natural law into the acceptance of 
a divine will.  Correct behavior—practical wisdom—is living in accord with God’s will. 
However, the Christian tradition, like Goethe, questions the ancient Greek notion of a 
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wholly intelligible logos.  Instead, it emphatically emphasizes the division of being 
between an omniscient and all-powerful God and his non-omniscient and fragile 
creations.  The stress on submission to an oftentimes implacable divine plan in religious 
orthodoxy manifests itself with particular regard to wisdom and aging, as Richard C. 
Fallis writes, in “praise for the older person who accepts his or her fate; it may also take 
the form of satire against those who do not know ‘their places’” (36).  The elderly, then, 
are expected to live in calm deference, devoid of youthful passions, and, in the tradition 
of the New Testament, to prepare to face final divine judgment with the hope of eternal 
salvation.      
Divine judgment and eternal salvation by the Christian God were not relevant 
concerns for Seneca and Cicero, both Stoics.  Notwithstanding, death, Cicero’s Cato 
assuages us in De Senectute, is not to be feared.  Cato’s response to the fourth criticism 
of old age is reminiscent of Socrates’ memorable last lines in Plato’s Apology:  “Death is 
one of two things.  Either it is annihilation, and the dead have no consciousness of 
anything, or, as we are told, it is really a change—a migration of the soul from this place 
to another” (line 40c).  Cato, like Socrates, advises his interlocutors that if death puts an 
end to the soul, then it should be regarded with indifference; alternatively, if death leads 
to the immortality of the soul, then it should be desired (50).  A true Stoic, Cato 
maintains that, with either alternative, death should be met with halcyon acquiescence.  
We should not rebel against the laws of Nature: “Each one should be content with such 
time as it is allotted to him to live” (52).  Cato advises further that, “if you live on, you 
have no more reason to mourn over your advancing years, than the farmers have, when 
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the sweet days of spring are past, to lament the coming of summer and autumn” (53).  
Death, believes the Stoic, is one among the many ordering principles of Nature, and the 
life of the human being, as part and parcel of Nature, is thus governed by the principle of 
death.  Cato professes that the “most desirable end of life is when—the understanding 
and the other faculties unimpaired—Nature, who put together, takes apart her own 
work” (54).   
It is in the Stoic sensibility of Cato’s last line that we are to understand the much 
later noble life of Ernest Hemingway’s fisherman Santiago in The Old Man and the Sea.  
Santiago, alone in the Gulf Stream, endures physical and spiritual suffering of epic 
proportions in order to catch an enormous and equally noble marlin.  Imbued with the 
drama of the universal struggle to live, Santiago reveals that: “You are killing me, fish, 
the old man thought.  But you have a right to.  Never have I seen a greater, or more 
beautiful, or a calmer or more noble thing than you, brother.  Come on and kill me.  I do 
not care who kills who” (92).  There is a unity between Santiago and the marlin, and it is 
a unity between equals in the natural world, in which all creatures must live, struggle, 
and die as part of the natural order.  And—most importantly—Hemingway and Cicero 
both believed that the living and struggling and dying that has to be done should be done 
with courageous dignity.  
In this section, we have explored the theme of the elderly sage in an admittedly 
small sampling of philosophy and literature.  The aged, with a mind unfettered by the 
passions and endowed with both the knowledge of ultimate reality and with the 
pedagogical wisdom of experience, offer counsel and inspire respect.  This sensibility is 
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timeless and pervades our understanding of what it means to be old.  In the next section, 
however, we explore an equally pervasive but altogether sinister sensibility—the elderly 
as decrepit, senile, and ill-tempered.      
THE DECREPIT, THE SENILE, AND THE ILL-TEMPERED 
When the age is in, the wit is out. 
Shakespeare, Much Ado About Nothing III.v.33 
While Plato and his followers lauded the virtues of the elderly, and, while esteemed 
ancient Greek city-state Sparta elected a gerontocracy, it is instructive to note that the 
Greek gods did not suffer from old age.  Hesiod tells us that “accursed Old Age” is the 
child of Night, and its siblings are “hateful Destruction,” “black Specter,” “Death,” 
“Blame,” “painful Grief,” and “Retribution” (59).  Minois remarks that there was a 
“temple to old age in Athens, in which old age was portrayed as an old woman draped in 
black, leaning on a stick with a goblet in her hand; near her, stood a water clock which 
had almost run out” (44).  And, indeed, disparaging tales of the elderly abound in Greek 
mythology.  The myth of Tithonus is well-known:  Aurora,5
                                                 
5 Her name is “Eos” in another version of the myth. 
 the Goddess of the Dawn, 
asks that Zeus give her mortal husband, Tithonus, eternal life.  Zeus acquiesces; 
however, Aurora fails to ask for eternal youthfulness.  Tithonus hence grows old, decays, 
but still he lives on.  Aurora, weary of his decrepitude, isolates the ancient Tithonus 
alone in a room, where he is to remain, eternally and incessantly babbling (Evelyn-White 
421-23).  In another version of the story, Aurora turns Tithonus into a noisy grasshopper, 
likely a cicada (Hamilton 289-90). The myth is intended to both indict and explain the 
 31 
 
elderly’s tendencies toward loquacity.  Even the eloquent Cato in Cicero’s De Senectute 
confesses, “old age is naturally prolix, nor can I pretend to acquit it of all the weaknesses 
laid to its charge” (42-43).  Old age so depicted is indeed a calamity.  The elderly are 
grotesque nuisances and are utterly dispensable; what a contrast to the theme of the 
venerable Homeric sage!  According to this angle of vision, age does not bring wisdom 
but is, instead, characterized by both physical and mental decline.   
In Greek mythology old age is a divine punishment for human impiety:  Zeus 
punishes the brazen Prometheus by creating Pandora, who then unwittingly unleashes 
countless miseries, including old age, on the theretofore blissful human race (Evelyn-
White 9).  Similarly, according to ancient Hebrew scripture, the original fall of Adam 
and Eve explains aging, suffering, laboring, and death.  In Genesis God punishes Adam: 
“In the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread, till thou return unto the ground; for out of 
it wast thou taken: for dust thou art, and unto dust shalt thou return” (3:19).  Augustine 
and Thomas Aquinas explicitly attribute aging and death to original sin, before which 
man was eternal.  Aquinas writes, “man was incorruptible and immortal in the state of 
innocence.  For, as Augustine says (QQ.Vet. et Nov. Test., qu.19): ‘God made man 
immortal as long as he did not sin, so that he might achieve for himself life or death.’”  
(I: First Part. Question XCVII. Article I. Objection IV); and, “the withdrawal of original 
justice has the character of punishment, even as the withdrawal of grace has.  
Consequently, death and all consequent bodily defects are punishments of original sin.  
And although these defects are not intended by the sinner, nevertheless they are ordered 
by the justice of God Who inflicts them as punishments” (II: Second Part. Part I. 
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Question LXXXV. Article V. Objection III).  Compare the secular yet parallel theme in 
contemporary Latin-American Gabriel García Márquez’s astonishing One Hundred 
Years of Solitude:  José Arcadio Buendía, founder and patriarch of the Eden-like city 
Macondo, in which no one—at least initially—ages, suffers madness in return for his 
impudent pursuit of knowledge.  Buendía’s decline foreshadows the prolonged terrible 
yet fascinating demise of Macondo and all of its inhabitants.  Buendía himself is tied to a 
tree by his wife, Ursula, where he babbles Latin incoherently, gradually grows old, and 
dies. 
While old age is revered in Judaism, there is more than a little despair at the loss of 
mental and physical faculties that come with growing older.  The author of Ecclesiastes 
laments,   
Remember now thy Creator in the days of thy youth, while the evil days come 
not, nor the years draw nigh, when thou shalt say, I have no pleasure in them; 
While the sun, or the light, or the moon, or the stars, be not darkened, nor the 
clouds return after the rain:  In the day when the keepers of the house shall 
tremble, and the strong men shall bow themselves, and the grinders cease 
because they are few, and those that look out of the windows be darkened, And 
the doors shall be shut in the streets, when the sound of the grinding is low, and 
he shall rise up at the voice of the bird, and all the daughters of musick shall be 
brought low; Also when they shall be afraid of that which is high and fears shall 
be in the way, and the almond tree shall flourish, and the grasshopper shall be a 
burden, and desire shall fail: because man goeth to his long home, and the 
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mourners go about the streets: Or ever the silver cord be loosed, or the golden 
bowl be broken, or the pitcher be broken at the fountain, or the wheel broken at 
the cistern.  Then shall the dust return to the earth as it was: and the spirit shall 
return unto God who gave it.  Vanities of vanities, saith the preacher; all is 
vanity.  (12:1)  
This biblical passage is filled with bleak metaphors of decrepitude.  “All is vanity” 
writes the author: mortal life is unsubstantial and fleeting, and the aged near its wretched 
end.  
Indeed religious eschatological texts emphasize life as a time of spiritual and moral 
preparation for meeting the challenge of death and the liberation of the soul, and, in the 
tradition of Augustine and Thomas Aquinas, the process of aging is often experienced as 
a process of atonement for original sin.  Humankind is to eschew the material world and 
to prepare for rebirth into an abundant, eternal spiritual life.  Crucially, in one major 
strand of Christianity, the degradation of the body that occurs with age serves as a 
powerful metaphor for both sin and for worldly transience.  Shulamith Sahahar, 
interpreting a medieval philosophical treatise by Petrarch, explains that the “degradation 
and increasing unloveliness of the body and the loss of physical pleasures are indicators 
of the fragility, impermanence and insignificance of this world.  The young body is like 
a flower, but a flower whose fading is inherent in its blossoming” (85).    
With the decay of the sinful body, the spirit is strengthened.  The influential 
eleventh-century saint, Saint Bernard of Clairvaux, asserts that the “mind is stronger 
than time, and even while the body is growing cold in death a holy zeal glows in the 
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heart, and while the limbs grow helpless, the vigor of the will remains unimpaired and 
the ardent spirit feels not the weakness of the wrinkled flesh” (744).  Bernard recalls the 
last of line of this passage by the Apostle Paul in Second Corinthians (747):  
And he said unto me, My grace is sufficient for thee: for my strength is made 
perfect in weakness.  Mostly gladly therefore will I rather glory in my 
infirmities, that the power of Christ may rest upon me.  Therefore I take 
pleasure in infirmities, in reproaches, in necessities, in persecutions, in 
distresses for Christ’s sake: for when I am weak, then I am strong.  (12:9-10)   
The idea that a weak body leads to spiritual strength is a very important idea.  We see it 
in many texts across time, from religious to secular.  We have already seen that many 
philosophers, such as Plato, associate reason with the immaterial mind, or the soul, and 
appetite with the material body and that aging frees one from bodily appetites.  But in a 
major strand of Christian theology, the body takes on moral significance that it does not 
have in other kinds of texts: the body is evil; it is a manifestation of sin. 6
Plato’s contemporary, Aristotle, vehemently propounds a caustic attitude toward old 
age.  In his Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle maintains that old age, like disability, makes 
“men mean” (lines 1121b10-15).  Further, elderly people, much like sour people, do not 
make friends readily due to their ill-temper (1158a1-5); when the elderly people do make 
friends, it is only for the sake of utility (1156a25).  Aristotle thus does not share Plato’s 
      
                                                 
6 Another major strand of Christianity stresses that the human body, as God’s creation and in God’s 
likeness, is good.  This strand is based on important passages in Genesis, including the following: “And 
God said, Let us make man in our image, after our likeness: and let them have dominion over the fish of 
the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over the cattle, and over all the earth, and over every creeping 
thing that creepeth upon the earth” (1:26); and “And God saw every thing that he had made, and, behold, it 
was very good” (1:31).  
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optimism about the process of aging and attendant character development.  In Rhetoric, 
Aristotle records his most scathing observations of both the elderly and the young:  
Young individuals have strong passions, their impulses are like “sick people’s attacks of 
hunger and thirst,” and all of their mistakes are mistakes of excesses (lines 1389a1-
1389b10).  The character of the elderly, Aristotle contrasts, lies at the opposite extreme.   
They have lived many years; they have often been taken in, and often made 
mistakes; and life on the whole is bad business.  The result is that they are sure 
about nothing and under-do everything.  They ‘think’, but they never ‘know’; 
and because of their hesitation they always add a ‘possibly’ or a ‘perhaps’, 
putting everything this way and nothing positively.  They are cynical; that is, 
they tend to put the worse construction on everything.  Further, their experience 
makes them distrustful and therefore suspicious of evil.  Consequently they 
neither love warmly nor hate bitterly, but following the hint of Bias they love as 
though they will some day hate and hate as though they will some day love.  
They are small-minded, because they have been humbled by life: their desires 
are set upon nothing more exalted or unusual than what will help to keep them 
alive.  . . . They lack confidence in the future; partly through experience—for 
most things go wrong, or anyhow turn out worse than one expects; and partly 
because of their cowardice.  They live by memory rather than by hope; for what 
is left to them of life is but little as compared with the long past; and hope is of 
the future, memory of the past.  (1389b10-1390a10)   
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Aristotle has a decidedly different interpretation of the stages of life than Schopenhauer.  
Life is “bad business” for Schopenhauer; so when life’s coarseness eventually 
extinguishes the “poetry of youth” and embitters even the most romantic of visions, what 
remains, Schopenhauer avers, is a “clearness of view.”  However, what is a clear view of 
the world to Schopenhauer is, for Aristotle, quite distorted and utterly deficient.  
Aristotle condemns senescence for its warped landscape of experience that saps the 
world of its richness.  
It is men who are in their prime, Aristotle continues, who possess the ideal 
character, which is an intermediate condition between the characters of young and old 
and is thus free from extremes.  He writes, “To put it generally, all the valuable qualities 
that youth and age divide between them are united in the prime of life, while their 
excesses or defects are replaced by moderation and fitness” (Rhetoric 1390b5-10).  
Aristotle appraises that the body is in its prime between the ages of thirty and thirty-five 
and the mind in its prime at the age of forty-nine (1390b10); interestingly, Aristotle was 
around fifty when he made these observations.  Aristotle’s catalogue of the ills of the 
young and aged are, of course, meant to be commensurate with his Doctrine of the Mean 
and as such may be oblique.7
                                                 
7 Virtue, according to Aristotle, is the disposition to act in the right manner and at the extremes of excess 
and deficiency, which are vices; his Doctrine of the Mean, then, is that virtue is the intermediate condition 
between excess and efficiency.  For his discussion of virtue and his Doctrine of the Mean, see Book II in 
Nicomachean Ethics, cited in the affixed Works Cited.  
  Nevertheless, Aristotle’s observations have an unsettling 
experiential bite.  For Aristotle the moderation of the elderly is not due to a 
reconciliation with the cruelties of reality, per Schopenhauer; nor is it due to the Platonic 
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and Stoic ideals of self-control, which is crucial to the attainment of wisdom.  Rather, for 
Aristotle, the moderation of the elderly constitutes a fundamentally misguided pathology 
of reticence (1390a15):  they are meager, deluded fools.   
Simone de Beauvoir perceptively observes that what is striking about Aristotle’s 
view is “the notion that experience is not a factor of progress but of degradation.  An old 
man is one who has spent the whole of a long life getting things wrong, and this cannot 
make him superior to younger people who have not piled up as many mistakes as he 
has” (111).  It is indeed quite striking that an empiricist such as Aristotle who is often 
cited as the impetus for the theory of the “association of ideas” could express such 
invective against the aged.8
                                                 
8 Passages from Aristotle’s De Memoria et Reminiscentia are often credited for inspiring associationist 
thinking.  For example, consider the following: “Acts of recollection, as they occur in experience, are due 
to the fact that one movement [in consciousness] has by nature another that succeeds it in regular order” 
(line 451b10).  Also: “Whenever, therefore, we are recollecting, we are experiencing certain of the 
antecedent movements until finally we experience the one after which customarily comes that which we 
seek.  This explains why we hunt up the series [of movements], having started in thought either from a 
present intuition or some other, and from something either similar, or contrary, to what we seek, or else 
from that which is contiguous with it.  Such is the empirical ground of the process of recollection . . 
.”(451b15-20).  Parva Naturalia. Trans. J. I. Beare. The Basic Works of Aristotle. Ed. Richard McKeon. 
New York: Random House, 1941. 607-17. Print.  
  The theory of the association of ideas, which marked the 
beginning of empirical psychology, received its first explicit thematic treatment in the 
work of Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and David Hume.  The theory describes the 
principles by which ideas are connected in consciousness and which then govern the 
order of thoughts.  Hume listed three such principles: resemblance, contiguity, and cause 
and effect (32).  As Beauvoir points out, associationist empiricism actually supports the 
idea that, as the number of associations between ideas increases with age, older 
individuals have greater knowledge and wisdom (200).  However, for Aristotle, the 
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progenitor of associationist thinking, this is ostensibly not the case: an increase in the 
number of connections between ideas does not produce wisdom. 
Although he does not explicitly mention the connection, Aristotle’s view of the soul 
no doubt can be brought to bear on his views about aging.  Plato believed that the body’s 
deterioration liberates the immortal soul from worldly appetites that cloud reason.  In 
contrast, Aristotle believed that the soul is intimately linked to the body: the soul is the 
expression of the body; it is the body’s essence, “‘the essential whatness’ of a body” (De 
Anima line 412b10).  Aristotle characterized the relationship between the body and soul 
as hylomorphic.  “Hylomorphism” is derived from two Greek words, “hulê,” which 
means “matter” and “morphê,” which means “shape” or “form.”  Broadly, the form of an 
object is what kind of thing the object is, and the matter is what it is made of.  In 
Aristotle’s hylomorphism, the soul is the form of the body, and the body is the matter of 
the soul.  The soul structures the body, much like the shape of a brick structures the clay 
from which it is made.9
                                                 
9 Aristotle develops hylomorphism in his De Anima and Metaphysica.  For the discussion in Metaphysica, 
see in particular Book Z, or Book 7, which can be found in The Basic Works of Aristotle, cited in the 
affixed Works Cited.  Aristotle’s description of the hylomorphic relationship between the soul and body, 
which is treated in De Anima, is part of a much larger project to reject Plato’s dualistic division of reality 
into the realm of the Forms and the realm of the particulars of our experience.  Aristotle sought instead to 
locate forms within the particulars of our experience.  
  Although it would be quite logical to next infer that Aristotle 
did not believe that the soul survives bodily dissolution, in his De Anima he reveals the 
surprising caveat:  “From this it indubitably follows that the soul is inseparable from its 
body, or at any rate that certain parts of it are (if it has parts)—for the actuality of some 
of them is nothing but the actualities of their bodily parts.  Yet some may be separable 
because they are not the actualities of any body at all” (413a4-10).  Aristotle later reveals 
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in Book III, Chapters IV and V of De Anima that the part of the soul that is not an 
actuality of the body and thus must be immortal is its thinking capacity.  Thus, what we 
might safely and perhaps humbly infer from Aristotle’s proposed hylomorphic 
connection between the body and soul is that the bodily degradation that comes naturally 
with aging implies harm to the parts of the soul that are not involved in thinking.   
It would seem that Plato at least, who believed in the immortality of the soul, would 
be quite sanguine about aging, and, indeed in his Republic, he is.10
In the first place, we shall absolutely prohibit the taste of wine to boys under 
eighteen.  We shall tell them they must have too much concern for the 
passionate temperament of youth to feed the fire of body or soul with a further 
current of fire before they address themselves of the labors of life.  In the next, 
while we permit a moderate use of wine to men under thirty, we shall 
  However, in Laws, 
his last and longest dialogue, written a few years before his death at age eighty or eighty-
one, Plato is not so sanguine.  In this dialogue, three elderly men discuss at length the 
best laws to regulate those living under the rule of law.  It is important that these men are 
elderly; Plato ostensibly continues to associate age with wisdom.  In the passage 
preceding the passage below, the interlocutors discuss the formation of choirs, which 
will recite noble doctrines to “enchant” children to live just lives (II.664b-c).  Agreeing 
that it might be difficult to convince the older men to sing, for “the older and more 
sober-minded he grows, the more bashful he feels about it [singing]” (II.665e), the 
wisest Athenian member proposes the following regimen of wine:  
                                                 
10 For a discussion of Plato and aging, see the “The Elderly Sage” section of Chapter II. 
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absolutely forbid carousing and free potations.  But when a man is verging on 
the forties, we shall tell him, after he has finished banqueting at the general 
table, to invoke the gods, and more particularly to ask the presence of Dionysus 
in that sacrament and pastime of advancing years—I mean the wine cup—
which he had bestowed on us for comfortable medicine against the dryness of 
old age, that we might renew our youth, and our harsher mood be melted to 
softness by forgetfulness of our heaviness, as iron is melted in the furnace, and 
so be made more tractable.  (II.666a-c) 
Old age certainly does not seem like something to which to look forward: one must bear 
dryness, heaviness, and harsh mood.  Admittedly, the purpose of the wine is to diminish 
inhibitions, not to help men turn toward the reality of the Forms, and, granted, the 
purpose of Plato’s Laws is different from the purpose in his Republic—the former is 
intended less as an ideal program and more as an actual code.  Nonetheless, the practical 
Plato who suggests wine to ease age’s heaviness is starkly different from the ideological 
Plato who commends Cephalus for bearing the physical burdens of old age by 
cultivating his purportedly exceptional character.  Plato in Laws even concedes that 
disease, age, and sullen temper may “derange a man’s mind” (XI.929d).  Plato thus, at 
least here, sides with Aristotle’s negative view of old age.  
Cicero, too, reveals in his personal letters that his experience of old age does not 
match the ideal depicted in his De Senectute.  In his Letters to Atticus, he confides, “I 
must keep reading my Cato Major [De Senectute], which is dedicated to you: for old age 
is beginning to make me ill-tempered.  Everything puts me in a rage” (287).  Andrew 
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Preston Peabody notes that, at the time of this letter’s composition, Cicero was grieving 
the loss of his beloved daughter, Tullia, and was extremely apprehensive about Mark 
Antony’s plans (vi); of course, his apprehension was warranted as Antony ordered 
Cicero’s murder.   In the same vein, Tim Parkin advises us that Cicero’s apologia for the 
elderly in De Senectute should be read in the context of his eroding powerbase 
(“Ancient” 43).  Georges Minois agrees:  He remarks that both Cicero and Plato outline 
an ideal old age, which they were both far from reaching in their own experience (57-60, 
111).  Further, Minois hypothesizes that the preferred place that Plato gives the aged, 
particularly in Laws, in which the government he devises essentially amounts to a 
gerontocracy,11
  In The Coming of Age, Simone de Beauvoir provides to-date one of the most 
comprehensive descriptions of how social and political forces have molded perceptions 
of old age.  Ultimately, according to Beauvoir, it is class struggle that shapes the cultural 
norms by which we view the elderly:  “Both today and throughout history, the class-
struggle governs the manner in which old age takes hold of man: there is a great gulf 
between the aged slave and the aged patrician, between the wretchedly pensioned ex-
 hints at the inferior situation of the aged in Greek society (59-60).  
Indeed, although many in classical Greece, like Plato, associated old age with wisdom, 
power and wealth still laid with younger generations (Minois 62-63, Parkin, “Ancient” 
44).  It is not surprising that youth was esteemed and senescence derogated in a society 
famed for seeking perfection and for prizing strength and beauty.    
                                                 
11 Plato writes in Laws that no curators of the laws shall be “elected to his office at an age earlier than 
fifty” (VI.755a).  Additionally, in the Republic Plato writes that “the rulers must be the elder and the ruled 
the younger is obvious” (line 412c).  
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worker and an Onasis” (10).  Further she pronounces, “We have seen the motives 
underlying the praise of Solon, Plato, Cicero and Seneca—eulogies of old age that the 
privileged have smugly repeated throughout the centuries, claiming to find truth in them.  
The learned man’s objective point of view is very different” (121).  Old age, Beauvoir 
contends, is an utter and irrevocable disaster for the impoverished working class, and 
wealthy moralists such as those described in this chapter—Plato and Cicero—champion 
old age in their didactic but insincere writings in order to bolster their own power.   
The interpretation offered here, on the other hand, turns on the view that metaphors 
of aging transcend class.  There is no doubt that social and political critiques of the 
experience of old age, such as Beauvoir’s, among the few others mentioned here, offer 
interesting and clear-cut insight on how and why aging is experienced the way that it is, 
be the experience cut by class or generational power struggle or by other cultural factors.  
These kinds of critiques, however, lack existential richness.  Aging is a process that is 
experienced with a deep individual existential ambivalence that transcends cultural 
norms and power struggles.  Positive and negative perceptions of senescence can be and 
indeed are experienced by the self-same individuals.  There is little evidence that Plato 
had any ulterior motive when he wrote the conversation between Cephalus and Socrates; 
the virtuous old man, says Plato, has great wisdom.  So, too, Plato says that the burdens 
of old age can make one go mad.  Cicero says that life should be lived with Stoic 
acceptance; so, too, Cicero says that his age brings bitterness with it.  These 
inconsistencies are not to be understood as logical inconsistencies of the incompetent 
philosopher; nor are they to be understood as political slips.  Instead, these 
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inconsistencies constitute the real cacophonic internal dialogue that is part of the 
struggle that goes on throughout life to articulate what the living itself means; and every 
day there is novel meaning to be had.  Inconsistencies are to be celebrated as a sign of 
personal growth.  It was the celebrated American poet Walt Whitman who wrote,  
Do I contradict myself?   
Very well then I contradict myself,  
(I am large, I contain multitudes.)  (part 51.7-9)    
Curiously, Beauvoir does indeed admit in her text that some attitudes toward old age 
cut across time and culture: “Although the meaning and the value attached to old age 
vary in different societies, old age nevertheless remains a fact that runs throughout all 
history, arousing a certain number of identical reactions,” (92) she writes.   Moreover, 
she, firmly taking sides, unlike Plato and Cicero, endorses the negative attitudes toward 
old age.  She bemoans that  
For every individual age brings with it a dreaded decline.  It is in complete 
conflict with the manly or womanly ideal cherished by the young and the fully-
grown.  The immediate, natural attitude is to reject it, in so far as it is summed 
up by the words decrepitude, ugliness and ill-health.  Old age in others also 
causes an instant repulsion.  This primitive reaction remains alive even when 
custom represses it; and in this we see the origin of a conflict that we shall find 
exemplified again and again.  (40)   
Advanced age, no matter one’s social status, believes Beauvoir, amounts to a horrifying, 
irreversible biological decline, and, ostensibly, a positive social context merely mitigates 
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a natural revulsion to old age.  Indeed, in the well-known story of Gautama Buddha, 
founder of Buddhism, it is the appalling sight of an old man, along with the sights of a 
sick man and a corpse, which lead the young Prince Siddhārtha to reflect on the deep 
sufferings of humankind and inspire his renowned spiritual journey.12
Expressions of revulsion of old age abound both in the writings of antiquity and in 
the writings of modernity, to be sure.  Montaigne is emphatic that age does not bring 
wisdom but instead brings physical and even moral decline.  Disdainful of what he 
considered hypocritical attempts to convince otherwise, Montaigne writes in his Essayes,    
    
But mee thinks our soules in age are subject unto more importunate diseases 
and imperfections, then they are in youth.  I said so being young, when my 
beardlesse chinne was upbraided me; and I say so againe, now that me gray 
beard gives me authority.  We entitle wisdome, the frowardnesse of our 
humours, and the distaste of present things; but in truth wee abandon not vices, 
so much as we change them; and in mine opinion for the worse.  Besides a sillie 
and ruinous pride, combersome tattle, wayward and unsotiable humors, 
superstition and ridiculous carking for wealth, when the use of it is well-nigh 
lost, I finde the more envie, injustice and leaudnesse in it.  It sets more 
wrinckles in our mindes, then on our foreheads: nor are there any spirits, or 
very rare ones, which in growing old taste not sowrely and mustily.  (3: 37)   
Beauvoir notes that, paradoxically, although Montaigne thought that age had not 
                                                 
12 The story of the Gautama Buddha is originally recorded in the Jātaka, which is a very large collection of 
early Indian literature.    
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enriched him, his essays became richer as he grew older (159-60). 
Horace, Cicero’s Epicurian contemporary, also expresses invective against old age 
in his Ars Poetica (The Art of Poetry): 
An old man is surrounded by disadvantages, either because he seeks for 
something and refuses through miserliness to touch what he has found already; 
or because he conducts all his affairs with a cramped and trembling: always 
putting things off, reluctant in expectation, inactive, greedy for the future, 
difficult, complaining, given to praising the bygone days of his boyhood, ready 
to punish and criticize the young.  The years as they come bring many 
advantages with them and take as many away as they withdraw.  (lines 169-76) 
One recalls nineteenth-century Victorian novelist Charles Dickens’ iconic Ebenezer 
Scrooge, who is the embodiment of the mocked and bitter curmudgeon.  Dickens’ prose 
is masterful:   
Oh!  But he was a tight-fisted hand at the grindstone, Scrooge! a squeezing, 
wrenching, grasping, scraping, clutching, covetous old sinner!  Hard and sharp 
as flint, from which no steel had ever struck out generous fire; secret, and self-
contained, and solitary as an oyster.  The cold within him froze his features, 
nipped his pointed nose, shriveled his cheek, stiffened his gait; made his eyes 
red, his thin lips blue; and spoke out shrewdly in his grating voice.  A frosty 
rime was on his head, and on his eyebrows, and his wiry chin. He carried his 
own low temperature always about with him; he iced his office in the dog-days; 
and didn’t thaw it one degree at Christmas.  (10-11)  
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Two of Horace’s Epodes, VIII and XII, are unabashedly misogynistic and 
shockingly vulgar.  Here is the first part of VIII: 
  You dare to ask me, you decrepit, stinking slut, 
   what makes me impotent? 
  And you with blackened teeth, and so advanced  
in age that wrinkles plough your forehead, 
  your raw and filthy arsehole gaping like a cow’s 
   between your wizened buttocks. 
  It’s your slack breasts that rouse me (I have seen 
   much better udders on a mare) 
  your flabby paunch and scrawny thighs 
   stuck on your swollen ankles.  (lines 1-10) 
Old women indeed have often been considered piteous and even evil creatures.  
Countless numbers of elderly women accused of witchery have been—and are still 
today!—burned at the stake.  The cannibalistic hag in the fairytale “Hansel and Gretel,” 
too, is an emblem of the horrifying evil old woman.    
The Roman Juvenal’s diatribe against old age in his Satires is unforgettable; Parkin 
remarks that it is “one of the most powerful and bitter attacks on senectus in the 
literature of the ancient world, if not all time” (Old Age 80).  Here is a portion of 
Juvenal’s Satire: 
   ‘Grant us a long life, Jupiter, O grant us many years!’ 
  In health or sickness, this is your only prayer. 
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  Yet how grisly, how unrelenting, are longevity’s countless 
  evils!  Look first at your face: an ugly and shapeless 
  caricature of itself.  Your skin’s now a scaly hide, 
  you’re all chapfallen, the wrinkles you’ve developed 
  resemble nothing so much as those carved down the cheeks  
of some grandmotherly baboon in darkest Africa. 
Young men are all individuals: A will have better looks 
or brains than B, while B will beat A on muscle; 
but all old men look alike, with tremulous limbs and voices, 
bald pates, wet runny noses, like a baby’s, 
and toothless gums with which they must mumble their bread: 
so repulsive to their wives, their children—indeed, themselves— 
that they arouse distaste even in legacy hunters.  (X.188-202)    
Juvenal next describes negative mental features of old age:  “But worse than all bodily 
ills is his mental collapse, when he fails to remember the names of servants, or recognize 
the friend who was yesterday’s host at dinner, let alone the children he begot and 
brought up” (X.233-36).   Why desire a long life?  The man with this desire did not learn 
his lesson from the story of the wretched Tithonus; the aged are doomed to suffer 
atrocious mental and physical diremption.   
Eighteenth-century Jonathan Swift’s immortal Struldbruggs in Gulliver’s Travels 
are, like Tithonus, examples of the deplorable woes of immortality.  Gulliver, when he 
discovers that immortal creatures exist, cries, “Happy nation where every child hath at 
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least a chance for being immortal!  Happy people who enjoy so many living examples of 
ancient virtue, and have masters ready to instruct them in the wisdom of all former 
ages!” (209).  Soon, however, he finds that the advanced age of the Struldbruggs 
assuredly does not bring wisdom; rather, it brings misery, for the Struldbruggs have, 
Swift explains, “not only the follies and infirmities of other old men, but many more 
which arose from the dreadful prospect of never dying.  They were not only 
opinionative, peevish, covetous, morose, vain, talkative, but uncapable of friendship, and 
dead to all natural affection, which never descended below their grandchildren” (213).  
The Struldbruggs lose power: they are unemployable and have no legal privileges, such 
as the ability to purchase land.  Their physical condition deteriorates:  They “lose their 
teeth and hair; they have at that age no distinction of taste, but eat and drink whatever 
they can get, without relish or appetite.  The diseases they were subject to still continue 
without encreasing or diminishing” (214).  They become senile:  “In talking they forget 
the common appellation of things, and the names of persons, even those who are their 
nearest friends or relations” (214); and “they can never amuse themselves with reading, 
because their memory will not serve to carry them from the beginning of a sentence to 
the end” (214).  Finally, worst of all, they cannot communicate with others:  
The language of this country being always on the flux, the Struldbruggs of one 
age do not understand those of another; neither are they able after two hundred 
years to hold any conversation (farther than a few general words) with their 
neighbours the mortals; and thus they lie under the disadvantage of living like 
foreigners in their own country.  (214)   
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Strikingly, as society progresses, the Struldbruggs are left behind in their own private, 
bleak world.  They are estranged from everyone.  This is a novel and philosophically 
terrifying idea—old age is experienced as an entrapment in a world in which there is no 
meaningful connection with others.    
 In the above-cited passage by Juvenal there is another idea of particular interest.  
Juvenal writes, “but all old men look alike, with tremulous limbs and voices, bald pates, 
wet runny noses, like a baby’s, and toothless gums with which they must mumble their 
bread” (X.198-200).  Juvenal alludes here to a longstanding and powerful theme—old 
age as second childhood.  The physical and mental decline that many experience in their 
old age can lead to a deficient state seemingly comparable to the early developmental 
stages of a child.  Crucially, this decline can lead to great dependence on others.  
Children, in particular, are often expected to care for their aged parents; this is true 
across time, and it is true across cultures.    
In his most famous work, the satire The Praise of Folly, sixteenth-century humanist 
Erasmus rehearses the ancient words of Juvenal:  
For what difference between them, but that the one has more wrinkles and years 
upon his head than the other?  Otherwise, the brightness of their hair, toothless 
mouth, weakness of body, love of mild, broken speech, chatting, toying, 
forgetfulness, inadvertency, and briefly, all their other their actions agree in 
everything.  Any by how much the nearer they approach  to this old age, by so 
much they grow backward into the likeness of children, until they pass from life 
to death, without any weariness of the one, or sense of the other.  (18) 
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Life comes around in a vicious and deadly circle: life ends as innocently and as senseless 
as it begins.   
Satirists such as Juvenal and Erasmus, among countless others, depict old age as a 
second childhood quite cruelly; others depict the same theme quite sympathetically; 
either way it is depicted, however, the aged are cast as powerless and inferior.  The 
recent, extraordinarily popular Tuesdays with Morrie, which was adapted into a 
television movie, recounts the touching relationship between a former student, Mitch, 
and his aging Professor, Morrie, who is dying from Lou Gehrig’s disease.  The two 
converse here about Morrie’s decline.  Interestingly, the conversation is a benevolent 
recasting of Erasmus’ satiric observation that, as old age is so unpleasant, the gods assist 
with a “pleasant metamorphosis,” which essentially amounts to senile dementia (17).        
“Do you remember when I told Ted Koppel that pretty soon someone was 
gonna have to wipe my ass?” he said. 
I laughed. You don’t forget a moment like that. 
“Well, I think that day is coming.  That one bothers me.” 
Why? 
“Because it’s the ultimate sign of dependency.  Someone wiping your 
bottom.  But I’m working on it.  I’m trying to enjoy the process.” 
Enjoy it? 
“Yes.  After all, I get to be a baby one more time.”  (49) 
And, the poem “The Little Boy and the Old Man” by beloved contemporary children’s 
author, Shel Silverstein, is strikingly poignant:  
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Said the little boy, “Sometimes I drop my spoon.” 
Said the little old man, “I do that too.” 
The little boy whispered, “I wet my pants.” 
“I do that too,” laughed the little old man. 
Said the little boy, “I often cry.” 
The old man nodded, “So do I.” 
“But the worst of all,” said the boy, “it seems 
Grown-ups don’t pay attention to me.” 
And he felt the warmth of a wrinkled old hand. 
“I know what you mean,” said the little old man.  (95) 
Although Silverstein paints a touching picture, full of love and empathy, we bemoan the 
insult of advanced age, which reduces the old man’s grievous experiences to the level of 
those of a child.  Moreover, and crucially, the obvious breakdown in the old age as a 
second childhood theme is a stark disanalogy between the old man and the child: the 
child’s future possibilities are many and the old man’s few.  
 In addition to physical and mental decline, the elderly suffer much more grievous 
losses: the loss of loved ones.  The older one grows, the more likely one is to experience 
the pain of bereavement; and there is no greater pain than this.  Death thus looms large 
and pervasive: old age means the approach of our own implacable death, and it means 
the utterly devastating experience of the death of precious loved ones.  Cicero addresses 
the former vituperatio of old age in his De Senectute, but, despite the loss of his own 
daughter, he does not address the latter; Juvenal, however, does.  In his Satires, Juvenal 
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relates,   
If he [the old man] keeps his wits intact, though, he still must endure 
the burial of his sons, the death of his dearly-beloved 
wife and brother, urns filled with his sisters’ ashes. 
Such are longevity’s penalties—perpetual grief, 
black mourning, a world of sorrow, ever-recurrent 
family bereavements to haunt one’s declining years.  (X.240-45)      
Old age, it seems, is a lonely, desolate landscape, populated with loss and grief.  One 
must endure mental and physical decline, loss of power and prestige, and nauseating, 
aching emptiness where life incandescent once existed.  
CONCLUSION 
Aging is an irreducible and ineluctable dimension of experience that embraces all human 
beings.  This chapter has endeavored to canvass prominent conceptions of the elderly 
within the history of philosophy and in literature.   In the next chapter, we shift from 
these overarching conceptions of the elderly, which are too much like pigeon holes, to 
individual experience.  The leading questions are these:  How is it with me as I age?  
How do I experience my time as time goes by?  The topic of the next chapter is, hence, 
the phenomenological upshot of the common grievance “I feel old.”   
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CHAPTER III 
KILLING TIME: AGING AS A PATHOLOGY OF BEING 
 
I never wake up in the morning without finding life a little more devoid of  
interest than it was the day before.  But what saddens me most is remembering  
my life as it was twenty years ago and then suddenly coming back into the 
present. 
Jonathan Swift, April 5, 1729, at the age of sixty-two, “Swift to 
Viscount Bolingbroke and Pope” 
In this chapter, we turn from our understandings of the aged to the process of aging.  
This process of aging, of course, begins at conception with the commencement of the 
mortal clock.  If, following Kant, time and space are human constructs, then the weighty, 
nascent question that our existence in time raises is this:  How does time go by for us?  
In radical constructivism, which has its roots in Kant’s work, reality may be independent 
of human experience, but meaning is not.  We are the arbiters of meaning.  We interpret 
the world.  Thus the aim of this chapter is to understand how we experience time as time 
passes.  The answer to this question constitutes the vertebral strand of any 
phenomenology of aging.  Moreover, it is contended here that there are both salubrious 
and destructive ways of experiencing time.  At its most salubrious, aging is a way of 
participating in time such that we are continuously transformed by our experience.  At 
its most destructive, aging is a withdrawal from time:  If, following process 
philosophers, we hold a relational ontology—that is, if the self is a bundle of relations—
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then we stagnate and ultimately die an ontological death when we no longer build those 
relations and hence withdraw from time.  An ontological death is the diagnosis for the 
absence of novelty and possibility in our lives.  Thus it is clear that it is not only at the 
end of our physical lives that we die:  Indeed, we can undergo a living death when we no 
longer are willing to be transformed by the flux of experience.  Offered below are just 
three prongs of this baleful diagnosis: aging experienced as ontological lassitude, aging 
experienced as a vicious nostalgia, and, finally, aging experienced as obsolescence.          
Note well:  What becomes salient is the idea that the phenomenology of aging can 
cut much deeper than the imputed characteristic of increased wisdom or the more 
obvious manifestations of physical decay, both the subject matter of the previous 
chapter.  Indeed, if we follow the existentialists and the classical American philosophers, 
particularly William James and John Dewey, the way in which we understand our 
experience of aging is transformed into an ontology that bespeaks an existential 
commitment.  The working assumptions here are first, as Jean Paul Sartre’s famous line 
goes, that “existence precedes essence” (348), and, second, the particularly American 
philosophical angle of vision, that of the supremacy of experience in shaping ontology.  
William James expresses this ontological sensibility incisively:  In one of his diary 
entries, he writes, “Life shall [be built in]13
                                                 
13 Editor’s footnote to the bracketed words: MS. doubtful 
 doing and suffering and creating” (Letters 
148).  To exist, thus, is to direct the cacophonic stimuli of the everyday such that we 
articulate an ontological understanding of ourselves; it is to grab hold of the uncertainty 
that is irrevocably interwoven into the fabric of our present; put simply, it is to decide 
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what and how we will do that day with, if we make the pragmatic turn, an eye on the 
consequences.  And, importantly, it is the choosing, not the choice, that is ontologically 
significant.   
The human endeavor, then, in the American philosophical tradition, requires that we 
pay attention to our experience; the upshot of our existence depends upon it.  William 
James is so vigilant about experience that his weltanschauung, radical empiricism, 
leaves nothing out:  
To be radical, an empiricism must neither admit into its constructions any 
element that is not directly experienced, nor exclude from them any element 
that is directly experienced.  For such a philosophy, the relations that connect 
experiences must themselves be experienced relations, and any kind of relation 
experienced must be accounted as ‘real’ as anything else in the system.” 14
James argues that philosophy should be restricted to what is directly experienced, and he 
argues that, unlike the view held by both rationalists and empiricists, relations must 
count as experiences themselves. 
 
(“World” 195)   
15
                                                 
14 The emphasis on the text is James’. 
  Relations are the transitive parts of experience that 
relate the substantive parts; they constitute an affective fringe of focal experience.  
James’ radical empiricism dovetails with his knowledge-by-acquaintance, constructivist 
15 David Lamberth clarifies how the view James holds about relations differs from the view held by 
rationalists and empiricists.  He writes that, according to the view held by rationalists and empiricists, 
“while the particular determinate qualities of objects are given in experience, all of the relations among 
these same qualities or percepts are supplied ex post facto by the mind or consciousness which is the 
subject of these same experiences.  Depending on whether one is an empiricist or rationalist at heart, 
relations are either accorded lesser or greater philosophical respect than the determinate content of the 
experience itself” (18).  For James, relations are part of experience. 
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epistemology.  He explains, “Knowledge of sensible realities thus comes to life inside 
the tissue of experience.  It is made; and made by relations that unroll themselves in 
time” (“World” 201).  Intelligibility itself thus comes from inside individual experience.  
The relations are crucial: the world is the relational manifold.  The world exists for 
us inside our experience.  That is, the world gains its meaning from our experience of the 
world: we wrest meaning from the world, hand over hand, listening to the phenomena of 
experience, making relations, with an eye toward the future.  Philosophy is, as James in 
one place expresses well, “our more or less dumb sense of what life honestly and deeply 
means.  It is only partly got from books; it is our individual way of just seeing and 
feeling the total push and pressure of the cosmos” (“Present Dilemma” 362).  In James’ 
radical empiricism, experience is the metaphysical ground that preserves the ontological 
and epistemological immediacy of pluralistic phenomena and is, too, the burial site for 
pervasive ontological dualisms, such as the long-standing dualisms between the self and 
the world and the mind and the body; these dualisms, according to James, are 
functional—they are ways in which we interpret the flux of experience.  An ontology of 
possibility, then, is one in which the flux of experience is heeded, is, in empirical terms, 
allowed to dialectally mold and re-mold conceptual knowledge.  Reality is always up for 
revision: knowledge must be faithful to the messaging of experiencing.16
                                                 
16 There is vigorous debate about the metaphysical claims of radical empiricism.  For example, the case 
has been made that “pure experience” is metaphysically monistic; this view has had to reconcile, however, 
James’ claim that that he holds a metaphysical pluralism.  There is also vigorous debate regarding the 
epistemological status of concepts relative to percepts.  I have side-stepped this debate by merely pointing 
out the consensus that there is a dialectic relationship between percepts and concepts.  It is worth noting 
here, as does Lamberth (39), that percepts themselves have been selected from the stream of experience in 
virtue of the selective interests of perception itself.   As James remarks, “perception involves a twofold 
   
 57 
 
James’ philosophical sensibility is embraced and nuanced by John Dewey, whose 
own vision centers on the transactions between the human as a biological organism with 
its environment.  For Dewey, relations affectively explored form the core of individual 
meliorism:  We sally forth and then fall back, as in a rhythm, in-step and then out-of-step 
with nature.  The stepping can be spiritually pedagogical, an achievement, when it brings 
with it a deepening and grounding awareness of the teeming complexity of connections 
that comprise the affairs of our everyday.  We must, as Dewey says, be on the qui vive, 
be vigilant; we must listen to experience, as an animal with its nostrils flared and ears 
alert, waiting to respond to a sign from its environment.  And, with “motion merging 
into sense and sense into motion,” Dewey writes, the “past absorbed into the present 
carries on; [the live creature] presses forward” (“Experience as Aesthetic” 540).    
Unfortunately, however, as contemporary American philosopher John J. McDermott 
often points out, Heraclitus warns us that the logos speaks, but no one listens,17
                                                                                                                                                
choice.  Out of all present sensations, we notice mainly such as are significant of absent ones; and out of 
all the absent associates which these suggest, we again pick out a very few to stand for the objective reality 
par excellence” (“Stream” 71).     
 which, if 
we are to believe William James and John Dewey, is ontologically very dangerous 
indeed!  This is especially the problem when it comes to aging:  The process of aging—
particularly in the aged—too often has been funded neither by the progression of 
existential injunctions to do nor by the classical American sensibility of possibility, but 
by, rather, metaphors of ontological erosion.  It is only in youth that we see aging as a 
17 For example, see page 133 of McDermott’s essay “Possibility or Else!  The Philosophy of William 
James” in Drama. 
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“becoming.” Youth is an ontological sprint within a universe of possibility.  Along with 
Walt Whitman, the young call out, 
  The spotted hawk swoops by and accuses me, he complains 
   of my gab and loitering.   
I too am not a bit tamed, I too am untranslatable, 
I sound my barbaric yawp over the roofs of the world.  (part 52.1-4)    
This youthful yawp outstrips the passive inertia of any “civilized,” translated, aged 
philosophical concept.  Youth here is possibility:  It is a translation forever in the 
making; it is a Jamesian affective experiential fringe that is forever overflowing and 
breathing novelty into conceptual knowledge; it is the raw, creative powers of the 
individual to always make a place in the world. 
We have seen in the previous chapter that Simone de Beauvoir, along with many 
others, understands aging to be a process of degeneration.  According to Beauvoir, 
Old age is not a mere statistical fact; it is the prolongation and the last stage of a 
certain process.  What does this process consist of?  In other words, what does 
growing old mean?  The notion is bound up with that of change.  Yet the life of 
the foetus, of the new-born baby and of the child is one of continuous change.  
Must we therefore say, as some have said, that our life is a gradual death?  
Certainly not.  A paradox of this kind disregards the basic truth of life—life is 
an unstable system in which balance is continually lost and continually 
recovered: it is inertia that is synonymous with death.  Change is the law of life.  
And it is a particular kind of change that distinguishes ageing—an irreversible, 
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unfavorable change; a decline.  The American gerontologist Lansing suggests 
this definition: ‘a process of unfavourable, progressive change, usually 
correlated with the passage of time, becoming apparent after maturity, and 
terminating invariably in death of the individual’.  (11)   
It is true that aging is a process, as Beauvoir maintains.  And, indeed, it is true in great 
part that aging is a process of physical decline, which Beauvoir emphasizes in her 
doleful tome.  Pollyanna views about growing old are blithely naïve about the possible 
depths of physical human suffering that stretch out, boundless, just below the surface of 
the personscape.  As natural beings, our lives undergo the perpetual intransigent press of 
the nitrogen cycle.  The ravages of time destroy visages, bend knees, mete out senility 
and bring societal opprobrium, and then there is death; these are eviscerating facts that 
none can deny.  “Old age,” as Chateaubriand says, “is a shipwreck.”18
All the world’s a stage, 
  Shakespeare, in 
his As You Like It, quite famously agrees with Chateaubriand and Beauvoir.  His 
description of the “seven stages of life” is overwhelmingly dismal.   
And all the men and women merely players. 
They have their exits and their entrances, 
And one man in his time plays man parts, 
His acts being seven ages.  At first the infant, 
Mewling and puking in the nurse’s arms. 
                                                 
18 There is debate on whether this line should be attributed to Chateaubriand or Charles de Gaulle.  I 
follow Wayne Booth, who sides with Chateaubriand on page 48 in his The Art of Growing Older, cited in 
the affixed Works Cited. 
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Then the whining schoolboy, with his satchel 
And shining morning face, creeping like a snail 
Unwillingly to school.  And then the lover, 
Sighing like furnace, with a woeful ballad 
Made to his mistress’ eyebrow.  Then a soldier, 
Full of strange oaths and bearded like the pard, 
Jealous in honor, sudden and quick in quarrel, 
Seeking the bubble reputation 
Even in the cannon’s mouth.  And then the justice, 
In fair round belly with good capon lined, 
With eyes severe and beard of formal cut, 
Full of wise saws and modern instances, 
And so he plays his part.  The sixth age shifts 
Into the lean and slippered Pantaloon 
With spectacles on nose and pouch on side, 
His youthful hose, well saved, a world too wide 
For his shrunk shank, and his big manly voice, 
Turning again toward childish treble, pipes 
And whistles in his sound.  Last scene of all, 
That ends this strange eventful history, 
Is second childishness and mere oblivion, 
Sans teeth, sans eyes, sans taste, sans everything.  (II.vii.139-66) 
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It is instructive to note that both Shakespeare and Beauvoir link the physically 
diremptive process of aging to its ultimate end—old age, and then, finally, death.  
Beauvoir is not alone: implicit in most discussions of aging is an assumption of 
advanced age.  A child “grows up,” while an adult, on the other hand, ages.  And it is 
true that old age is the concern of the previous chapter, which is a case in point—
philosophical and literary conceptions about what it means to age are in fact inevitably 
connected to perceptions about the elderly.  However, significantly, one need not be old 
to feel old.  How many chronologically young and not-quite-old have plaintively 
confessed, “I feel old”?  It thus does not seem that we should be so quick to associate the 
verb, “aging,” with the noun, “aged.”  At nineteen, poet Christina Rossetti laments a 
youth gone too soon. 
Oh roses for the flush of youth, 
   And laurel for the perfect prime; 
 But pluck an ivy branch for me 
  Grown old before my time.  (34) 
Rossetti’s experience of aging is one of spiritual lassitude, and, if we are to listen to 
William James and John Dewey, we might suspect that there is something much more 
sinister involved in the process of aging than physical decay.  Indeed, it is much more 
sinister:  Taking cue from the radically empiricist views of James and Dewey, it is 
contended here that the phenomenology of aging as decline constitutes nothing less than 
creative disengagement from the constant yet temporal, exhausting yet life-sustaining 
grappling to orient ourselves in a universe that, through this grappling, sustains our 
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Promethean ontological signature.  Beauvoir, as quoted above, is at least partially 
correct: inertia is synonymous with death.  However, Beauvoir must be qualified: she 
refers to inertia of bodily processes, whereas it is contended here that it is also an inertia 
of creative energy that is synonymous with death—that is, ontological death.  The logos 
speaks, says Heraclitus; yet we do not hear it, and aging becomes the diagnosis of a 
disease that kills novelty, the cameo of inner life.  This degenerative kind of aging 
becomes, paradoxically, a withdrawal from time, a renunciation of what makes us 
human.19
Offered here are just three ways in which we withdraw from time as time passes: 
aging experienced as ontological lassitude, aging experienced as a vicious nostalgia, and, 
finally, aging experienced as obsolescence.  These are three ways in which we halt the 
       
                                                 
19 It is important to distinguish between Sartre’s ideas about being from the ones presented here.  
According to Sartre, there are two types of being: being-in-itself, which is the content of prereflective 
experience, and being-for-itself, which is Sartre’s term for consciousness.  Being-for-itself makes 
individual experience happen by “negating” being-in-itself.  This occurs when being-for-itself breaks 
being-in-itself apart into this and not-this and that and not-that.  Thus, there is a perpetual process of 
negation and continuous movement into a future of possibility and uncertainty.   
       The activity of being-for-itself does not stop as long as one is physically alive, even if one is living 
inauthentically, or in bad-faith.  We are always choosing what we will be, and this, according to Sartre, 
constitutes our freedom.  When we live in bad-faith, we refuse to recognize that possibility is the 
ontological way in which we are in the world, and/or we refuse to appropriate our possibility by not 
making choices for ourselves.  Thus, even when in bad-faith, we are free to deny our freedom and free let 
others make choices for us.   
       For James, in contrast, the activity of consciousness is tied up with the pragmatists’ ideas about 
growth.  Consciousness, like Sartre’s being-for-itself, does indeed “interpret” the raw data of experience, 
although James would not say it does so through a process of negation.  However, while always at work, 
our consciousness can fail to interpret our experience such that we do not spiritually grow and adapt to the 
world around us.  And, in Dewey’s language, when the “live creature” does not adapt, it dies.  This is what 
is meant here by “ontological living death.”  These ideas are explored further in the text below. 
       In conclusion, a living death is not possible for Sartre’s being-for-itself because being-for-itself is the 
negating activity of consciousness, which continues until physical death.  It is asserted here that, while the 
activity of consciousness always goes on, we are ontologically dead when consciousness fails to pay 
attention and adapt to the phenomena.   
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messaging of experience, ways in which we spend the time just to pass the time—we kill 
time—as if life were just a hobby, which is what we do when the doing really does not 
matter. 
AGING EXPERIENCED AS ONTOLOGICAL LASSITUDE 
Living is wearisome.  The press of the cosmos is constant and unforgiving, and we are 
fragile creatures indeed.  It is nothing short of astonishing that most of us manage to 
muster the personal strength and stamina to confront the barrage, long day after long day 
and many a long night.  We live through the doldrums, the business-as-usual, and the 
crises: boring routines, minor annoyances that accrue to treacherous proportions, health 
concerns, family and relationship struggles, work, personal devastation of many kinds, 
and, finally, the atrocities of planetary-wide social and economic injustice.  This is the 
exhausting topography of modern survival.    
Let us now, however, raise the stakes: let us make the activities of this arduous 
modern survival constitutive of our person.  In the classical American and existentialist 
traditions, the self is the doing and suffering—is the relational, experiential manifold—
and as long as living goes on, these activities go on.  It is the doing—the reading of 
experiences—that is ontologically important, not the goal.  As John J. McDermott often 
cautions, the nectar is in the journey, not in the destination: “it is the journey which 
yields the nectar.  To ask of our journey that it yield surety as to its meaning other than 
its meaning en passant is to court spiritual arrogance” (Drama 234).  This mortal 
journey is one of immediate, pressing ontological participation.   
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It is utterly perplexing and ultimately vexing, then, that our “lives of quiet 
desperation,” in which we are as industrious as worker ants20
This existential anguish, which is, as Thomas R. Flynn relates, “our experience of 
the possible as the locus of our freedom” (67), is a paramount concern in the 
existentialist tradition.   It is also paramount for James, who has a deep and abiding 
existentialist sensibility.  As John J. McDermott tells us, the vertebral strands guiding 
James’ work are his “personal confrontation with nihilism; his belief in a continuous, 
intelligible, but unfinished universe; and his attempt to develop a method of inquiry 
which does justice to the processive quality of both nature and man” (“Introduction” xx).  
It is also, however, important to mark a difference between James and traditional 
existentialist sensibility, to which McDermott alludes in the quotation above.  James’ 
 but are yet buried alive 
under the drudge and dross, lacks ontological finesse.  The lachrymose question that 
inevitably comes to the fore is “is this all that there is?”  Time becomes more palpable, 
even obstreperous as we age.  It embodies an exhausting Sisyphean struggle in which 
one is utterly dismayed to find that the journey is all one has—is all one is—that the 
journey is difficult, it is often banal, and there is no rest.  There is always another 
boulder to push up the hill.  Being on the qui vive is exhausting, and knowledge that one 
should be on the qui vive, that the “inmost nature of reality is,” as James illuminates 
“congenial to powers which you possess” (“Sentiment” 331) is metaphysical 
responsibility at its most stark and overwhelming: every second is precious.   
                                                 
20 It is perhaps the most quoted phrase in Henry David Thoreau’s Walden: “The mass of men lead lives of 
quiet desperation” (7).  In a letter to a friend, Thoreau writes, “It is not enough to be industrious; so are the 
ants.  What are you industrious about?” (“To Harrison Blake” 371).   
 65 
 
radical empiricism is a metaphysical account of how we are contextually jointed to the 
world; our personal identity always develops in and through shared relations.  Thus, 
although we are free to existentially create the character of our own lives, it is not a 
capricious “anything goes”: there is a restraint that originates inside relationships; this is 
one of the great insights of James’ (and John Dewey’s) pragmatism. We dialectally 
respond to the “push and pressure of the cosmos” (James, “Present Dilemma” 362).   
Thus the despair that permeates James’ life, McDermott suggests, should be understood 
not in terms of an existentialist alienation, but, rather, in “the context of a classical Stoic 
setting, with the bond to nature accepted but the resignation and impossibility of novelty 
rejected” (“Introduction” xxx).    
James’ radical empiricism is an ontology of temporal possibility; and, it is only in 
an ontology of possibility, in which the future is open, that we can have ontological 
uncertainty.  Uncertainty, unlike possibility, highlights the utter fragility of our 
existence.  We cannot, like Descartes, resolve uncertainty by simply meditating on what 
we already know:  There never is full intelligibility.  This is important for John Dewey, 
in particular, who urges a cessation of the “quest for certainty.”21
                                                 
21 See, in particular, Dewey’s The Quest for Certainty: A Study of the Relation of Knowledge and Action, 
which is in The Later Works, Volume 4, cited in the affixed Works Cited.  Here Dewey maintains that 
knowledge of the world is experimental.  That is, knowledge is a transactional affair; it comes through our 
interactions.  Thus, thought and action are merely functional distinctions of the experimental approach to 
knowledge.  We can also reject the distinction between the knower and the known.  This distinction 
presumes that we can come to know the world as it exists outside of our experience of it.  Knowing, thus, 
is not a state of certainty.  Rather, it is a process; it is a mode of doing.  The “quest for certainty” is a 
misguided attempt to separate both theory from practice and knowledge from action.  It would be a terrible 
mistake, however, to infer that Dewey believed that all knowledge is cognitive.  Dewey writes that “things 
are had before they are things cognized” (Later Works 1:28).  Our experience of the world is, first and 
foremost, qualitative.  James and Dewey are seamless on this:  According to James, relations are felt.  The 
world is affectively “fringed,” open and ultimately ineffable.      
  According to Dewey, 
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knowledge is a transactional affair between the individual and the world, and is, by its 
very nature, uncertain.  Traditional philosophy, Dewey accuses, has essentially 
“translated into a rational form the doctrine of escape from the vicissitudes of existence 
by means of measures which do not demand an active coping with conditions” 
(“Escape” 366).  For Dewey and for James, uncertainty and chaos are woven into the 
fabric of nature itself.   It is with characteristic spirit that James reveals,  
I find myself willing to take the universe to be really dangerous, and 
adventurous, without therefore backing out and crying ‘no play.’  I am willing 
to think that the prodigal-son attitude, open to us as it is in many vicissitudes, is 
not the right and final attitude toward the whole of life.  I am willing that there 
should be real losses and real losers, and no total preservation of all that is.  I 
can believe in the ideal as an ultimate, not as an origin, and as an extract, not 
the whole.  When the cup is poured off, the dregs are left behind for ever, but 
the possibility of what is poured off is sweet enough to accept.  (“Pragmatism” 
470)    
According to James, there are no absolutes in which we are absorbed.  Novelty is real:  
Thus, it is in the dregs of uncertainty that James finds a sustaining power that spurs and 
undergirds his pragmatism.  The question, “why am I here,” is an experiential surd; it 
begs the absolute.  But the question “what am I to do,” does not: life is built, answers 
James, and it is built in relations.  And so we build until we die.  
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To be sure, there is no ontological uncertainty—and no possibility—in deterministic 
philosophical traditions such as Stoicism.   There is no Whitman yawp, no Dylan 
Thomas’ advice, 
  Do not go gentle into that good night, 
  Old age should burn and rave at the close of day; 
  Rage, rage against the dying of the light.  (148) 
Sophocles’ Chorus, instead, chants a Stoic liturgy of ontological acceptance: 
  Whoever craves a longer life than his allotted span 
  That man 
  I count a fool.  For what do more days add 
  But to his sum of grief, and not of pleasure, 
  If he endure beyond his appointed measure?  (Oedipus 139) 
We are not free, according to the Stoic tradition.  In a spiritual solidarity between 
the self and the natural world, our lives pass by in appointed, increasingly difficult and 
tragic stages until we return to dust.  The Stoic response to the irrevocable passage of 
mortal time is a powerful palliative sensibility of aequanimitas, which is, as nineteenth-
century physician Sir William Osler describes, a spiritual imperturbability, a “coolness 
and presence of mind under all circumstances, calmness amid storm, clearness of 
judgement in moments of grave peril, immobility, impassiveness, or, to use an old and 
expressive word, phlegm” (4).  The appropriate attitude is not, as in the existential 
tradition, angst, and, not, as in James’ and Dewey’s estimation, an “active coping.”  Life, 
 68 
 
on the Stoic view, unfolds according to a rational plan, in which there is no surprise and 
no novelty.   
For James, on the contrary, it is the individual will that makes the existential 
difference.  Here he marvels somewhat bemusedly that our ontological worth be decided 
by our own heroic will to participate in the rhythm of our surrounding environs:  “If the 
‘searching of our hearts and reins’ be the purpose of this human drama, then what is 
sought seems to be what effort we can make.  He who can make none is but a shadow; 
he who can make much is a hero” (“Will” 425).  James continues,   
“Will you or won’t you have it so?” is the most probing question we are ever 
asked; we are asked it every hour of the day, and about the largest as well as the 
smallest, the most theoretical as well as the most practical, things.  We answer 
by consents or non-consents and not by words.  What wonder that these dumb 
responses should seem our deepest organs of communication with the nature of 
things!  What wonder if the effort demanded by them be the measure of our 
worth as men!  What wonder if the amount which we accord of it were the one 
strictly underived and original contribution we make to the world!  (426)  
Woe to those who are weary of the rhythm, the effort!  They are but shadows, and they 
feel like shadows—dull and lost, out of breath, out of place—old.  They have lost the 
ability to translate experience into spiritual nutrition.  Aging experienced as decline 
amounts to a weariness of the will—an ontological lassitude—that need not be tied to 
the number of years one has lived.   
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Examples of ontological lassitude abound, such as that exhibited in Christina 
Rossetti’s poem, quoted above; but the life of Nikolai Kuzmich, as penned by Rainer 
Maria Rilke in his The Notes of Malte Laurids Brigge, is a lassitude stemming from 
existential angst that has degenerated into a fatal paralysis.  Rilke writes that Nikolai 
realizes that he has still some time to live and that it “occurred to him that these years 
could be changed into days, into hours, into minutes—indeed, if only one had the 
endurance, into seconds; and he figured and figured and attained a sum the like of which 
he had never seen.  He felt dizzy.  He had to steady himself” (138).  After calculating his 
time left to the second, Nikolai realizes that he is squandering much of it.  He thus 
resolves to save time.  He “got up earlier, washed himself less elaborately, drank his tea 
standing up, ran to his office, and arrived far too early” (138).  Then “something strange 
happened.  He felt a draft past his face, past his ears, he felt it on his hands.  He stood 
aghast.  The window was shut tight.  And as he was sitting there with wide open eyes in 
his dark room, he began to understand that what he felt now was time itself as it passed 
by” (140).  Nikolai feels the earth moving under his feet; he reels around.  “Lie down 
and keep quiet, he had once read somewhere.  “And since then,” Rilke tells us, “Nikolai 
Kuzmich has been lying” (140).  If who I am is what I do, if experience is the heart of 
this human drama and is the very touchstone of inquiry, then the vital question is this: 
what do I do with the time that I have?  Nikolai does nothing with his time; he has no 
experiences; he is but a shadow.  Time goes by for him, to be sure—he feels it—but he 
does not participate in time.  Unfortunately, Nikolai, like many, has died a living death.   
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Nikolai Kuzmich and others beset by ontological lassitude are Jamesian shadows for 
whom possibility has expired.  They “move through the world concavically”; this is a 
phrase of John J. McDermott’s,22
The former (Channing) is a concave man, and you see by his attitude and the 
lines of his face that he is retreating from himself and from yourself, with sad 
doubts.  It is like a fair mask swaying from the drooping boughs of some tree 
whose stem is not seen.  He would break with a conchoidal fracture.  You feel 
as if you would like to see him when he has made up his mind to run all the 
risks.  (“To R.W. Emerson” 96) 
 which can ultimately be traced back to Henry David 
Thoreau.  Thoreau’s use of the term “concave” in a letter to describe one of his 
acquaintances is revealing and to the point.   
To move through the world concavically is to violate the ontologically participatory 
demands of a rhythm between oneself and the hearsay of experience.  Old, 
overwhelmed, overcommitted, and so very tired, we shut down, hide, and go through the 
motions.  To stop choosing is to stop deciding how to take the world into one’s life; it is 
to lose the ongoing battle to effect the transformation of the self.  To choose is always to 
begin again—it is a rebirth—and those who do not choose stagnate and die.   
AGING EXPERIENCED AS A VICIOUS NOSTALGIA 
The central thesis of pragmatism, as William James writes, is that there “can be no 
                                                 
22 For example, in “A Lost Horizon” McDermott writes, “If we move through the world concavically, then 
that which is given to us is shrunk by the narrowing, closing of our a priori schema” (12-13).  Moving 
through the world concavically means to shut out possibility, and, although McDermott does not use the 
phrase to explicitly describe ontological lassitude, the existential implication of ontological lassitude is a 
preclusion of possibility. 
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difference anywhere that doesn’t make a difference elsewhere . . .” (“What Pragmatism 
Means” 379).  It is devastating then that, for most of us, there comes a time in our lives 
when we feel that we do not make a difference anymore.  It is as if we speak, but we 
very well might not have spoken; we get out of bed to go to work, but we very well 
might not have gotten out of bed at all.  It is, indeed, as if the time that we spend to live a 
meaningful life is time wasted.  If who we are is what we do, and if, as in pragmatism, 
how we understand the consequences of our actions both funds and posits the 
possibilities we envision for ourselves, then not making a difference arrests possibility 
and is, in short, an ontological death trap.  Moving through life is reduced to a struggle 
to subsist, to a mere continuation of breathing absent good reason to breathe.  Irrelevant, 
discounted, and powerless, the biologically-based deterioration of memory in senescence 
assumes terrible ontological significance—it is a sign that we are fading away.  
“Null”:  this is how Congregationalist minister John Ames in Marilynne Robinson’s 
contemporary fictional autobiography Gilead describes his elderly grandfather.   As a 
boy, Ames recalls travelling with his grandfather to watch a baseball game.  They were 
eager with anticipation because, as his grandfather says, “there was not a man on this 
round earth who could outrun or outthrow Bud Fowler” (46).  However, the game is an 
immense disappointment—nothing happens—and, as Ames shares with his readers, it 
“was not long after the trip to Des Moines that we lost him, or he lost himself” (47).  
Ames reflects on this grievous loss of his grandfather: 
I read somewhere that a thing that does not exist in relation to anything else 
cannot itself be said to exist.  I can’t quite see the meaning of a statement so 
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purely hypothetical as this, though I may simply lack understanding.  But it 
does remind me of that afternoon when nothing flew though the air, no one slid 
or drifted or tagged, when there was no waltz at all, so to speak.  It seems to me 
that the storm had put an end to it, as if it were a fire to be put out, an eruption 
into this world of an alarming kind of nullity.  “There was silence in heaven for 
about half an hour.”  It seems a little like that as I remember it, though it went 
on a good deal longer than half an hour.  Null.  That word has real power.  My 
grandfather had nowhere to spend his courage, no way to feel it in himself.  
That was a great pity.  (47)   
We exist, according to James and Dewey, always within a context of relationships; 
McDermott calls this our relational fabric.  What is to be done, then, when we find 
ourselves in old age exiled from the relationships that give our lives such brilliance and 
purpose by, to take two examples, a passé vision, such as the case of John Ames’ 
grandfather, or by a culture that treasures “new and fresh approaches” and all the 
vapidity these approaches entail?  Disappointment, pain, bitterness, and guilt—these are 
the emotions of an individual whose relational fabric is ripped apart by insidious 
exclusion.  Over time, it can become increasingly difficult to envision a future in which 
we have a palpable presence.  Aristotle’s inveigh against the elderly is trenchant:  “They 
live by memory rather than by hope; for what is left to them of life is but little as 
compared with the long past; and hope is of the future, memory of the past” (Rhetoric 
1390a5-8).  We are lost when we lose hope that we can make a difference—that others 
will hear and consider us—and we become pessimistic.  The soothing advice “It’s 
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always darkest before the dawn” is moot when there is no approaching dawn.  In a future 
devoid of interest, like Jonathan Swift’s, quoted at the beginning of this chapter, we are 
unable to move forward, and we become like Swift’s terrifying Struldbruggs—cast 
aside; obsolete.  “The Struldbruggs of one age do not understand those of another; 
neither are they able after two hundred years to hold any conversation (farther than a few 
general words) with their neighbours the mortals; and thus they lie under the 
disadvantage of living like foreigners in their own country” (Gulliver’s 214).    
For those who do not anticipate the dawn, the past can be captivating.  With a 
sensibility of entitlement, as in “I did my time,” we honor the past with endless 
reconnoiter, effectively reliving the era in which we were relevant:  This is a vicious 
nostalgia.  It is one of the ways in which we live concavically, in which we withdraw 
from the world.  The past has powerful reach: it envelops us like a bell jar, and it is 
enough for us that we once were.  We live with memories; we live as a memory.   Even 
beloved heroes have “their time”—the glory days of their prime, which inevitably pass 
away.  Here is the iconic Beowulf:   
and we took our places at the banquet table. 
There was singing and excitement: an old reciter, 
a carrier of stories, recalled the early days. 
At times some hero made the timbered harp 
tremble with sweetness, or related true 
and tragic happenings; at times the king 
gave the proper turn to some fantastic tale, 
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or a battle-scarred veteran, bowed with age, 
would begin to remember the martial deeds 
of his youth and prime and be overcome 
as the past welled up in his wintry heart.  (Heaney lines 2104-14) 
Fondly recalling the past is not in itself the problem and is, indeed, a virtue.  
Philosopher George Santayana famously wrote that “Those who cannot remember the 
past are doomed to repeat it” (284).  Santayana means, of course, that those who do not 
learn from their past mistakes are doomed to repeat those mistakes.  Remembrance 
becomes pathologic when it is not creative; when there is no reach between our past and 
present experiences; when we do not bring the past into the present context.  Instead, we 
are seduced by the complete intelligibility found in the repetitious rehearsal of events.  
When we are “alert,” in William James’ words, “to an ‘ever not quite’ to all our 
formulas, and novelty and possibility forever leaking in” (qtd. in Perry 386)—when old 
experiences are re-experienced and when the relations between experiences change such 
that new facets of meaning are forged—then there is intelligibility.  Complete 
intelligibility, however, is an impossibility.  Søren Kierkegaard expresses this quite 
strikingly in one of his diary entries.  He writes that  
It is quite true what Philosophy says: that Life must be understood backwards.  
But that makes one forget the other saying: that it must be lived—forwards.  
The more one ponders this, the more it comes to mean that life in the temporal 
existence never becomes quite intelligible, precisely because at no moment can 
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I find complete quiet to take the backward-looking position.  (“1843” pt. 5, sct. 
4, no. 136)   
Living forwards is an effort to ameliorate the present by a willingness to be transformed 
by the ever-novel circumstances of experience.  It is in nostalgia that we pessimistically 
stop living forwards, and we permanently assume the “backward-looking position.”  
Trapped in a private universe populated with memories of past figures, we sever 
connections with all others as we attempt to communicate with them via an experience 
that no longer has experiential purchase.  We live then in a ghostly universe that is ours 
alone. 
AGING EXPERIENCED AS OBSOLESCENCE 
We now turn from a discussion of the possible consequences of becoming obsolete in 
senescence, namely, turning towards nostalgia, to a discussion of living as obsoleting.   
Those who are not deadened by nostalgia and lassitude press on—they live forwards. 
For William James and John Dewey, this living forwards means that we are open to the 
pedagogy of experience.  The world impinges on our relational fabric, and we dialectally 
adapt to the world.  This adaptation is transformation of the “live creature,” according to 
Dewey, in order to cope in its environment.  This transformation is an achievement; it is 
the human creative effort to evaluate the affective and cognitive dimensions of life in 
order to live forward in a meaningful way.   
 It is thus in this very rich sense of living forward in a meaningful way that we can 
understand Dewey’s statement, “Philosophy is criticism” (“Context” 19).  Dewey 
believes that, at its most fundamental level, philosophy is a corrective:  For Dewey the 
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practice of philosophy is essentially the pedagogical subjection of our established 
concepts to the crucible of experience—this is what he means by “criticism”—in order 
to make a better way.  In other words, we listen to the messaging of experience.  The 
following is the above quotation by Dewey in its full context:   
Philosophy is criticism; criticism of the influential beliefs that underlie culture; 
a criticism which traces the beliefs to their generating conditions as far as may 
be, which tracks them to their results, which considers the mutual compatibility 
of the elements of the total structure of beliefs. Such an examination terminates, 
whether so intended or not, in a projection of them into a new perspective 
which leads to new surveys of possibilities.  ("Context” 19)  
Philosophy as criticism is never finished: “reflection,” says Dewey “is native and 
constant” (“Need for a Recovery” 61).  Philosophy, then, is not separate from our living; 
it is a description of how it is that we live.  If we are living forward, we are in the world 
in a critical way, which, in turn, opens up possibilities.  “Criticism,” thus, is not a 
disparaging term.  It is, rather, the often qualitative way in which we continuously 
evaluate our existential situation; it is the way we pay attention to the fringe and focus of 
experience for new relational leads.  Following these relational leads and the possibilities 
they entail enriches what it means to be a human being and is the sense in which human 
beings progress.     
Crucial in the passage above is Dewey’s point that philosophical examination of an 
existing structure of beliefs has the capacity to transform those beliefs into a new 
perspective.  Transformative criticism, according to Dewey, does not require that we 
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substitute whole-sale some beliefs for others.  Instead, we alter beliefs such that a new 
perspective is gained.  Progression, then, does not mean that we truncate the past 
experiences in which our beliefs have come to fruition, as if they are merely an 
embarrassing mistake.  Rather, we are loyal to the existential validity and import of all 
of our experiences.  We hold these experiences close so that, when the context of our 
lives changes, our past experiences can be reconnoitered, reflected upon, and even 
undergone again so that new meaning is gathered.  The past therefore can have 
extraordinary vitality.  Dewey relates that, “The live creature adopts its past; it can make 
friends with even its stupidities, using them as warnings which increase present 
wariness” (“Experience as Aesthetic” 539).  For Dewey, being open to the abiding 
salutary capacity of our own past experience is what makes personal growth and creative 
advance possible.   
James’ revolutionary early work on consciousness, which forms the basis of his 
later radical empiricism, dovetails well with Dewey’s understanding of transformative 
criticism.  According to James, the past, present, and future are fundamentally 
interconnected within a stream of consciousness.  Change is the flowing of one into the 
other; there are no discrete blocks of time between which we can jump when our 
loyalties change.  James provides the following striking illustration:   
The traditional psychology talks like one who should say a river consists of 
nothing but pailsful, spoonsful, quartpotsful, barrelsful, and other moulded 
forms of water.  Even were the pails and the pots all actually standing in the 
stream, still between them the free water would continue to flow.  It is just this 
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free water of consciousness that psychologists resolutely overlook.  Every 
definite image in the mind is steeped and dyed in the free water that flows 
round it.  With it goes the sense of its relations, near and remote, the dying echo 
of whence it came to us, the dawning sense of whither it is to lead.  The 
significance, the value, of the image is all in this halo or penumbra that 
surrounds and escorts it,—or rather that is fused into one with it and has 
become bone of its bone and flesh of its flesh; leaving it, it is true, an image of 
the same thing it was before, but making it an image of that thing newly taken 
and freshly understood.  (“Stream” 45-46) 
There is no intrinsic separateness: the separations that constitute things are pragmatically 
cut out of the flow of consciousness.  Each discrete thing is thus bathed by an inchoate, 
implicit dimension of relations—by, in James’ words, a “halo or penumbra that 
surrounds and escorts it.”  It is thus always possible to reconstruct things by changing 
the flow.  Counter-currents, eddies, and percolations: these are the fluid exertions of 
consciousness that convert old into new.  Furthermore, it is always possible to 
reconstruct every experience ever had:  Each experience is an event haloed by the 
inchoate.  We can reach back and change our histories by allowing the inchoate to speak, 
and it is in this way that our experiences grow.  We are thus not only our stories: we are 
our undergoings.   
 Both James and Dewey advocate a rich, processive ontological pluralism that 
embraces a developmental character of reality and that supports contextual value 
judgments.  This pluralism is the backbone of Dewey’s transformative criticism.  
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Unfortunately, however, while it is true that we live, as the trite saying goes, in very 
critical times, the kind of criticism that predominates is not Dewey’s understanding of 
progress through transformative criticism.  The critical times in which we live subvert 
rather than enhance community values:  Progress requires that we extirpate an antiquated 
past—as if it were dead weight—and criticism thus takes the form of an assault.  
Progress in this insidious sense is marked by experiential obsolescence.  We jettison our 
own experiences in the name of something more fashionable, and, equally capricious 
towards other’s experiences, we attack to demonstrate their inadequacies.  It is a rat-race 
to expose faults and to conquer:  We tear down as soon as we build, laughing at our 
ineptitude, and then we tear down what others have built, boasting of our superiority.   
 Aging in this way is a superficial contest.  To stay young means to maintain 
maximal productivity; it does not mean the infinitely more ambiguous and profound 
aspiration to maintain vitality.  Success is assessed by trajectory measurements, not by a 
sense of inward depth and outward vision.  The virtue of patience has been vitiated, and 
the deep notions of roots, origins, and biography have been obliterated because, as the 
saying goes, “that was then.”  The search for the Fountain of Youth to reverse human 
aging is far from new;23
It is important to note that obsoleting the past is not the same as forgetting the past.  
We may forget events, but these events are not erased: they become quiet as they slip 
 what is new, however, is that the search is almost completely 
characterized by a refusal to reckon with the historicity of our own persons.   
                                                 
23 A wonderful resource on this topic is Gerald J. Gruman’s A History of Ideas about the Prolongation of 
Life. New York: Springer Publishing Co., Inc., 2003. Print. Classics in Longevity and Aging Series. 
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back into the inchoate thickness of experience.  These past events are hidden, perhaps 
not even available to retrospection; yet they are not unknown.  Later, perhaps years later, 
there is another event—a perturbation—and this creates an aperture though which the 
past emerges and speaks, perhaps utterly transforming the way in which life is presently 
lived.  The old, once ambient, experience is re-experienced, and it is in this re-
experiencing that novelty is gleaned and along with it the potential for healing.  To quote 
John Dewey again, “What the live creature retains from the past and what it expects 
from the future operate as directions in the present.  . . . The past absorbed into the 
present carries on; [the live creature] presses forward” (“Experience as Aesthetic” 540).  
Past experience is interpolated into the present, and the live creature makes its way, 
sometimes tentatively, sometimes boldly, but always with ontological anticipation—that 
is, with a watchful eye on the consequences. 
In contrast, when we obsolete the past, we spend our time fending it off. And, 
indeed, while this obsoleting does prevent us from facing a wreckage of a past, it also 
prevents us from celebrating and learning from it.  Obsolescence, then, can be a 
capricious weapon of self-denial and deception that inures us of the ameliorative, 
miscible reach between experiences.  In James’ terminology, it halts the flow.  John J. 
McDermott opines,  
I take obsoleting as a casting-off, a burying alive of our potentially memoried 
experiences, thereby snapping, scissoring the organic continuity of our person.  
The more I obsolete my past, the less present I am to and for myself.  If we 
fudge, smudge, and bury our personal history, inclusive of events, smells, and 
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things, we find ourselves dragging around an experiential cemetery.  Our 
commitment to present-mindedness, a contemporary euphemism for narcissism, 
paradoxically renders us empty.  (“Lost Horizon” 9)   
The self, according to James, is a processive bundle of teeming relations.  In the mighty 
race to innovate, we repress and excoriate the personal entanglements that together 
constitute our very existence, thus debasing the seriousness of our mortal situation. 
Living by obsoleting is a living that is vacuous.  Aging with a finger perpetually on the 
delete button eviscerates living.24
CONCLUSION 
 
Aging experienced as ontological lassitude, as vicious nostalgia, and as obsolescence are 
the phenomenological diagnoses of relational inanition—living death.  If we experience 
life in these ways, one day we will turn inside, like Mary from Eugene O’Neill’s Long 
Day’s Journey into Night, and find nothing there.  Mary admits, “I’ve become such a 
liar.  I never lied about anything once upon a time.  Now I have to lie, especially to 
myself.  But how can you understand, when I don’t myself.  I’ve never understood 
anything about it, except that one day long ago I found I could no longer call my soul my 
own” (93; act 2).  Lost and empty, Mary retreats into the fog of a morphine-induced 
nostalgia, in which, in Mary’s words, “no one can find or touch you any more” (98; act 
3).   Like Mary, William James’ sister, Alice James, was, at the age of forty-three, 
empty.  She expresses her grief,  
                                                 
24 McDermott writes that “We live at a time characterized by the delete button” (“Lost Horizon” 10). 
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The fact is, I have been dead so long and it has been simply such a grim 
shoving of the hours behind me as I faced a ceaseless possible horror, since that 
hideous summer of ’78, when I went down to the deep sea, its dark waters 
closed over me and I knew neither hope nor peace; that now it’s only the 
shriveling of an empty pea pod that has to be completed.  (230) 
To have a presence is to be active in time, experientially engaged in a present and in 
a past that, through this engagement, has the open-ended capacity to give life meaning; 
this, indeed, is the activity of possibility.  To be alive is to listen to experience; aging is a 
dying when we stop listening. The optimistic message, however, is that our experience 
of aging can be reconstructed:  Time passes to be sure, but instead of extinguishing 
meaning in its wake, time can be the fertile ground in which we can create meaning.  
Wayne Booth eloquently alludes to this positive capacity of time in his anthology on 
aging with his insight that while authors “are quite certain, at the time of writing, that the 
only honest statement must be negative, they are caught in the great paradox of 
creativity: to speak to, or about, or against the nothingness is to make something and to 
demonstrate that making is one of life’s possibilities” (47). Importantly, this paradox of 
creativity signals that we can choose how it is that we undergo our aging.  We can 
choose to reconstruct our experience of aging such that character of time changes from a 
process of destruction into one of creative genesis.  “Making” is the grandest of all life’s 
possibilities.   
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CHAPTER IV 
DEATH: THE PRAGMATIST PERSPECTIVE 
 
A little longer grace, and I’ll pay the shot out of my own pocket: meanwhile 
Epicurus will oblige me.  He says, ‘Practise death’—or, if it’s more aptly put 
so, how to pass over to—ourselves.  The meaning here’s plain: it’s a splendid 
thing to learn thoroughly how to die.  Perhaps you think it superfluous to learn 
an accomplishment you’ll only have to use once.  That’s the very reason why 
we’re bound to practise it: we must be for ever learning a thing our knowledge 
of which we can’t test.   
Seneca, “Letter XXVI” 
The following Buddhist tale is ancient, and there are many variations.  A traveler, fleeing 
a tiger that is chasing him, jumps down into a dried-up well in order to escape.  Above 
him the beast snarls.  Suddenly, below him, he hears another snarl and, behold, there is 
another creature—a dragon—leering up at him.  He catches hold of a branch that grows 
from a crevice of the well, and the branch suspends him midway between the tiger and 
the dragon.  The traveler dare not climb out; he dare not drop down.  Soon his hands 
begin to weaken, and his body begins to tire.  As he looks around, he notices two mice, 
one white and one black, evenly circling around the base of the branch on which he 
hangs, gnawing at it.  He realizes that he will inevitably perish. Then, in front of him, he 
sees drops of honey clinging to a few leaves on the branch.  He leans out, reaches the 
honey with his tongue, and laps it up.  
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We thus, as Leo Tolstoy reflects on this allegory, perilously “hang on the branch of 
life” as time—symbolized by the white and black mice—gnaws away at it (19).  Faced 
with the radical and ineluctable finitude of our existence, Tolstoy wonders, “What is the 
point of living?  What is the point of wanting anything?  What is the point of doing 
anything?” (24).  He asks further, “Is there in my life any meaning that will not be 
extinguished by the inevitable death that awaits me?” (24).  These simple questions, 
Tolstoy emphasizes, “without which life is not possible,” lie “in the soul of every person, 
from a stupid child to an old man of great wisdom” (24).  Tolstoy is right.   
Finitude, of course, is a euphemism for death, and our approaching physical death 
becomes more palpable as we age.  Time demands sacrifices and hence becomes 
increasingly obstreperous: the innocence of youth quickly evaporates, our children age, 
the body deteriorates, and our loved ones suffer and die.  These events mark the 
approaching end of our lives:  The final stage of our own senescence is death.  
Especially in later years, then, the process of aging is tied to its ultimate outcome.  This 
contiguity of aging and death is fairly modern: in the centuries before medical 
advancement, infant mortality was extraordinarily high by modern standards, and, in 
general, life was uncertain.  However, even now, despite our modern skill at prolonging 
life, death is the only thing that is certain. 
What, then, especially as the end draws near in senescence, do we think about 
Tolstoy’s questions?  What is death?  These are venerated but personal questions, ones 
that we keep locked away in the recesses of our interiors, ones that emerge in many 
different shapes throughout our lives.  Moreover, crucially, it is not only at the end of 
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our physical lives that we die; indeed, the main point of Chapter III is that we can 
undergo a living death.  If the self is a bundle of relations—that is, if we hold a relational 
ontology—then we stagnate and ultimately die an ontological death when we no longer 
build those relations; when we no longer are willing to be transformed by the ongoing 
flux of experience.  An ontological death is the diagnosis for the absence of novelty and 
possibility in our lives.  If death, thus, is tied to our experience—if we die when our 
experience dies, not only with our physical bodies—then what distinguishes physical 
death?  More specifically, does physical death terminate experience, or does experience 
somehow survive physical death?   
In Western culture, physical death is either one of two events: oblivion or a path to 
immortality.25
                                                 
25 The belief in reincarnation, so prevalent in Eastern culture, will not be addressed here.  Second, this 
dichotomy between oblivion and immortality is admittedly too simple.  Resurrection, for example, is very 
important to theological doctrine.  Resurrection occurs in time, and individuals gain new bodies.  The 
apostle Paul, however, conflates resurrection and immortality, and this chapter will follow suit.   
  To suffer oblivion at death is to be erased from the universe; immortality, 
however, is not so singularly defined.  In his Self, God, and Immortality, Eugene 
Fontinell catalogues six meanings.  The first is personal immortality, and it is perhaps 
the most familiar to us.  In personal immortality, the “I” survives physical death.  In the 
relational ontology defended here, personal immortality would have to be one in which a 
self that interprets the flux of experience endures.  Admittedly, it is not clear what an 
enduring self that interprets experience amounts to as experience takes place in time, and 
time is a feature of human existence, of which we run out at death.  Perhaps, however, 
we could allow for the continued existence of an active self outside of time that builds 
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relations of some kind.26
Whether death results in some mode of immortality or in oblivion is something we 
cannot know for certain, for death is not an event that we can experience.  We can only 
experience our dying and the loss of others.  At this point it is important to remember 
that pragmatism asserts that personal experience is the stuff of reality; it dispenses with 
the transcendental, which, it stresses, is an abstraction.   “Knowledge of sensible 
realities,” as William James writes, “comes to life inside the tissue of experience” 
(“World” 201).  Experience is thus the only suitable resource for beliefs, and the only 
knowledge that we can have about death and what follows it, incomplete as it may be, is 
rooted in our actual experiencing.   
  The remaining five versions of immortality that Fontinell lists 
are the following: absolute spirit immortality, in which we are immortal insofar as we 
are absorbed with the Eternal Spirit, the Everlasting God, or the One; cosmic 
immortality, in which we are immortal insofar as we emerge from and return to the 
cosmos or nature; ideal immortality, in which we are immortal insofar as we participate 
in timeless values or eternal ideals; achievement immortality, in which we are immortal 
through our creative acts or deeds; and posterity immortality, in which we are immortal 
through our children, the community, or the race (20-21).     
Fontinell maintains that, while pragmatism does not allow guarantees, we can 
speculate about what might happen at death by extrapolating from concrete experience.  
                                                 
26 The reader is referred to Fontinell’s chapter “Immortality: A Pragmatic-Processive Model” for a 
discussion of cosmic growth tied to creative action.  Fontinell claims that it “is the task of self-creativity 
begun in this life that must be extrapolated as continuing in any new life” (213).  Fontinell then quotes 
John Shea: “When time and history are not viewed as terrors but as mediums of human development, 
heaven will not be viewed as external and static perfection.  Heaven will be a time for continued growth 
and moral progress” (qtd. 213). 
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He asserts that   
pragmatism does not hesitate to venture some metaphysical guesswork or 
construct some metaphysical myths by way of extrapolation from concrete 
experience as to what characterizes reality or the world.  While, on the basis of 
what is available to human experience, there can be no absolute origin or 
absolute end, still we can discern and/or speculate about possible directions and 
opt to work for some directions and against others.  Such efforts, of course, 
must be energized by beliefs and hopes, which, though not “provable,” are 
nevertheless “reasonable.”  (10) 
Further, it can be added, we can evaluate these reasonable beliefs about death by 
subjecting those beliefs to the “test” of experience: that is, we can ask ourselves whether 
our experience continues to support our beliefs.  Pragmatism asserts that, as the world is 
unfinished—always in the making—we are always epistemically fallible.  Thus all 
reflective knowledge, including our beliefs and our concepts about God and an after-life 
are tentative and subject to revision in light of continuing experience.27
                                                 
27 Fontinell argues that any pragmatic extrapolation of the future must fulfill the following four 
conditions:   
   
First, it must proceed from data given in experience.  Second, this projected future must be 
plausible—that is, it must not be in fundamental conflict with the data from which it is an 
extrapolation.  Third, the future state must be sufficiently different from the present state so that 
the future is not merely the present indefinitely extended.  Fourth and most important, the 
extrapolation must render our present life—in both its individual and communal aspects—more 
meaningful, more significant, and more rich.  (19-20) 
Fontinell then develops in fascinating detail a relational “field model” of the self, in which the divine and 
human consciousness are continuous.  This model, he contends, which is most congenial to James’ 
Varieties of Religious Experience, supports belief in immortality by fulfilling the first three above 
conditions.  This chapter, however, will not endeavor to demonstrate that particular beliefs about death are 
reasonable given particular data of experience.  Rather, it will be assumed that the self is relational, and 
the work in this chapter will endeavor to show that particular beliefs about death are pragmatically 
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Therefore, the crucial point relevant to this discussion is that any belief, including 
our beliefs about death, must be lived:  We live what death means.  In pragmatism, then, 
questions about the meaning of death must be rephrased more explicitly to the following:  
How do our beliefs about death transform our experience?  Death’s meaning must be 
located within the experiential flow of human life.  In the words of William James, 
“There are concepts, however, the image-part of which is so faint that their whole value 
seems to be functional.  ‘God,’ ‘cause,’ ‘number,’ ‘substance,’ ‘soul,’ for example 
suggest no definite picture; and their significance seems to consist entirely in their 
tendency, in the further turn which may give to our action or our thought” (“Percept and 
Concept” 1012).  Oblivion and immortality are indeed concepts, vague concepts, to be 
sure.  James continues by outlining the method that will be employed in this chapter to 
evaluate our beliefs about these concepts—the pragmatic method, or what he calls in the 
following passage the “pragmatic rule”:  “The pragmatic rule is that the meaning of a 
concept may always be found, if not in some sensible particular which it directly 
designates, then in some particular difference in the course of human experience which 
its being true will make” (1012).  Death’s meaning is the difference that its being true 
makes in our lives.   This difference is played out every day, sometimes painfully in the 
forefront of consciousness, sometimes nebulously within the profound depths of joy, and 
sometimes in the heaviness of the day-to-day.  Death, whether we believe that it leads to 
oblivion or to a form of immortality, or whether we deny it, is in the way we think and in 
                                                                                                                                                
desirable or undesirable insofar as they either satisfy or fail to satisfy the most important fourth condition 
above—that beliefs about the future should transform our experience in a desirable way.   
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the way that we move.   
This chapter, thus, aims to attain an understanding of physical death—the 
experiential difference beliefs about death make in our lives.  There are two implicitly 
interwoven elements in this chapter.  The first element is descriptive: it will delineate the 
ramifications for experience when death is, first, denied; second, when it is believed to 
amount to oblivion; and, third, when it is believed to precede a form of immortality. 28
The prescriptive pragmatic evaluation turns on the most valuable concept of death.  
The most valuable concept of death, in turn, makes the most valuable difference; this is 
crucial, and to understand this point is to understand the central thrust of pragmatism—
that of individual and societal meliorism.  The pragmatist tradition understands human 
inquiry as an open-ended struggle to enrich the quality of human life—to make life 
better.  It does not seek, as has often been accused, to increase simple individual 
   
The second element is prescriptive: that is, it shall suggest how our beliefs about death 
should affect our lives.  John J. McDermott, echoing the existentialist sensibility of the 
above Buddhist tale, opines that “we should experience our own lives in the context of 
being permanently afflicted, that is, of being terminal” (Drama 286).  But the next 
question we must ask ourselves is what should experiencing our lives as terminal mean?  
Should life be experienced as the short interlude between birth and dissolution, per 
McDermott’s meaning, or should life be experienced as the finite mortal term that 
precedes immortality, as Fontinell ultimately puts forth?  
                                                 
28 Although some assert that belief in immortality is denial of death, including quite famously for example, 
Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud, this is not the position taken here.  See the more detailed discussion under the 
section “Death as a Path to Immortality” in this chapter.  
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satisfaction.  Human enrichment is infinitely more complex and lovely.  In a pragmatic 
evaluation, the consequences of holding a belief should make our experience of the 
world more fruitful, more open to the possibility of novelty; indeed, this idea has been 
developed and defended throughout Chapters III and IV.  Thus when it comes to 
philosophical analysis, Dewey weighs in, we must ask ourselves, “Does it end in 
conclusions which, when they are referred back to ordinary life-experiences and their 
predicaments, render them more significant, more luminous to us, and make our dealings 
with them more fruitful?” (“Experience and Philosophic Method” 18).  For Dewey and 
for James, the task of philosophical inquiry is to make our life open to the informing 
character of experience, to make it thick with relations and hence with abiding, 
concatenated meaning.  Experience is, in Dewey’s words, “pregnant with connections” 
(“Need for a Recovery” 61).29
For the most part, James attends to the individual’s sustained efforts to purposively 
carve a life out of an expectant yet treacherous terrain.  “The solid meaning of life,” 
writes James, “is always the same eternal thing,—the marriage, namely, of some 
unhabitual ideal, however special, with some fidelity, courage, and endurance with some 
man’s or woman’s pains.—And, whatever or wherever life may be, there will always be 
the chance for that marriage to take place” (“What Makes a Life Significant” 659).  
James is clear: this struggle toward a novel ideal begets a vital inner significance, which 
  A life of novelty and deep significance emerges from our 
activity of forging these connections both in ourselves and in our communities.     
                                                 
29 The following is the full quotation: “An experience that is an undergoing of an environment and a 
striving for its control in new directions is pregnant with connections” (“Need for a Recovery” 61). 
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cuts across social class and occupation,30
Wherever a process of life communicates an eagerness to him who lives it, 
there the life becomes genuinely significant.  Sometimes the eagerness is more 
knit up with motor activities, sometimes with the imagination, sometimes with 
reflective thought.  But, wherever it is found, there is the zest, the tingle, the 
excitement of reality; and there is ‘importance’ in the only real and positive 
sense in which importance ever anywhere can be.  (“Certain Blindness” 631) 
 and is the crux of life’s meaning.  He 
unwaveringly affirms that  
Individual progress, then, is an embodied delving into an “ideal”—a purpose that 
affectively moves us—and time is experienced as path to that ideal.  In James’ words, 
progress is “that strange union of reality with ideal novelty which it continues from one 
moment to another to present” (“What Makes a Life Significant” 657).  Reality is an 
unfinished process, and progress is reality wrought by our own visionary efforts.  Into 
these passages the strong ontological strand in James is easily read.  How we comport 
ourselves in the present—by identifying and struggling to achieve a novel ideal—is the 
activity by which we create an existence.   
For James, the notion of meliorism is bound up with that of the individual: 
progression is the therapeutic, transformative way in which the individual interprets the 
phenomenal flux; but for Dewey, the potentially salutary capacity of experience has an 
                                                 
30 Throughout “What Makes a Life Significant,” James explicitly rejects Tolstoy’s contention that the 
hard-working peasant class leads a more meaningful life than the affluent class because it must struggle to 
survive.  James maintains that the struggle to live a meaningful life, which roughly consists in energy and 
perseverance to achieve an ideal, transcends class. 
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explicit social application.31
Modern philosophic thought has been so preoccupied with these puzzles of 
epistemology and the disputes between realist and idealist, between 
phenomenalist and absolutist, that many students are at a loss to know what 
would be left for philosophy if there were removed both the metaphysical task 
of distinguishing between the noumenal and phenomenal worlds and the 
epistemological task of telling how a separate subject can know an independent 
object.  But would not the elimination of these traditional problems permit 
philosophy to devote itself to a more fruitful and more needed task?  Would it 
not encourage philosophy to face the great social and moral defects and troubles 
from which humanity suffers, to concentrate its attention upon clearing up the 
causes and exact nature of these evils and upon developing a clear idea of better 
social possibilities; in short upon projecting an idea or ideal, which instead of 
expressing the notion of another world or some far-away unrealizable goal, 
  Dewey’s center of vision is his profound historical and 
social consciousness:  He advocates a philosophy that can answer the pressing concrete 
problems facing society; modern philosophy, occupied with the tedious perennial 
intellectual enterprise of overcoming a self-imposed split between subject and object, 
according to Dewey, cannot.  He expounds on the virtues of pragmatism over other 
forms of philosophy:   
                                                 
31 Within The American Evasion of Philosophy, Cornell West offers an insightful biographical sketch and 
philosophical study of Dewey.  His evaluation of James is warm, but West lauds Dewey:  “American 
pragmatism reaches its highest level of sophisticated articulation and engaged elaboration in the works and 
life of John Dewey.  To put it crudely, if Emerson is the American Vico, and James and Pierce our John 
Stuart Mill and Immanuel Kant, then Dewey is the American Hegel and Marx!” (69).  
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would be used as a method of understanding and rectifying specific social ills?  
(Reconstruction 123-24).   
Pragmatism affirms that subject and object are merely functional distinctions of a more 
encompassing experience.  Dewey firmly believed that if we were to turn our attention to 
experience itself, we could evolve a dynamic method to help heal the problems that 
plague our communities.  Dewey, in short, guided by the insights of pragmatism, hoped 
to assuage human suffering.  In particular, Dewey draws our attention to the contextual 
significance of problems.  Problems occur in a particular context; absolute solutions, 
thus, simply will not suffice.  As a context changes, the problem changes shape; so, too, 
the solution must change shape.  A problem must be worked and re-worked in light of 
the problem’s changing context.  Dewey hence saw pragmatism, with its metaphysical 
and epistemological respect for difference and for pluralism, as the crucial philosophical 
ground for promoting an enduring social reform. 
Following both Dewey and James, then, a pragmatic approach to death must be 
grounded in experienceable consequences, and these consequences should be valued in 
terms of their capacity to promote individual significance as well as social reform.  Thus, 
now equipped with the pragmatic method, we turn our attention to the following 
pragmatic evaluations: the denial of death, the consequences of which, it will soon be 
evident, are ultimately harmful, death experienced as oblivion, and death experienced as 
a path to immortality. 
THE DENIAL OF DEATH 
A caveat must be addressed, and a very large one at that:  Questions surrounding the 
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implacability of death and the concomitant ambiguity that imbues our own living—
questions that essentially amount to “Why bother?”—may indeed be in the soul of every 
human being, as Tolstoy writes; however many live in self-deceptive denial of their own 
impending ends.  We, in McDermott’s words, “run for cover on behalf of our escape 
from death” (Drama 290).  Death is what happens to other people, and we refuse to 
believe that our mortal lives will end, too.  There exist many pretenses of safeguard.  
Pharmacology, exercise programs, and dieting: more than mere measures to improve 
health and extend life, they compose the covert mechanics of denial—they are Fountains 
of Youth, ultimately futile efforts to perpetuate life indefinitely.32
It is a deep-seated fear of death that leads to its denial.  This fear is, at its most 
general, fear of the unknown.  In perhaps the most recognized quotations of our time, 
Shakespeare’s Hamlet contemplates death and agonizes over what might follow it.  
    
To be, or not to be—that is the question. 
Whether ʼtis nobler in the mind to suffer 
The slings and arrows of outrageous fortune, 
Or take arms against a sea of troubles 
And by opposing end them.  To die, to sleep— 
No more, and by a sleep to say we end 
The heartache and the thousand natural shocks 
That flesh is heir to.  ʼTis a consummation 
                                                 
32 See, in particular, Gerald J. Gruman’s A History of Ideas about the Prolongation of Life. New York: 
Springer Publishing Co., Inc., 2003. Print. Classics in Longevity and Aging Series. 
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Devoutly to be wished.  To die, to sleep, 
To sleep—perchance to dream.  Aye, there’s the 
 rub, 
 For in that sleep of death what dreams may come 
When we have shuffled off this mortal coil 
Must give us pause.  . . .  (III.i.55-68) 
In this passage, Hamlet weighs the risks of suicide:33
Although Hamlet might prefer oblivion to his tragic life, many others would not:  
Fear of death is often the fear of oblivion, which is discussed in greater depth below.  
There is a classical argument in response to this fear, which some may find comforting:  
Epicurus writes, “Therefore that most frightful of evils, death, is nothing to us, seeing 
that when we exist death is not present, and when death is present we do not exist” 
(150).  Epicurus’ meaning is this:  We did not exist before our conceptions, and we do 
not now find this fact of oblivion troubling.  Therefore, concludes Epicurus, we should 
not find the oblivion that occurs with death troubling either—there will be nothing that 
remains of us that will be aware of it.  Epicurus’ point is similar to the one made at the 
  He wonders whether death would 
mean oblivion, which he compares favorably to the chaotic and melancholy struggles of 
his life; and suicide thus would then be an escape.  Alternatively Hamlet wonders “what 
dreams may come”—whether he would be damned to Hell—which would be a fate 
worse than living.   
                                                 
33 It must be noted that there is no little scholarly disagreement on how this passage should be interpreted. 
Some question whether Hamlet is in fact contemplating suicide. 
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beginning of the chapter—that we cannot experience our own deaths.  It was also 
pointed out that we do experience our dying, and there may be considerable pain in the 
process of dying.  Epicurus’ position, however, is that this pain—or any pain—should 
not be feared.  
Those not convinced by Epicurus go on fearing, and, even if they do believe in 
some form of immortality, they may fear that it will not be enough, that it will not be one 
in which personal identity is sustained.  Eugene Fontinell, for example, asserts that 
“there are no adequate surrogates [to personal immortality] which can serve to alleviate 
the pain of loss” and that, further, “[a]ssuming that human persons are precious 
realizations of nature or the cosmic process, the failure to maintain these persons in that 
mode of individuality upon which their preciousness depends may be a harsh truth to be 
endured but surely not to be celebrated” (21).   
Lastly, although we might believe in an immortality in which our personal identity 
is preserved, we may fear that we will miss the earthly interactions with the many 
important people and things that made our lives so precious.  We may deeply regret, for 
example, that we will not live to see our children or our grandchildren grow.  John 
Ames, the deeply pious Congregationalist minister in Marilynne Robinson’s Gilead is 
given only months to live after he is diagnosed with a heart condition, and he is filled 
with love and deep longing for his young family and for his earthly life.  Overwhelmed 
by his “admiration for existence” (56), Ames reveals,    
I feel sometimes as if I were a child who opens its eyes on the world once and 
sees amazing things it will never know any names for and then has to close its 
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eyes again.  I know this is all mere apparition compared to what awaits us, but 
it is only lovelier for that.  There is a human beauty in it.  And I can’t believe 
that, when we have all been changed and put on incorruptibility, we will ever 
forget our fantastic condition of mortality and impermanence, the great bright 
dream of procreating and perishing that meant the whole world to us.  In 
eternity this world will be Troy, I believe, and all that has passed here will be 
the epic of the universe, the ballad they sing in the streets.  Because I don’t 
imagine any reality putting this one in the shade entirely, and I think piety 
forbids me to try.  (57)   
In this striking passage, heaven cannot replace the magnificence of human existence.  
Our “fantastic condition of mortality,” with its embattled days and nights, with its 
constancies and vicissitudes, and with its celebrations and lamentations, is indeed a 
journey of epic proportions.  There is, as Ames so passionately and convincingly 
testifies, every reason to feel anxious and saddened about the prospect of our own 
deaths, regardless of what we think death might entail.      
Self-deceptive denial offers a convenient escape from our fears of the unknown and 
of terrible loss.  If there is a positive side to denial at all, then, it is this: relief from this 
paralyzing fear and pain, which, in turn, helps us get through the day.  However, the 
adverse consequences of self-deceptive denial of death are grave; there are intolerable 
losses.  We lose the drama of living: we lose our sense of the very temporality that 
makes us human, and with it we lose the spiritual depth that this final event can inspire 
via reflection or via vicarious experience.  We also lose the capacity to empathize with 
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the suffering of others and thus forfeit the ability to commune with others.  To deny 
death is to live life where people, places, and happenings are shallow, devoid of the great 
mystery of life—the unexperiencable end.  A life into which death is not admitted 
eliminates pain; but it also eliminates the steadfast resoluteness to endure—to continue 
living a life that is pock-marked with nothingness which, paradoxically, makes the rest 
of the living so poignant.   
Our mortality exists in the way that we touch the world and in the way the world 
touches back.  To deny our mortality is to refuse to touch the world, and, then, the world 
does not touch back.  If we hold a relational ontology, such as the one defended in 
Chapter III, it is in this pernicious condition of denial that our relationing is sheared of 
experiential depth; and it is in this condition that great ontological loneliness abides.  Let 
those who live in denial of death, then, heed the wise words of Seneca, 
Death weighs heavy on one 
who, too well known to all, 
dies unknown to himself.  (Thyestes II.401-03)  
To live in courage is to accept the inevitability of death.  In return for our acceptance is a 
life of finitude that is, at its best, a life in which we are fully engaged as participants in a 
processive reality.   
Once death is intrepidly faced, however, we must choose again; this choice is the 
way we live in finitude.  We can live as if death results in oblivion; or, alternatively, we 
can live as if death is the final event of mortal life that precedes an immortal life outside 
of time.  Each of these ways of living is the pragmatic difference death makes in our 
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lives.  We shall thus now turn to consider the consequences of each way.    
DEATH AS OBLIVION 
And, to say all in a word, everything which belongs to the body is a stream, and 
what belongs to the soul is a dream and a vapour, and life is a warfare and a 
stranger’s sojourn, and after-fame is oblivion. 
    Marcus Aurelius, Meditations Book 2, 16  
John J. McDermott writes that the “first, foremost, and permanent ontological fact of our 
human situation is that we were born to live but sure to die” (Drama 224).  And, if, 
indeed, there is no life after death, then “time,” as McDermott warns, “is a prelude to 
disaster.”34
 What is the point of human activity, then, if we are to soon join the innumerable 
masses already dead and forgotten?  This is Tolstoy’s question posed in the beginning of 
the chapter, and it is one of the most important questions that can be asked.  In 
  On this view, whether young or old, whether it is announced in the form of a 
diagnosis—cancer, perhaps, or senility—each one of us is terminal.  We are born, we 
live for a time, and then we die.  Oblivion: we come, and then we go, and that is that; we 
are completely erased from the universe.  Others’ feelings of love and loss and their 
memories of us only last so long—a generation, perhaps two; authored books are soon 
buried under the modern deluge of published material; and a placard on a door or even 
on a building are soon replaced by the name of one of the other billions of people in this 
world.   
                                                 
34 See McDermott’s essay, “The Inevitability of our Own Death: The Celebration of Time as a Prelude to 
Disaster” pages 278-90 in his Drama. 
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answering this question, there lie two choices.  These choices again are paths—that is, 
ways of living.  The first path is to live life as if all of its activities were meaningless.  If 
we are to die, and all is to come to naught, why do anything in the first place?  In the 
most chillingly pessimistic passage from Samuel Beckett’s Waiting for Godot, Pozzo 
cries out, “one day we were born, one day we shall die, the same day, the same second, 
is that enough for you?  They gave birth astride of a grave, the light gleams an instant 
then its night once more” (103).  We merely take up space for a brief time; all the 
decisions over which we agonized, all the castles we built are undone, null, along with 
us.   
This nihilistic way of living, from the pragmatist’s perspective, is destructive.  In 
place of a commitment to ameliorate, it substitutes a despairing, even cynical 
detachment from the world and from ourselves:  We are trapped, prisoners of an absurd 
world, strangers for a while, biding time until we return to nothing.  Accompanying 
detachment is the sensibility of powerlessness—a white-flag surrender into quiescence.  
If living is a waste, why bother with the struggle?  These sensibilities are in polar 
contrast to both the pragmatist and process angles of vision presented here.  According 
to the process vision, it is we who, together with the world, build ourselves; far from 
being strangers from the world, we emerge through an intimate participation.  There are 
no singles; there are only relations, and thus we are fundamentally ontologically 
connected with the world—it is woven into our doings.  Moreover, the character of these 
relations is, at its most ideal, pedagogical, and this is the pragmatic affair:  It is through 
our relations that we learn about ourselves and how we can continue to cultivate our own 
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personal growth; and it is also in virtue of our shared relations that we can help build 
better communities. 
 Perhaps it should not be surprising that when the aged ask themselves, “Why 
bother?” the decision is, more than any other age group, not to bother.  Indeed, suicide is 
most prevalent in the United States at ages sixty-five and older.  It represents sixteen to 
twenty-five percent of the total number of suicides, a rate purportedly attributed to a 
deteriorating quality of life, including ill-health, social isolation, and depression (Brody).  
Add to this list the ontological erosion discussed in Chapter III, which consists, in brief, 
in a withdrawal from making relations.  More than any group, then, the elderly suffers.  
Life for them is plagued with loss—loss of meaning, loss of health, loss of societal 
value, loss of loved ones, and loss of time left to live.  “Shall I live a miserable, 
meaningless life waiting for an inevitable death?” the elderly traveler of Tolstoy’s 
allegory asks.  His answer is, “No, I shall not,” and, still suspended between the two 
beasts, he releases his grip.    
A deteriorating quality of life in senescence is a problem with prehistoric roots:  It 
was not uncommon for a tribal elder to commit suicide to help preserve tribal resources.  
And, indeed, life for those who reached older ages before the relatively recent 
dominance of modern medicine was extraordinarily treacherous.  The influential ancient 
Roman stoic Seneca advises the foundering elderly individual to preserve his dignity by 
“extricating the suffering spirit.”  Seneca counsels,   
And that leads us to pronounce on the question whether it’s right to turn from 
the finale of old age in disgust, and bring about its close by our own hand 
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instead of waiting for it.  The man who awaits his doom inertly is all but afraid, 
just as the man who swigs off the bottle and drains even the lees is over-given 
to his liquor.  In this case, however, we shall try to find out whether the last part 
of life is really lees, or something extraordinarily bright and clear if only the 
mind’s uninjured, the senses come unimpaired to the aid of the spirit, and the 
body isn’t foundered and a prey to death in life.  For the crucial point is whether 
it’s life or death a man’s prolonging.  If, on the other hand, the body’s past its 
duties, it may be (why not?) the right thing to extricate the suffering spirit.  
Indeed, you may have to do so a little before the due time, for fear that when 
the due time comes you may have lost the power to do so.  And since in living 
badly there’s a greater peril than in dying quickly, a man’s a fool not to insure 
against an enormous risk at the cost of a few days.  Old age, if it lasts very long, 
brings few to death unmarred: for many of the aged life collapses into lethargy 
and impotence.  After that do you consider a scrap of life a more poignant loss 
than the freedom to end it?  Don’t listen to me with a frown, as if that verdict 
applied to you at the moment.  Weigh my words.  I shan’t cast old age off if old 
age keeps me whole for myself—whole, I mean, on my better side; but if it 
begins to unseat my reason and pull it piecemeal, if it leaves me not life but 
mere animation, I shall be out of my crumbling, tumble-down tenement at a 
bound.  (“Letter LVIII” 189-90)  
Seneca himself had the courage of his convictions and calmly committed suicide at 
Nero’s orders.  Extraordinarily, Seneca’s centuries-old advice is not dated:  Countless 
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individuals and political action groups, planetary-wide, have cogently argued that 
palliative end-of-life services such as euthanasia should be legalized in order to preserve 
human rights and dignity.   
Seneca’s position on suicide, of course, is not shared by everyone; indeed, the 
philosophical history of attitudes toward suicide is rich and quite varied.  For example, 
while Christian theology, particularly the Roman Catholic tradition, holds that suicide is 
morally impermissible, the existentialist tradition holds that suicide is a free and 
courageous act—perhaps the only free act—of an individual who is charged with the 
difficult task of creating meaning in what is fundamentally an absurd situation.  
Pragmatists, on the other hand, would judge the moral status of suicide based on the 
context of the particular situation.35
   There is, however, another way to live in which death is experienced as oblivion. 
This way is Albert Camus’ way; it is John Dewey’s way; and it is John J. McDermott’s 
  Whatever the appropriate moral response to suicide, 
the act implies a struggle and then a decision of the greatest finality—the choice of death 
over life.  This decision indeed makes starkly thematic the capacity we have to direct our 
embodied lives; it also makes starkly thematic the precariousness of our embodied lives.   
We take an existential risk when we make a life—when we formulate and pursue a 
possibility—in the midst of ontological uncertainty.  Suicide is the making of a life—it is 
the last act—and it is the act fraught with the greatest risk:  To choose to end is to make 
a decision from which there is no recovery. 
                                                 
35 For a careful and thorough delineation of John Dewey’s moral philosophy, see Gregory Fernando 
Pappas’ John Dewey’s Ethics: Democracy as Experience. Bloomington: Indiana UP, 2008. 
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way.   Life may be absurd, absent of a transcendent, given purpose, bound by death, and 
sown with the seeds of its own demise, but by no means is it futile!  We take the 
Sisyphean path now:  We intrepidly, doggedly carry on in the face of the absurd, and we 
build, sustain, and protect with no guaranteed future, with tychism until the end.  We 
thus see Sisyphus pushing the rock up the hill with dignity, purpose, and, as Camus tells 
us, with joy.  Suicide, of course, is always an option, but as long as that rock exists, there 
is reason enough to choose to push it.  While his “whole being is exerted toward 
accomplishing nothing,” Camus proclaims, “Sisyphus is the absurd hero” (376).  
Sisyphus becomes profoundly human in his burdens and endless toil, Camus continues; 
too, he becomes our inspiration. 
If the descent is thus sometimes performed in sorrow, it can also take place 
in joy.  This word is not too much.  Again I fancy Sisyphus returning toward his 
rock, and the sorrow was in the beginning.  When the images of earth cling too 
tightly to his memory, when the call of happiness becomes too insistent, it 
happens that melancholy rises in man’s heart: this is the rock’s victory, this is 
the rock itself.  The boundless grief is too heavy to bear.  These are our nights 
of Gethsemane.  But crushing truths perish from being acknowledged.  Thus, 
Oedipus at the outset obeys his fate without knowing it.  But from the moment 
he knows, his tragedy begins.  Yet at the same moment, blind and desperate, he 
realizes that the only bond linking him to the world is the cool hand of a girl.  
Then a tremendous remark rings out:  “Despite so many ordeals, my advanced 
age and the nobility of my soul make me conclude that all is well.”  Sophocles’ 
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Oedipus, like Dostoevsky’s Kirilov, thus gives the recipe for the absurd victory.  
(377)  
Oedipus and Sisyphus both acknowledge the absurd, and it is only after this 
acknowledgement that Oedipus can freely and victoriously remark that “all is well.”  
The remark, avers Camus, “is sacred.  It echoes in the wild and limited universe of man.  
It drives out of this world a god who had come into it with dissatisfaction and a 
preference for futile sufferings.  It makes of fate a human matter, which must be settled 
among men” (378).  The source of the sacred is human striving, which arises from 
temporal purpose within the expectant everyday affairs of the human race.  The striving 
is not futile because it is first and foremost born out of human choice to struggle.  Camus 
adds further, “There is no sun without the shadow, and it is essential to know the night.  
The absurd man says yes and his effort will henceforth be unceasing.  If there is a 
personal fate, there is no higher destiny, or at least there is but one which he concludes is 
inevitable and despicable.  For the rest, he knows himself to be the master of his days” 
(378).  Life is meaningful, and it is meaningful precisely because it is so precious.  
Oblivion may come after death, but, until then, we honor the brilliance of the transient.     
Let us consider again our other story—the Buddhist tale, where we left the traveler 
clinging to a branch.  While for many the presence of the tiger above and dragon below 
the branch makes the hanging inane, Camus, in contrast, sees the beasts but yet reaches 
out to savor the honey.   And, crucially, it is the ever-threatening presence of the beasts 
themselves that sweetens the honey.  With a sense of urgency, he savors it.  How 
delicious!   
 106 
 
Likewise, “Celebrate!” John J. McDermott exclaims in his essay “The Inevitability 
of our own Death: The Celebration of Time as a Prelude to Disaster” (Drama 290).  
Although McDermott admits that he does not have complete epistemic knowledge, the 
“overwhelming evidence,” he affirms, “is that we are terminal” (283).  However, it is 
only in virtue of acknowledging our terminality that we live most meaningfully: we live 
as if we are terminal, as if time itself is the honey to be savored.  Along with Camus, 
along with Sisyphus, and along with our traveler, McDermott utters, “I believe that time 
is sacred.  It is not sacred, however, because it has been so endowed by God, the gods, 
nature, or any other force.  I believe that time is sacred because human history has 
endowed it with our meaning, our suffering, our commitments, and our anticipations” 
(288-89).  With McDermott, the travelers of this path endure and celebrate the sacred 
affairs of time and grow under its tutelage.  With McDermott, the travelers of this path 
look around, they run—not walk, stop and smell the roses, dig deep, listen to even the 
faintest of whispers; all animated by the exigencies of temporality.  In short, they pay 
attention, they are present, because the present is passing, and the present is all that there 
is.  Our mortality is a painful fact to endure to be sure; but in the pain there can be 
healing.  Says Oedipus, “all is well,” and this, as Camus points out, is the human 
victory—to live a life buoyed by our own strength (378).   
Temporal life is fecund, and it is fecund because we are involved with it.  We do not 
merely cling to a branch, then, reaching out for honey for solace; nay, we pull ourselves 
up, one hand over the other, in the face of the beast; and honey is what is wrought by our 
efforts.  This is a crucial reworking of the ancient metaphor: We make the honey. 
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Celebrate!   
Human achievement therefore takes place on ontological ground:  Achievement is 
the fruition of a human endeavor to make life significant—to make it better—all the 
while caught in the teeth of radical finitude.  It is this deep and abiding existential 
ontological sensibility that gives force to McDermott’s pragmatism.  His commitment to 
meliorism cannot be grasped without first coming to terms with our radical finitude.  
McDermott warns that “starvation, interpersonal violence, and repression are not only 
morally evil, but metaphysically evil as well, for they offend human life within the fabric 
of time, knowing full well that there we have no future recourse to any salvific 
resolution that transcends our human lives (Drama 153-54).  Time, indeed, marks our 
human capacity to help heal suffering; this is McDermott’s weltanschauung.  We must 
help.  On McDermott’s view, meliorism is nothing less than the activity of redemption—
not the redemption of human death through eternal salvation, but, rather, the 
transformation of our lives and our communities to make them worthy of the journey of 
the transient.  We build, sustain, and protect through the urgent liturgy of care, with 
death always as our concluding ontological lot.  McDermott’s reworking of the ancient 
metaphor is anchored in an understanding of our lives as a journey of melioration.  To 
Tolstoy’s question “What is the point of living?  What is the point of wanting anything?  
What is the point of doing anything?” (24), McDermott questions in return, “If the nectar 
is not in the journey, where else could it possibly be?” (235). 
However, perhaps paradoxically, according to McDermott, the process of our living 
is directed by the injunction to grow without cessation.  This point is crucial.  Even 
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though the beasts above and below await us, we do not look at them because the dying is 
not the point that we have to make—the living is.  In other words, we must not 
experience our lives as a preparation for death, even as we age: to do so constitutes a 
withdrawal from living, from the messagings of experience.  We live not in denial of our 
impending death—we know the beasts are there, and their presence pragmatically 
changes our living—but, as John Dewey writes, the live creature “presses forward” 
(“Experience as Aesthetic” 540).  If we are to live with death as a telos, no matter what 
we think death consists of, the event becomes a sterile metaphor for the events in our 
lives.  This is especially the tendency as we age:  Our experiences begin to have meaning 
only insofar as they lead to our own deaths, the result of which is to eliminate potential 
novelty.  Indeed, this is exactly how the ancient metaphor goes awry: the traveler waits 
for death, clinging to the branch, honey merely the solace.  In contrast, in McDermott’s 
version of the metaphor, honey is instead the hard-earned prize for a life lived on the qui 
vive.       
With McDermott, the great American poet Walt Whitman expresses his existential 
commitment to live “now.”   
I have heard what the talkers were talking, the talk of  
the beginning and the end,  
But I do not talk of the beginning or the end.   
There was never any more inception than there is now,  
Nor any more youth or age than there is now,  
And will never be any more perfection than there is now,  
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Nor any more heaven or hell than there is now.   
Urge and urge and urge,  
Always the procreant urge of the world.  (part 3, lines 1-9)   
The world presses in on us now, and, in turn, we respond now.  While we respond by 
heeding the consequences of our possible decisions—this is the pragmatic maxim—the 
caveat is this:  If we, especially in senescence, tie aging to its final outcome, death, the 
events in our lives are experienced in terms of preparation for our future non-being, and 
the meaning that we draw from our experiences is structured by our eventual demise.  
We thus read our experiences one way, and we are blocked from other ways of meaning; 
McDermott calls this one-sided reading of experience because of an end, a goal, or a 
destination a “canopy of ultimate explanation.”  He explains this term:  “If a person 
perches on behalf of a closed mind, a stinginess with regard to the having of experience, 
especially those had as novel and against the grain, then heed the advice of William 
James—stick out your neck and take a chance by an experimental exploration of 
experiences beyond your present sight” (Drama 135).  McDermott continues his 
interpretation of James:  “James suggests that we move through the world avoiding a 
canopy of ultimate explanation by which we shut out novelty and possibility” (135).  
Death, then, in this section understood as oblivion, is not a perch:  It is not the only event 
that gives life meaning.  To be sure, death is present in the way that we live our lives.  
However it is dangerous to live with death as the only operative telos; to do so, indeed, 
obfuscates the living that there is to do.  It is far better to instead take flight between the 
many relational leads that quicken within experience:  We meliorate with an eye always 
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on possibility—not on an end—so that time’s passing is the medium for growth.  Life 
may be terminal, but life is still to be lived forward.  
We thus now return to our original prompt: what does death as oblivion mean?  That 
is, to put it pragmatically, if we believe that death results in oblivion, how does that 
belief affect our lives?  It has been suggested thus far that the answer to this question is, 
first, two-fold: we either live as if our actions are meaningless, or, alternatively, at the 
other extreme, we live as if our actions are sacred.  According to this pragmatically 
preferable latter angle of vision, if we do not harbor hope for immortality, then life can 
be all the richer because it is imbued with our hope that we can ameliorate ourselves and 
our communities within the confines of time; moreover, life is invested with our actions 
to do so.   
Pessimistic existentialists might balk at this idea that we can still have hope if there 
is no life after physical death: that is, they might counter that hope is not tenable if the 
possibility of a self that interprets the flux of experience is ultimately terminal.  Indeed, 
there exists a great tension between the melioristic push of pragmatism and this sort of 
pessimistic existentialism.   McDermott himself perhaps offers the most eloquent 
rejoinder to the pessimist.  He warns that “to be systematically pessimistic is to draw the 
curtain on possibility, on growth, on novelty, and on the most indomitable characteristic 
of the human spirit: the ability to begin again, afresh, with hope for a better day” (Drama 
157).  McDermott continues his warning, 
Dewey is adamant in his conviction that nothing will go totally right in either 
the short or the long run.  He is equally convinced that all problems are 
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malleable and functionally, although not ultimately, resolute even if they are 
sure to appear in another guise at another time.  I refer to this as a metaphysics 
of transiency, in which human life is seen as a wandering, a traveling, a 
bemusement which rocks from side to side, comedy and tragedy, break-through 
and setback—yet, in all, a purposive, even progressive, trip, in which the 
human endeavor makes its mark, sets its goals, and occasionally scores, an 
event which Dewey calls a “consummatory” experience, as in “that was an 
experience.”  (157)    
If we take the pessimistic view that there can be no hope because each of us will 
eventually disappear into oblivion, then we essentially have discounted the living that is 
there to do for its own sake!  The possibility of overcoming death is not the only event 
that gives life meaning.  The, perhaps pedestrian, kind of hope at stake here is not the 
hope that we will continue on eternally.  Hope here makes no claims of resolution or of 
transcendence.  Instead, pragmatist hope consists of the unglamorous desire and 
expectation that life lived tomorrow will be better than today, and it is filled with 
confidence in our efforts.  The Indo-European root of “hope” is keu, which means curve 
(“keu”).  Keu entails a change in direction.  Pragmatist hope is the hope that we can read 
our experience to continuously change direction, to make a different way—a better way.   
Truly, then, the reply to the existential pessimist is that it is indeed nothing other 
than hope that nurtures and sustains pragmatism’s melioristic sensibility.  It is a 
profoundly textured hope, a hope not tethered to an eschatology, a hope which 
acknowledges pessimism, admits ultimate tragedy, that things will not come out right at 
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the end; yet it also is a hope that recognizes that the world of time and our doings are 
constitutive of our person, and thus it demands of us to do better, to make ourselves and 
the world better, and, above all, to try, try again.  It is a hope that inspires “grit”—a 
colloquial term but a sacred one in America’s history.   
DEATH AS A PATH TO IMMORTALITY 
The last enemy that shall be destroyed is death. 
1 Corinthians 15:26 
In this section we explore the experiential consequences of living life as if it is part of 
the journey to an eternal afterlife.  As explained above, John J. McDermott believes the 
consequences of living this way dire; he believes that we should experience our lives as 
a prelude to oblivion.  John Dewey agrees:  In his later work, Dewey expresses that a 
belief in immortality has “morally and socially injurious consequences of putting 
practical preoccupation with another world in place of active interest in this one” 
(“Intimations” 426).  Moreover, argues McDermott, belief in immortality is part of an 
eschatology that functions as a canopy of ultimate explanation, under which life unfolds 
according to a purposeful plan.  Religious traditions in particular emphasize worldly 
cultivation of the soul in order to meet the challenge of physical death, which is the 
portal to an eternal spiritual afterlife.36
                                                 
36 There are important secular eschatologies as well:  Hegel held a metaphysical eschatology in which all 
dualities are rendered intelligible within an Absolute system and in which history unfolds as a progression.  
Marx, in turn, held that all societies progress through a dialectic of class struggle.  
  Thus the process of living is always connected to 
its end:  Indeed, argues McDermott, all experience is funneled into an eschatology.  If, 
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following John Dewey, the present is “pregnant with connections,” 37 and if, following 
William James, “the mind is at every stage a theatre of simultaneous possibilities,”38
In short, belief in an eternal afterlife, according to McDermott and Dewey, is a 
deterrent to a creative life.  If we, as Christian evangelist Billy Graham begins the first 
chapter of his latest publication, Nearing Home: Life, Faith, and Finishing Well, look 
back and in everything “see how God’s hand” has guided us, then life has proceeded 
according to God’s plan (2).  It is God who halos our relationing and directs the kind of 
possibilities that lie before us.  McDermott contends that living life in this way dampens 
the creative, existentially sustaining power of the individual to continuously interpret the 
meaning of experiences undergone.   God functions as a static condition to which 
experience must conform and therefore stifles novelty.  Especially as the end of life 
nears, then, the aged tie their living to an afterlife: living in senescence becomes 
essentially a preparation for the challenge of death and the possibility of rebirth.  Earthly 
experience is guided by a greater design, and the questions thus posed by Tolstoy in the 
beginning of the chapter—What is the point of living?  What is the point of wanting 
anything?  What is the point of doing anything?  Is there in my life any meaning that will 
 
then canopies of ultimate explanation set within the framework of a constructivist 
epistemology circumscribe the meaning of our experiences; no possibilities for novel 
relations between experiences are allowed to seep in under the edges.   
                                                 
37 See footnote 4 for the entire quote and citation information.  
38 In his “The Stream of Thought” James writes that “the mind is at every stage a theatre of simultaneous 
possibilities.  Consciousness consists in the comparison of these with each other, the selection of some, 
and the suppression of the rest by reinforcing and inhibiting agency of attention” (73).   
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not be extinguished by the inevitable death that awaits me?—have answers that lie 
somewhere, whether known by us or not, because the world of time gains its meaning 
from a divine realm.  Aging, thus, is experienced as a waiting for something more, for 
something better; and time itself becomes a means to another end.39
It is the pragmatist Eugene Fontinell who cogently rejoins both McDermott and 
Dewey:  He believes that, while it is not without its dangers of hindering responsible 
living, a belief in immortality can enrich rather than vitiate life.  Fontinell, in his Self, 
God, and Immortality, explains that,    
   
[One] claim of McDermott’s that I consider open to question is that immortality 
belief is an obstacle to growth and creative activity, whereas terminality belief 
is a stimulus.  It would seem that there is no compelling evidence either way.  
Immortality belief does deenergize some, becoming an obstacle to their 
participation in the “building of the earth.”  Yet the same belief spurs others to 
engage in a variety of modes of creative activity.  (184)   
Thus Fontinell responds that if we examine the empirical evidence, we will see that an 
immortality belief need not curtail human growth.   
Although Fontinell unfortunately neither further elaborates on the way in which an 
                                                 
39 It is important to note that McDermott does not deny that those with religious beliefs can and do act in 
ways that should receive our moral approbation.  For example, most agree that the Good Samaritan in 
Luke 10: 25-37 acts in the appropriate manner; moreover, we would say that the Samaritan acts in the 
appropriate manner regardless of the way in which he “reads experience.” However, differences in the 
way the Samaritan reads experience do produce different results insofar as his experience operates as an 
existential pedagogy of how to understand his selfless activity in the world, or of how to take the world 
into his own life.  McDermott (and James) should not be construed, at least here, as providing an ethics of 
how to behave with respect to one another so much as offering individual guidance on how to listen to the 
phenomena of experience.      
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immortality belief can spur creative activity, nor does he provide further detail about the 
empirical evidence of creative activity, we need only to look to New Testament 
scriptures and to the lives and writings of various Christians40
Ye are the light of the world.  A city that is set on an hill cannot be hid.  Neither 
do men light a candle, and put it under a bushel, but on a candlestick; and it 
giveth light unto all that are in the house.  Let your light shine before men, that 
they may see your good works, and glorify your Father which is in heaven.  
(Matthew 5:14-16) 
 to see that Dewey’s 
assertion that an immortality belief distracts individuals from the this world is far too 
narrow a portrayal.  In the Sermon on the Mount, Jesus preaches that those who serve 
God are shining exemplars who produce good works.   
The kingdom of God may be fulfilled in the afterlife, but, contra Dewey, the kingdom is 
afoot in this life, and believers have a great responsibility to behave in accordance with 
God’s commandments.  Moreover, when asked about God’s greatest commandments, 
Jesus replies in part with his version of the Golden Rule: “Thou shalt love the Lord thy 
God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind.  This is the first and 
great commandment.  And the second is like unto it, Thou shalt love thy neighbor as 
thyself.  On these two commandments hang all the law and the prophets” (Matthew 
22:37-40).  Love is the message of God’s greatest commandments; love is central to our 
                                                 
40 Theologian Dietrich Bonhoeffer, for example, prominently opposed Nazi dictatorship.    
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lives now, and it inspires great acts of service with generally beneficial consequences.41
Fontinell, it should be noted, loosely allies himself with William James:  James, 
although he has little explicitly to say about immortality, save his brief essay “Human 
Immortality,” opines that immortality is “one of the great spiritual needs of man” (1100).  
Ostensibly concerned with the negative consequences that may result when we exclude 
possibilities in this essay, James responds to several scientifically-motivated objections 
to immortality.  Belief in immortality, James argues, is at the very least theoretically 
legitimate.   
 
Moreover, although Ralph Barton Perry confirms that “James did not himself have 
an experience of the presence of God” (266), James is quite well-known for his openness 
to religion and to the religious experience of others, most notably recorded in his “The 
Will to Believe” and Varieties of Religious Experience.  However, especially as he grew 
older, James entertained what Perry calls a “hopeful half-belief in personal immortality” 
(270).  James, quite characteristically, contends in “Human Immortality” that the “whole 
subject of immortal life has its prime roots in personal feeling” (1100); and James’ 
hopeful half-belief in immortality in his older age was, according to Perry, primarily 
motivated by two feelings: first, James’ deepening moral conviction that good should 
ultimately triumph over evil.  Perry maintains that James came “more and more to feel 
that death was a wanton and unintelligible negation of goodness” (268).  Second, Perry 
continues, although it was subordinate to his desires for novelty and danger, James in his 
                                                 
41 It is also true that great atrocities have been committed in the name of religion.  The reply could still be 
made to Dewey that, even in these instances, active interest in this world was not replaced by 
preoccupation with another world. 
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vulnerable moods was moved by his own suffering and the suffering of others, and he 
longed for safety and security.  Interestingly, it is James himself who argues that monism 
is pragmatically preferable for “sick souls,” or for those who are not hardy enough to 
live without an ultimate guarantee, and that the pluralism he espouses is sorely deficient 
insofar as it requires a “certain ultimate hardihood” (Meaning 941).  However, a “man is 
not always at his best,” as Perry illuminates—including James—and “the failure of 
pluralism in extremis is an argument against it” (265).  Beliefs in God and in immortality 
are thus pragmatically essential for these Jamesian “sick souls.”   
Indeed, according to many, including Marx, Nietzsche, Freud, Dewey, and 
McDermott, religion is a psychological defense mechanism, constructed to shelter us 
from the difficulties of existence.  Dewey charges that immortality, the “eternal and 
immutable,” is the misguided “consummation of mortal man’s quest for certainty” 
(“Time” 99).  Further, Dewey quotes Marx, “Of belief in immortality more than of any 
other element of historic religions it holds good, I believe, that ‘religion is the opium of 
the peoples’” (“Intimations” 426-27).  However, the assertion that a belief in religion, in 
a monistic God who acts against total dissolution, is an untoward act of denial is not 
pursued in this chapter.  Crucially, the belief that it is denial presupposes that God does 
not exist, and talk of the existence or nonexistence of God without reference to 
experience, according to the pragmatist, as already discussed in the first section of the 
chapter, is without meaning.  What is at issue in this chapter is whether belief in God and 
in immortality is pragmatically harmful or helpful.   James and Fontinell argue that 
belief in God can be pragmatically helpful; Dewey and McDermott argue not.   
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Fontinell’s appeal to empirical evidence that individuals with a belief in immortality 
do indeed “build the earth” may suffice as a response to Dewey, who maintains that 
religion distracts us from the “here and now”; it does not, however, suffice as a reply to 
McDermott.  In particular, in order to address the crux of McDermott’s concern, which 
is at heart a defense of James’ pluralistic philosophy, Fontinell’s confidence that a belief 
in immortality can spur creative activity must be addressed within the framework of 
McDermott’s canopy of ultimate explanation.  For McDermott, the central, very 
difficult, question must be this:  Can we live our lives believing in immortality—a 
guarantee that all will go well for us in the end—without  having it become an existential 
crutch, a static directive for Jamesian “sick souls,” a way to explain how and why things 
go the way they do, including ourselves?  If we fulfill our purpose when we reunite with 
God, can aging, especially in senescence, be anything other than a means to reunite with 
God?  Put another way, if we do indeed identify ourselves with an ideal order in which 
we will ultimately be preserved, can we prevent this order from becoming a transcendent 
telos, a stale metaphor for the events in our lives?   
One might respond with an epistemological question in turn: if God is omniscient, 
how can God’s plan be inadequate?  Second, James, notwithstanding his connection 
between religion and “sick souls,” seems to think that we can avoid canopies of ultimate 
explanation.  In Varieties of Religious Experience, James maintains that what is 
existentially significant about all of religious experience is a personal identification with 
a “more” of the universe, which in turn leads to a more satisfying life.  He writes that 
“Apart from all religious consideration, there is actually and literally more life in our 
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total soul than we are at any time aware of (457); religious experience, in particular, 
makes us aware of the existence of this processive more.   James continues that, in 
religious experience, regardless of whether one identifies herself with, for example, 
mysticism or transcendental idealism, “the conscious person is continuous with a wider 
self through which saving experiences come”42
Thus it is not the belief in immortality per se that is crucial here for James; what is 
crucial, instead, is religious experience: religious experience is the medium through 
which we become aware of the ill-defined, fluid nature of reality and hence the 
existential possibilities that exist just outside our own immediate purview.  A belief in 
immortality is of course not necessary to have religious experiences; nor does a belief in 
immortality necessarily follow a particular religious experience.  If, however, we are 
committed to a particular kind of theology and in some form of immortality, then these 
commitments open up the possibility for religious experiences.  If one holds a belief in 
immortality, then, life can be all the richer.   
 (460).  The religious life, James asserts, 
is one in which we live in a higher union, and it “opens itself to us as a gift” (459).  What 
is significant, then, about religious experience in general is not so much that we find 
metaphysical security for the unfortunate price of surrendering our lives to a canopy of 
ultimate explanation, under which we are directed by the plan of a monistic being; 
rather, what brings metaphysical security, according to James at least in Varieties, is that 
we become very much aware of how we are existentially bound to everything else in the 
universe:  We become aware that we are part of the processive flow.   
                                                 
42 emphasis is James’ 
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Indeed, maintains James, the “religious impulse,” enriches life because it positively 
affects the “personal centres of energy of the various subjects” (Varieties 462).  Further, 
he writes, religious experiences “possess, it its true, enormous biological worth.  
Spiritual strength really increases in the subject when he has them, a new life opens up 
for him, and they seem to him a place of conflux where the forces of two universes 
meet” (Varieties 455).  Hence a life transformed by religious experience need not be one 
that is prescribed by eschatological metaphors; it need not be lived as merely a 
temporary expedient to another realm.  Instead, a life transformed by religious 
experience may be one in which time is a sacred journey, characterized by the 
possibilities revealed in the ever-occurring union between the self and the “more” of the 
universe.  On this interpretation of James, then, we find ground to respond to John J. 
McDermott:  If we believe that death is a path to immortality, we can believe in 
immortality without having that belief strip us of our existential possibilities.         
THE ONTOLOGY OF DEATH: A DEFENSE OF RELATIONAL IMMORTALITY  
When man encounters himself, he does not do this in and by himself, apart and 
alone; on the contrary, he always finds himself within another thing which, in 
turn, is made up of many other things.  (60)   
I am not my life.  This, which is reality, is composed of myself and things.  The 
things are not I, nor am I the things.  We are mutually transcendent, but we are 
both immanent in that absolute coexistence which is life.  . . . My life is not 
mine, but I belong to it.  This is the broad, immense reality of my coexistence 
with things.  (158) 
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José Ortega y Gasset, Some Lessons in Metaphysics 
It is because of the fluid, processive nature of reality that we can answer McDermott’s 
concern that living life as if physical death is a pathway to spiritual rebirth condemns us 
to living life under a canopy of ultimate explanation.  The view that the self is a bundle 
of relations is defended in Chapter III:  Our existence is constituted by our relationing.  
Thus if in religious experience our relationing occurs with the “more” of the universe, 
which we identify as God and God’s realm, then our existence unfolds in that 
relationing.  It is in that relationing that we may find peace—not quiescence but, rather, 
in a settling into the rhythm of a personal genesis that occurs in the midst of a billowing, 
processive unity.  We find that there are no separates.  We are fundamentally part of a 
growing totality, interwoven into the fabric of time; and our personal growth occurs as 
part of the growth of the unity.  Our growth constitutes how we age, how we move 
through time.  
If who we are is constituted by our interactions, including our interactions with 
family, friends, teachers, and so on, identity is then a shared affair.  Our relationing is 
existentially interpenetrating.  We thus inherently matter, and we have existential moral 
responsibilities to one another to make our interactions pedagogical—that is, conducive 
to shared personal growth.  Moreover, and most importantly for the purposes of this 
chapter, it is contended here that our interconnectedness even persists after our own 
physical death—this is relational immortality.  Relational immortality is an experiential 
immortality in which, even if death amounts to a permanent loss of a self that interprets 
the flux, itnis not the end of our possibility:  Our own embodied experience may end; 
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however, we can continue to affect the manifold of experience through the relations we 
made while alive.  We remain ontological constituents in the lives of others, shaping 
their very existence.  
In his Self, God, and Immortality, Eugene Fontinell, takes a bleak view of any form 
of immortality in which the “I” does not survive physical death.  Fontinell does not 
defend relational immortality.  Forms other than personal immortality, Fontinell asserts, 
are not “adequate surrogates which can serve to alleviate the pain of loss” (21).  
Fontinell’s position is that, assuming “human persons are precious realizations of nature 
or the cosmic process, the failure to maintain these persons in that mode of individuality 
upon which their preciousness depends may be a harsh truth to be endured but surely not 
to be celebrated” (21).  Finally, Fontinell argues, any form of immortality in which the 
individual does not endure has a diminished “pragmatic efficacy,” or diminished ability 
to ameliorate the self and society.  Fontinell next devotes his energies to a detailing of a 
relational “field model” of the self, in which the divine and human consciousness are 
continuous.  Using this model, then, Fontinell reveals experiential data from which we 
can extrapolate a survival of the self following physical death.  
Although the work in this chapter and in the other chapters does not empirically 
demonstrate the possibility of the kind of personal immortality Fontinell defends, 
relational immortality is not wholly unrelated to it.  In relational immortality, some part 
of the self does persist following physical death and it does so in others, much as ripples 
in a pond.  Experience contains the dead after their deaths.  It is thus optimistically 
offered here that relational immortality is an exceedingly robust notion of immortality, 
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one in which Fontinell and many others might take heart. 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter has endeavored to show, first, that the meaning of death is the effect it has 
on our living and that there are two main metaphors at work in our experience of death: 
death as oblivion and death as a path to some form of immortality.  Second, each of 
these ways has both a destructive and fructifying path.  If we believe that death amounts 
to oblivion, life runs the risk of becoming pointless, absurd; alternatively, on the 
fructifying path, a life limited by time becomes sacred and should be cherished and 
nurtured.  On the other hand, if we believe that death precedes immortality, we can, if 
we take the destructive path, weave that immortality into a canopy of ultimate 
explanation; alternatively, on the fructifying path, we may have religious experiences 
that open up to us our existential possibilities.  Finally, in this chapter it was offered that 
relational immorality, in which we endure through the lives and experiences of others, is 
a robust form of immortality with potential for great pragmatic efficacy.    
It is of the utmost importance to conclude with a pragmatic epistemological and 
ontological proviso: this approach to death in this chapter is an application of the 
pragmatic method and, inasmuch, the conclusions drawn herein are open to 
modification.   Developed here is an understanding of the concepts of death as oblivion 
and death as immortality that serves life’s needs.  The universe is unfinished, and as 
experience changes, so too should our concepts:  Our concepts must remain relevant to 
our lives; they must solve problems and make life better.   Pragmatism’s commitment to 
concrete meliorism—to healing—is its greatest contribution to the discipline of 
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philosophy and to society.  Pragmatism, however, cannot offer the security of absolutist 
solutions in any form—including ontological, epistemological, and ethical; these kinds 
of solutions, indeed, pragmatists argue, are red herrings—that is, they mislead those who 
grapple with the making of their lives always in specific, yet ever-changing contexts.  
The world is open; it grows.  We do not know what will happen.  Thus there can be no 
response to the question, “Is death oblivion or does it lead to immortality?”  This lack of 
response, admittedly, can be vexing.  But pragmatism rallies:  There is an answer to this 
question to be had within our experience.  William James elaborates: 
For pluralistic pragmatism, truth grows up inside of all the finite experiences.  
They lean on each other, but the whole of them, if such a whole there be, leans 
on nothing.  All ‘homes’ are in finite experience; finite experience as such is 
homeless.  Nothing outside of the flux secures the issue of it.  It can hope 
salvation only from its intrinsic promises and potencies.  (“Pragmatism and 
Humanism” 457).   
We thus make our finite homes, uncertain though redemptively malleable, following the 
leads of lived experience.  We do the best we can—striving, grappling, growing, 
helping—and there is always more work to be done. 
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CHAPTER V 
AGING: FROM EXPERIENCE TO POLICY 
 
God, grant me the serenity to accept the things I cannot change 
The courage to change the things I can 
And the wisdom to know the difference. 
Serenity Prayer 
John Dewey’s overarching vision is social melioration, and the vision for this chapter 
follows suit:   The purpose of this chapter is to apply the work of the previous chapters, 
which was to broadly reconnoiter our experience of aging, in order to inform polices that 
concern the aged.  Policy is the method by which we take care of the people in our 
communities, and this chapter strives to articulate how we can best take care of the aging 
population.       
It is contended here that, in keeping with the pragmatist tradition, aging in the 
context of policy must begin with a reckoning of the way we experience aging:  
Experience is the rudimentary tool that helps forge appropriate, resonating reform that 
has purchase on our everyday lives.  Moreover, if we reconstruct our experience of aging 
such that it is no longer singly funded by metaphors of erosion and decline, as was urged 
in Chapter III, and, if we reconstruct our experience of aging so that its process is no 
longer tethered to death, as was advised in Chapter IV, then resulting policy might in 
reciprocation both protect and promote possibility—not just retard degeneration and 
forestall death—within the lives of older individuals.   
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We have seen in Chapter III that living at its most salubrious is a process of creative 
individual genesis.  The character of existence is of our own handiwork:  One evaluates 
or reads experience and then makes a life by envisioning and pursuing a possibility in 
the midst of ontological uncertainty.  The character of time’s passing is thus constituted 
by what we do in time, and this doing is radically creative.  Moreover, the activity of 
building relations is the fundamental way in which we press into our possibilities.  We 
are contextually jointed to the world, and our personal identity always develops in and 
through shared relations.43
Therefore it is clear that, when we turn to policies that concern the aged, 
preservation of the individual’s ability to envision and pursue a life is paramount.  In 
other words, ontological autonomy must be honored, and the aged must be empowered 
with respect to self-determination.  The practical ways in which an individual’s 
ontological choices about her life can be realized must be kept open.  Moreover, as 
ontological choices are sown through relations, policies should encourage meaningful 
relationships; likewise, they should discourage isolation, which unfortunately becomes 
increasingly problematic with advanced age, as loved ones age, move away, and die.         
   
It is the contention of this chapter that the primary underlying barrier to adequate 
policy reform is its one-sided approach to care of those in senescence:  Current policy 
has embraced a concept of aging—namely, the concept of aging as a disease, wherein 
aging is synonymous with physical and mental decay and destruction.  In the current 
policy purview, aging is a scourge and should be slowed and, wherever possible, 
                                                 
43 See Chapter III for a development of these ideas. 
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stopped.  Unfortunately, what has been grievously overlooked is a second and more 
important concept of aging—aging as ontological growth—and thus, in effect, policy has 
retarded individual spiritual growth and shackled the possibility of older individuals.  
Alternatively, it is maintained in this chapter that aging as ontological growth is a crucial 
dimension of good care of the human being, which policy should both foster and protect.  
There must be structures put into place that provide conditions for this dimension of 
good care of the elderly human being.  If we understand and honor the aging process as 
an ongoing self-transformation in response to the press of the environment, then the 
“press” of policy, as part of the environment, should lead to beneficial consequences.   
The following caveat should be emphasized:  The prescriptions for good care of the 
elderly human being and good care of the human being at any age are not unrelated.   As 
discussed at length in Chapter III, the potential problems associated with the process of 
aging need not be limited to the elderly.  Aging as a decline is not just for older adults.  
If we understand aging as ontological decline, as disengagement from the creative 
process by which we live forward into possibility, then the verb “aging” need not be 
restricted to the noun “aged.”  Put simply, one need not be old to feel old.  Aging in this 
sense is an ontological disease which might occur quite early in life.  Movement beyond 
age-defined policies is thus an essential step to good care for all populations.  The spirit 
of any sort of policy reform should be to promote inner development of each and every 
individual, no matter the age.   
Aging is indeed the narrative of all generations; nonetheless, there is a sense in 
which adults over the age of sixty are the most vulnerable to the destructive forces of the 
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aging process—physical, mental, and ontological.  There is a sense in which they are 
utterly at the mercy of others.  The elderly are no longer the head of their families: their 
progeny now head their own families, and, especially in western cultures, older 
generations no longer hold authority over the younger.  Older adults have generally left 
or are leaving the workforce and are often viewed as dependent on others for their 
income and their care.  Moreover, they require more health care because of chronic 
health conditions and diseases that tend to strike later in life.  There are thus 
overwhelming shadows of burden and alienation within senescence; sans hooks and 
relations with people and events in the world and viewed as parasitic on the working 
generation, the aged are resented and cast aside, warehoused, if they are lucky, in 
geriatric centers.   
 Therefore, the need to create a warm cultural ambiance of the aged is urgent.  This 
chapter serves as an advocate for the kind of care the aged deserve.  One of the most 
important tasks for policy should be to help the elderly reclaim dignity within in a 
society that currently warehouses them; it should be to add the spiritually rich 
dimensions of hope and possibility to the aged persona.  Using the ideas presented in this 
entire work, we can reframe the way we think about aging in the aged to spur much 
needed institutional transformation.  In turn, policy can help the elderly recast 
themselves as individuals who have the capacity for possibility and are thus worthy of 
care and concern.   
The line is thin, however, between self-deception and what is within reach.  
Possibility goes not unbounded.  There is an approaching of death, of course, which ends 
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one’s own embodied possibility, at least in this world, but there is not only that—there 
are some things that those in senescence just cannot do.  Lack of physical strength and 
physical and mental stamina constrain activity.  It would be out of the ordinary, for 
example, to see an elderly individual sprinting short distances for exercise.  However, 
each one of us must realize this:  There are things that I can do that only I can do!  
Moreover, one of the gifts of advanced age is a synthetic vision, which informs life’s 
possibilities.  In her Mrs. Dalloway, Virginia Woolf’s character Peter Walsh alludes to 
this vision. “The compensation for growing old, Peter Walsh thought, coming out of 
Regent’s Park, and holding his hat in hand was simply this: that the passions remain as 
strong as ever, but one had gained—at last!—the power which adds the supreme flavour 
to existence,—the power of taking hold of experience, of turning it round, slowly, in the 
light” (67).  Age brings a depth of understanding of our own past experiences; a 
sagacious and steady power of relating events, of making connections and drawing 
lessons from them.  It is a synthetic vision with which we guide the present into future.   
In order to reconstruct the experience of aging so that it means ontological growth 
rather than deterioration, the synthetic vision of older adults must be accompanied by 
courage and determination.  Courage and determination are required to transcend 
cultural opprobrium, to explore the existentially unfamiliar, to do something that matters, 
to make something of oneself.  One must take a risk to keep on going, even when, as the 
hackneyed phrase goes, “the going gets tough” in old age.  It is perseverance and 
fortitude—not blind optimism— that push us forward.  Like the subject of Theodore 
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Roethke’s poem, “The Decision,” we forge a way through the rough elements.  
According to the second stanza,  
Rising or falling’s all one discipline! 
 The line of the horizon’s growing thin! 
 Which is the way? I cry to the dread black, 
 The shifting shade, the cinders at my back. 
 Which is the way? I ask, and turn to go, 
 As a man turns to face on-coming now.  (169) 
“Which is the way?” the man asks; and, indeed, this is the life-giving question that must 
be asked.  The aged, with synthetic vision, with courage and determination, must 
continually ask what is it about my life now that lends itself to a fresh beginning? 
It is imperative that policies intended to care for the aged give them both the means 
to continuously ask this question and the resources to provide for the answers, whatever 
they might be.  To put it simply, to the question what is it about my life now that lends 
itself to a fresh beginning, policy must ask in kind, what is it that you need to make a 
fresh beginning?   The interplay of the answers to these questions is the best way in 
which ontological autonomy and self-determination might be honored and, crucially, 
personal growth promoted.  In addition, it is important to note that facilitating the 
experience of aging as a dynamic process of existential growth necessitates broad, open-
ended, and malleable policy measures to serve changing and likely quite assorted needs.  
Finally, it is clear that the conception of good care at stake here extends to contexts far 
beyond traditional health care, which is generally medical in nature and encompasses 
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medical professionals taking care of individuals’ medical needs in healthcare settings 
such as clinics, hospitals, and geriatric centers.  Good care in the context of aging in this 
chapter is a very rich, qualitative, ambiguous notion, the content of which is shaped by a 
demand to promote personal achievement and quiet triumph over routine and spiritual 
lassitude; good care does not seek to promote, at least directly, the more quantifiable 
traditional indicators of good health, namely reductions in rates of mortality and 
morbidity.           
The capacity of human relationships to fulfill these dynamic, qualitative conditions 
of good care should not be underestimated.  This is because relationships can be 
ontologically pedagogical insofar as they help us affectively explore and build relations.  
In a relational ontology, which was defended in Chapter III, the self is a bundle of 
relations.44
To take a germane example, we can reconstruct our experience of aging so that 
aging ultimately means ontological possibility and not decline.  This could be done, for 
example, by refusing to understand the events that occur in senescence as a prelude to 
  Relations themselves are the transitive parts of experience, and they connect 
the focal parts of experience.  Making relations is the activity by which we “read” focal 
experience: we, in essence, interpret experience, and we thus articulate a certain 
understanding of ourselves, the world, and our places in the world.  The continuous 
activity of building relations—of connecting and interpreting our experience—is the 
fundamental way in which we press into the possibilities for novelty in our lives.   
                                                 
44 Relations are first introduced with reference to William James and John Dewey in Chapter III, pages 3-
5. 
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death; instead, we can understand these events as opportunities for development.  To wit, 
an elderly woman relates the message of her experience in a nursing home.   
I’ve been told that I must not succumb to the facts of my age.  But why 
shouldn’t  I?  I am now in my 91st year and I doubt that my activity for 
example, in civic affairs, could restore my spirits to a state of bouncing 
buoyancy.  Lack of physical strength alone keeps me inactive and often silent.  
I’ve been called senile.  Senility is a convenient peg on which to hang 
nonconformity  . . .  A new set of faculties seems to be coming into operation.  I 
seem to be waking to a larger world of wonderment—to catch little glimpses of 
the immensity and the diversity of creation.  More than at any other time in my 
life, I seem to be aware of the beauties of our spinning planet and the sky 
above.  I feel that old age sharpens my awareness.  (“Frances” 323)  
This nursing-home resident celebrates what age has brought to her—a new awareness of 
creation—cultivated not within the guidance of relationships with others but within, as 
John Dewey writes, an “active and alert commerce with the world,” that transforms her 
experience (“Experience as Aesthetic” 540).   
At the most general level, the spirit of policies that concern the aged should be to 
dispel loneliness and disconnection; it should be to increase relations so that 
potentialities can be developed.  Relations can be cultivated in dynamic activities that 
require active engagement and are potentially transformational.  For example, relations 
can be cultivated by commerce and with the environs, like the nursing home resident, 
above, as well as by commerce with other individuals in healing relationships.  Relations 
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can also be cultivated by engaging in aesthetic activities, such as playing an instrument, 
painting, and gardening.  Moreover, our relationing is existentially interpenetrating.   
That is, who we are is constituted by our interactions with the world and those in it, and 
identity is thus a shared affair.     
It is important that the healing capacity of relationships and our creative endeavors 
do not imply resolution, cure, or any other variety of certitude so common in medical 
contexts; healing, instead, implies amelioration.  Healing occurs when we affectively 
read and undergo our experiences such that we continuously find a “place” in the world.  
Our healing occurs in a rhythm—a rhythm of experiences, old and new, which we weave 
and then reweave into a relational fabric.  Healing thus is a process with no fixed end-
point.  The position maintained throughout the present work is that the existential 
significance of living as healing is an aging experienced as growth.  Any relationship is 
potentially a healing one, including, but not limited to, relationships formed within civic, 
church, medical, and academic situations.    
By way of summary, then, the practical recommendations for policy reforms that 
promote aging experienced as growth are thus far the following:  First, ontological 
autonomy must be honored, and, likewise, the aged must be empowered with respect to 
self-determination.  Second, policy should aim to increase relations so that potentialities 
are developed; this could be achieved by creating opportunities to creatively engage with 
others or by developing potentially transformative capacities such as instrument playing, 
painting, and gardening.  Finally, policy should shift away from measures that cast aging 
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as a process that requires a “cure” and should shift toward measures that cast aging as a 
healing process with its own possibilities for surprise, novelty, and renewal.   
THE MEDICAL CONTEXT: CARE AS HOSPITALITY 
What might, then, a program of care for the aged consistent with these recommendations 
look like?  When we consider care for the aged, we traditionally consider care in medical 
contexts—namely, healthcare.  This need not be so: the kind of care for the aged 
defended in this work is assuredly not constrained to healthcare.  Novelty and the 
potential for self-transformation are contained even within the quotidian affairs of 
experience.  Anywhere that there is, in John Dewey’s words, “an affair of the intercourse 
of a living being with its physical and social environment,” an opportunity for 
ontological growth exists (“Need for a Recovery” 61), and policy need only provide a 
forum for this intercourse to occur.  Moreover, care for the aged in the medical arena is 
most often linked to death, which modern medicine seeks to prevent.  In contrast, great 
lengths have been taken here to show that aging need not be a disease, physical or 
ontological, and that aging should not be linked to embodied death; at its best, aging is a 
journey that has value for its own sake.   
However, notwithstanding these shortcomings of the concept of care within medical 
contexts, it is perhaps most convenient to consider this context as a potential model, 
albeit an imperfect one with much room for improvement, for policy formulations in 
other contexts.  This is so for several reasons:  First, older adults generally do require 
more medical intervention than other populations.  Second, medical care is often 
considered to be the paragon of care, and healthcare professionals enjoy a monopoly on 
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the provision of care services.  Finally, we rely on healthcare professionals to provide 
appropriate care for older adults, often with the hope and need that a clinical orientation 
is supplemented with a spiritual orientation, an orientation which is characterized by a 
serious appreciation and engagement of the existential and spiritual dimensions of 
human life.   Unfortunately, the fact that medical treatment is so one-sided and thus does 
not meet the spiritual needs of older adults makes restructuring the dynamics of care 
especially urgent in clinical settings.  
It is propitious for us indeed that one division of medicine has already embraced a 
philosophy of care, wholly different from its clinical, curative division and that this 
philosophy might only be expanded to buttress the clinical to compensate for its 
shortcomings; it is a philosophy of care for those who cannot be cured and in whom 
clinicians see “no hope.”  This kind of care is palliative care for the dying, or hospice 
care.  To palliate means to relieve suffering, and the goal of palliative care is to improve 
the lives of those suffering from serious illness by mitigating the physical symptoms of 
the illness and addressing other emotional and spiritual consequences of the illness, such 
as depression, guilt, anxiety, and reflections about ultimate meaning.  While palliative 
care can be administered to those with any kind of illness, including curable and chronic 
illnesses, hospice provides compassionate, palliative care only to those with terminal 
illnesses.   
Hospice centers first developed in Europe in the early 11th century to care for ill and 
dying travelers.  Modern hospice programs are the results of the efforts of Dame Cicely 
Saunders in the 1960s.  She established St. Christopher’s Hospice in 1967 in London, 
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which was to serve as the model for subsequent hospice programs in America.45
Hospitality, therefore, means primarily the creation of a free space where the 
stranger can enter and become a friend instead of an enemy.  Hospitality is not 
to change people, but to offer them space where change can take place.  It is not 
to bring men and women over to our side, but to offer freedom not disturbed by 
dividing lines.  It is not to lead our neighbor into a corner where there are no 
alternatives left, but to open a wide spectrum of options for choice and 
commitment.  It is not an educated intimidation with good books, good stories 
and good works, but the liberation of fearful hearts so that words can find roots 
and bear ample fruit.  It is not a method of making our God and our way into 
the criteria of happiness, but the opening of an opportunity to others to find 
their God and their way.  The paradox of hospitality is that it wants to create 
emptiness, not a fearful emptiness, but a friendly emptiness where strangers can 
enter and discover themselves as created free; free to sing their own songs, 
  The 
etymology of the word is important:   “Hospice” is derived from the Latin word hospes, 
which means both guests and hosts, and “hospitality,” as first described by theologian 
Henri Nouwen, was later embraced by Leonard Lunn, the chaplain at St. Christopher’s 
Hospice.  Lunn took hospitality to be the vertebral characteristic for spiritual care of the 
dying.  Nouwen’s description of the meaning of hospitality parallels, in many ways, the 
kind of care suggested here to nourish aging experienced as growth.   
                                                 
45 See The Management of Terminal Malignant Disease, edited by Cicely Saunders and Nigel Sykes, cited 
in the affixed Works Cited.  This work includes information related to the history of hospice care as well 
as guidance on its undertaking. 
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speak their own languages, dance their own dances; free to leave and follow 
their own vocations.  Hospitality is not a subtle invitation to adopt the life style 
of the host, but the gift of a chance for the guest to find his own.  (qtd. in Lunn 
224) 
Hospitality describes a space in which a stranger, a guest, befriends another, a host, and 
in this space, through this friendship, there exists freedom for self-discovery and the 
possibility for self-transformation.  Self-transformation is possible even at the end of life 
and, indeed, especially so at the end of life, when existential grief may be deep, and 
when perhaps, after having lived a life “unknown to himself,” the need for self-discovery 
is greatest.46
End-of-life care for those whose lives will end sooner rather than later—for all of 
our lives will end sooner or later—demands deep spiritual palliation through hospitality.  
The stranger seeks spiritual connection: to banish loneliness when it has become 
ontological, to be hooked up in the most intimate of ways with the world, to be loved, to 
be cherished, to be needed, to matter, and to keep mattering.  The stranger must become 
a friend.  And a policy of hospitality is the means by which the stranger becomes a 
friend.  Policy thus becomes the cradle for pedagogical relationships; and what is taught 
by relationships is how to grow as a human being such that time’s passing is enriching 
and transformative, is characterized by creative genesis, even when death is imminent. 
 
                                                 
46 Seneca cautions that, 
Death weighs heavy on one 
who, too well known to all, 
dies unknown to himself.  (Thyestes II.401-03)  
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Promisingly, within organized hospice care there is a successful new program that is 
gaining force.  Inspired by her conviction that individuals need help leaving the world 
just as much as they need help entering the world, Phyllis Farley launched Doula to 
Accompany and Comfort in 2000 at the New York City Jewish Board of Family and 
Children’s Services (Kleinfield).  As of 2013, many facilities throughout the state of 
New York utilize doulas to accompany the dying, and doula programs have been 
organized at Mount Sinai Medical Center in New York, Baylor Medical Center in Texas, 
and Capital Care in Canada (Doula to Accompany).  Program volunteers provide 
companionship and comfort to those who have less than eighteen months to live.  Most 
of the patients are isolated and do not have the support of family or friends.  Volunteers 
visit the patients, talk with them, and build personal, life-changing relationships until the 
end of the patients’ lives. 
 The story of Bill Keating and Lew Grossman, as chronicled in N.R. Kleinfield’s 
New York Times article, “In Death Watch for Stranger, Becoming a Friend to the End,” 
is inspiring and instructive.  Bill Keating, a buoyant, affluent, retired lawyer, volunteers 
for the doula program.  He completes a training program and is then sent to care for his 
first case, Lew Grossman, who doctors say does not have much time left.  The first few 
meetings are awkward, and Keating struggles to converse.  Grossman then shares with 
Keating that the food in the geriatric center is terrible, and this is Keating’s way in:  Lox 
and cream cheese sandwiches, matzo ball soup, olives, steak tartare, chocolate milk, and 
doughnuts—Keating prepares it all and shares it with Grossman.  Before long, 
Grossman’s appetite returns, and he gains weight; Grossman also becomes more 
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animated, and there is laughter in his eyes.  And, as Kleinfield relates, when Keating 
departs from each meeting with Grossman, he would “think to himself, ‘I kind of like the 
fella.’”  Next comes the music:  After turning off the television Grossman always 
watches, they listen to jazz and big band, song after song; Grossman begins to divulge 
pieces of his life.  The food and the music create the sacred setting though which 
Grossman’s story pours forth, including the people he has loved, now absent, his 
problems with drinking, and his worries about entering heaven.  In the meantime, 
Grossman keeps living.  Keating’s friendship, Kleinfield suggests, has become 
Grossman’s most efficacious medication.  Grossman tells Keating, “It’s good to have a 
friend when you’re old and sick.”  
Keating knows he must talk about death with Grossman, but he does not want to 
because it “gives him a funny feeling.”  Grossman, however, is beginning to fail.  
Keating puts on some Glenn Miller and asks Grossman when he is up in heaven, how he 
would like to be remembered.  Their conversation is pivotal for them both.      
Mr. Grossman looked up at Mr. Keating and whispered, “I want to be 
remembered.”  He tried to stop himself from crying. 
“You will be remembered,” said Mr. Keating, his eyes damp too.  “I will 
always remember you.  People ask me about you all the time.  And I say, 
You’re a fabulous person.  Knows more about music than anyone I know.  
What else should I say?” 
“I don’t know,” Mr. Grossman said.  
“Well, I know.  I’m lucky to have you as a friend.” 
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 We enter hospice care when there is no hope of living.  Be that as it may, from the 
day Grossman and Keating meet, there is hope—hope for ontological healing, hope for 
relations and connection, hope that meaning will be created and found.  Grossman is 
alone and confined to a room at the end of his life.  In this room he suffocates.  It is 
Keating and the hospitality Keating offers that opens space for Grossman, space to enjoy 
food and music, to find his voice, to recall his past and wonder about its implications, to 
worry about heaven.  Through Keating, Grossman is able to engage with the world, to let 
his past speak, and to live again, however brief.  
The healing is not only for Grossman; Keating, although he is not ill, although he is 
not dying, heals as well.  When Keating meets Grossman, Keating apprehends Grossman 
as simply soon-to-be-dead.  He wonders how “sitting death watch would mix with 
bridge and opera.”  But when, as Kleinfield phrases it, “life goes to visit death,” Keating 
finds Grossman at the brink of life—not just at the precipice of death—waiting to be 
touched and very much worthy of an earnest friendship.  Keating is bewildered when 
Grossman finally does succumb to death.  Kleinfield narrates his reaction: “Funny how 
the end was so long expected, and yet the crude reality left Mr. Keating stunned.  Lew 
gone?  Just like that?”  Keating’s communion with Grossman helps recast his views of 
the dying and of death.  In some ways, it is Keating who first enters the room as 
Grossman’s guest, as a stranger, and Grossman creates the space for Keating to 
understand that death and those who are dying are anything but sterile, brute facts about 
life that can be ignored.  Death cannot be disentangled from our living; death—those 
who are dying, those who have died, and our own impending deaths—are contained 
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within our living, and they add tragic depth and tragic joy and change the way we touch 
the world. Grossman’s and Keating’s companionship heals them both because it enriches 
the quality of both of their journeys.     
It is significant that the concept of care as hospitality, embodied in the story of 
Grossman and Keating, is quite unlike the traditional medical notion of good care in that 
it is neither prophylactic nor curative.  That is, care as hospitality intends neither 
prevention of harm, as in preventative care, nor does it intend to offer a cure.  Hospitality 
does not ambush bodily illness and death.  Instead, it is aspirational.  It promotes well-
being, understood in this specific context as ontological health, and its guiding 
sensibilities are space, relation, and transformation over and against diagnostication, 
professional authority, and technical victory. 
The subtle message from Grossman’s and Keating’s story—and the central 
argument of this chapter—is that kind of multi-dimensional care at stake in their 
interaction is precisely the kind of care needed to protect and promote the possibility of 
everyone, not just those with terminal illnesses.  The lesson is that the philosophy and 
the practices of Doula to Accompany and Comfort and, more generally, the philosophy 
and practices of hospice care, can be adapted to serve the pressing ontological needs of 
those in senescence.  The kind of care that is reserved for those at the end of life, care as 
hospitality, most often administered in hushed settings of disease and collapse, can also 
be meaningfully administered to older adults in far less grim settings to help them 
transition not to death but to, rather, a fresh start.   
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CONCLUSION 
The role of care as hospitality in the medical context can and should be expanded to fill 
the important existential gaps in clinical medicine.  Moreover, the role of care as 
hospitality can and should be expanded to programs and policy formulations in countless 
other contexts, including business, community, and religious contexts.  To reconstruct 
the meaning of time’s passing so that is nourishes the experience of aging as growth 
rather than aging as deterioration, policy must open a space for self-transformation via, 
in John Dewey’s language, engagement of the live creature.   
The possibilities for care of the aged are endless.  For example, consider the 
following:  First and foremost, the formation of pedagogical relationships, such as the 
one between Grossman and Keating, should be one of the primary goals of any program 
or policy.   In addition to organizations like Doula to Accompany and Comfort, which 
are overtly dedicated to the formation of relationships, inter- and intra-generational 
relationships might indirectly be facilitated through the built environment, by perhaps 
redesigning geriatric centers such that they are interpenetrated by a diverse population 
or, more broadly, by redesigning community structures so that they are accessible to all 
generations.  For the working elderly population, work standards and expectations could 
change based on perceived current strengths and potentialities, and work would thus 
offer meaningful challenges commensurate with desires and abilities.  Moreover, 
providing the opportunity for creative expression at work would be a crucial component 
of policy reform.  For those elderly who have retired from work, volunteer opportunities 
might provide avenues to help others and form valuable relationships.  
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Another example to model:  There have been numerous movements, including 
within the non-profit and small business sectors, to preserve the stories of older adults.  
These services help older adults record and even publish their personal memoirs for 
themselves, their families, and their friends.  In particular, the Spaces Between Your 
Fingers Project is working to build an “archive of human experience.”  The project pairs 
someone with an individual battling Alzheimer’s disease or related dementia to help 
save a memory.  Memories are written on a postcard and illustrated, and they are 
archived in the Philadelphia Free Library.  Efforts like these help to let the past speak 
and to find new meaning.  Moreover, efforts like these ascribe importance and respect to 
our very existence.  Our stories, our books, our things—they are who we are, and they 
are important and not to be thrown away and forgotten like trash that is no longer 
needed.   
Policy must attend to the possibility of the elderly by opening up the space for them 
to find courage to change what can be changed for the better.  This kind of care is the 
way in which we honor time’s passing as an opportunity for the live creature to live.  It 
is the way we honor the live, aged creature as worthy of the entire journey.   
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION: PHILOSOPHICAL GLEANINGS 
 
Then Creole stepped forward to remind them that what they were playing was 
the blues. He hit something in all of them, he hit something in me, myself, and 
the music tightened and deepened, apprehension began to beat the air.  Creole 
began to tell us what the blues were all about.  They were not about anything 
very new.  He and his boys up there were keeping it new, at the risk of ruin, 
destruction, madness, and death, in order to find new ways to make us listen.  
For, while the tale of how we suffer, and how we are delighted, and how we 
may triumph is never new, it always must be heard.  There isn’t any other tale 
to tell, it’s the only light we’ve got in all this darkness. 
James Baldwin, “Sonny’s Blues” 237 
The message to be heard here is not that there is nothing new under the sun.  Quite the 
opposite: novelty is everywhere, even in the ruins of the past, even in the weary eyes and 
ravaged bodies of the aged.  Although “the tale of how we suffer, and how we are 
delighted, and how we may triumph is never new,” as Baldwin shares with his readers, it 
is our task to keep it new for ourselves and others by telling it, writing it, singing it, 
playing it, over and over again, in as many ways as we are able.   Novelty is found in this 
struggle to keep it new; it is in the struggle that our suffering, our joys, and our triumphs 
speak to us and give us new meaning and new purpose, like light in the darkness.  
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And the message to be heard here, even with light in the darkness and even at the 
end of this dissertation, is not that we now have solved the problem, banished 
ontological and epistemic uncertainty and confusion, tied it all together, and that we can 
now thus live peacefully.  For, in the words of Walt Whitman,  
The press of my foot to the earth springs a hundred affections, 
They scorn the best I can do to relate them.  (part 14.10-11)    
Possibility means that the question is always open, that all answers are hypotheses and 
are thus by their nature, perhaps uncomfortably, tentative.  There is no right answer, at 
least, not for us, not in time, because the world itself is always in the making.  There is 
only the trying to find the answers.  And this is why the trying is more important than the 
provisional answers that we come to.  Therefore, the claim that there are no answers 
does not mean that we have given up the search, the soul and allure of philosophy.  It 
means, quite differently, that the search must always go on, like the blues that must 
always be played.    
Furthermore, the claim that the search must always go on is not the claim that we 
are not making progress.  We have made progress in this dissertation, and we are always 
making progress, provided we are live creatures on the qui vive, ready to run the risks of 
uncertainty.  Note well, however:  Progress does not mean that we getting closer to 
“getting it right.”  Progress means that, as time passes, we affectively undergo our 
experiences such that we continuously find our “place” in the world.  “Place” should not 
be read as a static noun but rather as a process; perhaps “placing” would be more apt.  
“Placing,” then, is a rhythm:  It is a rhythm of experiences, old and new, woven and then 
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rewoven into a relational fabric from which we draw courage to keep on living, to keep 
on making a somewhere in the nowhere.   
If philosophy is a way of life, then pragmatists are often accused of taking the quick 
and easy way.  Claiming non-omniscience, pragmatists abandon questions of ultimate 
meaning, and they limit their inquiries to differences and effects, like scientists who 
draw conclusions only after so much data.  They then always reserve the right to change 
their minds wholesale if the data change, now more like capricious lovers who have 
problems with commitment.  Pragmatists’ faith in God, some accuse, is too much akin to 
Pascal’s Wager—dispassionate and calculating, based on the belief’s pragmatic 
consequences, and, again, always with room for blasphemous uncertainty.   
 A response:  This is a misconception of pragmatism.  A belief, even a belief in God, 
must be lived if the belief is to have any depth.  A belief does not come first in the form 
of the question, Does God exist?—and next in the form of an answer, yes or no.  It is 
much different than this:  Belief comes first in the form of the question about a need—
What do I need in my life?—and, if the answer is that I need to live in relation with God, 
then we have the foundation for belief.  God then becomes part of the way that we move 
through the world.  Pragmatism does not objectively investigate beliefs outside of the 
way we experience those beliefs.  Indeed, beliefs consist precisely in the way we 
experience them; this is what makes beliefs so intimate, so wrapped up in our living.  
Beliefs are truly affective outpourings of our existence, not merely propositions whose 
truth values are under consideration.  For those who still balk at any individual basis for 
beliefs, consider the words of Kierkegaard.  
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When one man investigates objectively the problem of immortality, and 
another embraces an uncertainty with the passion of the infinite: where is there 
most truth, and who has the greater certainty?  The one who has entered upon a 
never-ending approximation, for the certainty of immortality lies precisely in 
the subjectivity of the individual; the other is immortal, and fights for his 
immortality by struggling with the uncertainty.  (“Truth”115) 
This dissertation, firmly rooted in existentialist and pragmatist sensibilities, has 
explored the ways in which we view the elderly in Chapter II; the ways in which we 
experience aging, including aging as both physical and ontological decay and aging as 
growth, in Chapter III; aging as it relates to death and aging under the auspices of a 
canopy of ultimate explanation in Chapter IV; and, finally, policies that concern the aged 
in Chapter V.  The main hypothesis that has been put forth is that we should live our 
lives on the qui vive, even in old age, and that this is aging at its best.  If, in old age, we 
continue to make a somewhere in the nowhere, then time becomes the vehicle for self 
transformation—not merely the vehicle for decay.   
A final illustration may prove helpful.  In his Studies in Iconology, Erwin Panofsky 
traces the development of the Father Time image in the ancient world.  Panofsky 
explains that there were two concepts of time at work in the Father Time image: kairos 
and the Iranian concept, aion.  Panofsky elaborates that kairos is the “brief, decisive 
moment which marks a turning point in the life of human beings or the development of 
the universe” (71).  Kairos is characterized by “symbols of fleeting speed and precarious 
balance” (73).  Aion, Panofsky continues, is the “divine principle of eternal and 
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exhaustible creativeness” (72) and is characterized by “symbols of universal power and 
infinite fertility” (73).  It is fascinating, as Panofsky notes, that neither of these two 
conceptions of time in the Father Time image symbolize decay and destruction.  Simply 
stated, then, it has been the chief aim of the dissertation to reinstate this ancient 
conviction that time’s passing can mean creation, not decomposition and organic death. 
  Who knows what a new day might bring?  Aging in old age can and should 
proceed with novel meaning and significance, every day.  The individual in John Keats’ 
musings, below, is defined not by number of years but by purpose. 
I go among the Fields and catch a glimpse of a Stoat or a fieldmouse peeping 
 out of the withered grass—the creature hath a purpose, and its eyes are bright  
with it. I go amongst the buildings of a city and I see a Man hurrying along—to 
what? the Creature has  a purpose and his eyes are bright with it.  (363) 
Aging is a retrospective and prospective exploration of us and the world that fuels a 
purpose; each and every day, until the end of our days, may our eyes be bright with it.  
In the words of the poet T.S. Eliot, 
Old men ought to be explorers 
Here and there does not matter 
We must be still and still moving 
Into another intensity 
For a further union, a deeper communion 
Through the dark cold and the empty desolation.  . . .  
   In my end is my beginning.  (129) 
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T.S. Eliot’s contentions and this dissertation are not Pollyanna caricatures of reality, 
which are devoid of the cacophonic, very real characteristics of our day-to-day lives as 
well as the great suffering most of us endure episodically throughout our lives.  This, 
instead, is the rhetoric of courage, strength, and endurance, in the midst of utter, 
ontological confusion and disarray.  This is the pedagogy of how to make the journey, 
especially when the journey is agonizing and dolorous.  It is not an effort to “look on the 
bright side,” to “make lemonade,” or to “count blessings.”  Instead, it is an effort to live 
life intensely, with purpose, and in spiritual communion with others.  
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